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Committee

Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict- Affected States: DRC and Rwanda

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Volume II

Additional written evidence

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The International Development Committee

The International Development Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Office of the Secretary of State for International Development.

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Written evidence from ActionAid

ACTIONAID UK

ActionAid is an international development organisation which works in more than 45 countries worldwide to help end poverty and bring about long-term, sustainable change—decided upon by communities themselves. Our international themes of work include women’s rights; the right to education; the right to food; the right to human security during conflicts and emergencies; the right to a life of dignity in the face of HIV and AIDS; and the right to just and democratic governance.

In the UK, ActionAid UK helps to achieve ActionAid International (AAI)’s mission through raising money for development programmes, and advocating and campaigning to secure rights and justice for poor and excluded people. ActionAid UK also houses AAI’s human security work, coordinating our interventions in conflicts and emergencies.

As women’s rights are a priority for ActionAid, our work on conflict and emergencies focuses on women’s empowerment.

WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

The UK has a strong record of intervention in fragile and conflict-affected countries, supporting conflict prevention and poverty reduction. ActionAid welcomes the commitment to continue to focus on fragile and conflict-affected countries and to increase the UK’s support to conflict prevention and poverty reduction. The most effective of these interventions will recognise the central role of women in building sustainable peace, why addressing women’s rights and tackling violence against women is key to ending conflict, and include gender equality as a strategic goal:

- Empirical evidence has been developing since the late 1990s which demonstrates the link between gender equality and lower levels of involvement in violent conflict.¹
- There is also ample evidence documenting how violence against women is used to destabilise communities and fuel conflicts.²
- Violence against women impoverishes individual women, as well as their families, communities and countries. It drains public resources, undermines human capital and lowers economic productivity.³ Even the most conservative estimates measure the national costs of violence against women and girls in the billions of dollars—anywhere from one to two billion, to over eight billion US dollars depending on the methodologies used.⁴ Costs at household level are also significant. A recent study in Uganda found that the average cost to a household per incidence of violence is US\$5. This is significant given Uganda’s per capita gross national income is only US\$340.⁵ It is simply not possible to end poverty without tackling violence against women.

Involving women in peace and governance processes and tackling gender inequality as a core development, diplomatic and defence objective therefore makes sense. This has been recognised by the United Nations through the adoption of Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820, and by the UK Government in its development of a National Action Plan (NAP) on UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security and the appointment of Lynne Featherstone MP as Champion on Violence Against Women and Girls Overseas. UN Women has also identified women, peace and security as one of its top strategic issues moving forward.

Successful approaches to preventing conflict and reducing poverty in fragile and conflict affected states benefit from aligning foreign affairs, defence and development policies to promote women’s rights. A priority focus on women’s rights across the UK’s international agenda would help to ensure delivery on development is not put in competition with or undermined by other important global agendas. Ideally, it would become standard for the UK to be expected, globally and amongst other governments and donors, to lead with women’s rights in all its international work.

¹ See for example: Caprioli, Mary (2003) Gender Equality and Civil Wars, CPR Working Paper No. 8, World Bank <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-1111996036679/20482367/WP8trxtsep3.pdf>; Caprioli, M “Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict.” *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (2), p.161–178.

² ActionAid (2010) *Destined to fail? How violence against women is undoing development*: http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/destined_to_fail.pdf

³ UN (2006) *In-depth study on all forms of violence against women: Report of the Secretary-General*.

⁴ Day, Tanis; McKenna, Katherine and Bowlus, Audra (2005) *The economic costs of violence against women: an evaluation of the literature. Expert brief compiled in preparation for the Secretary-General’s in-depth study on all forms of violence against women*: <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/expert%20brief%20costs.pdf>

⁵ International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) and United National Population Fund (UNFPA) (2009) *Intimate partner violence: high costs to households and communities*.

Recommendations for the UK Government:

- Make ending violence against women a foreign policy priority, core to promoting peace and security globally.
- Ensure the Champion on Violence Against Women and Girls Overseas has the authority and resources to make an impact on UK government policy and on the ground.
- Embed and integrate the objectives of the NAP across all relevant government departments and the National Security Council by:
 - Making explicit reference to the women, peace and security agenda in the UK's international work, including in DFID's work.
 - Recognising the central role of women in building sustainable peace in diplomatic, development and defence work.
 - Including gender equality as a strategic goal in the UK's work in fragile and conflict-affected states.
- Support UN Women on its agenda by providing at least £21 million in core funding, which equates to the amount previously allocated to UNICEF, an agency with an ambition and delivery model akin to UN Women.⁶

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS

Violence against women and girls has been specifically identified as a significant security issue in conflict situations through UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820. A Special Representative on sexual violence in armed conflict was also recently created by the Security Council. Despite this, violence against women and girls, especially sexual violence, remains widespread during and after conflicts.

One reason for this is that violence against women and girls during conflict is not being treated for its fundamental role in fuelling conflict. That is, violence against women and girls during conflict continues to be seen as a parallel rather than intrinsic security issue. This is in spite of Resolution 1820, which specifically treats sexual violence as a distinct security issue that requires a security response.

A second reason is the failure to see violence against women and girls in conflict in the context of huge power inequalities between women and men that exist in times of both peace and war. The reality is that failing to address sexual violence in conflict undermines efforts to end conflict and build peace.

It is clear that the UK Government is increasingly committed to addressing violence against women and girls. Indeed, in its bilateral aid review, it made strong mention of its intent to strengthen justice systems and other channels where women can seek redress. The DRC was highlighted for this work in particular. However ActionAid is concerned that this intent is not being followed through. For example, in the initial headline results framework for the DRC, the focus is primarily on the provision of basic services, and very little attention is paid to the harder-to-measure indicators needed to address violence against women and girls. In order to adequately evaluate DFID's real progress on addressing violence against women and girls in the DRC, its results framework needs to include SMART indicators directly related to tackling violence against women and girls.

Recommendations for the UK Government:

- Speak out against the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, and work within the international community to end impunity.
- Building on recent successes with all-female units, ensure that women are represented in peace-keeping forces in increased and significant numbers, and that such forces receive adequate training on sexual violence against women and girls.⁷
- Prioritise tackling gender inequality and violence against women and girls in all development programmes, not just in conflict situations.
- Ensure that funding for security and justice programmes specifically includes long-term support for women survivors of violence and the organisations that support them, with an emphasis on access to justice.

⁶ Gender and Development Network (2010), *UN Women: A New Opportunity to Deliver for Women*: <http://www.gadnetwork.org.uk/un-women-a-new-opportunity-to/GADN%20UN%20Women%20Policy%20Paper.pdf>

⁷ UN (2010) *Ten-year Impact Study on Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security in Peacekeeping. Final Report to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support*: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/10year_impact_study_1325.pdf

- Ensure that country-specific results frameworks include KPIs and indicators so that DFID's progress on tackling violence against women and girls can be assessed.

UK NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON UNSCR 1325 WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY

The National Action Plan for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (NAP) provides a framework to ensure 1325 is incorporated into the UK Government's work on conflict in defence, diplomatic and development activity.

The FCO, MOD and DFID have all made commitments to further the implementation of SCR 1325 in conflict policy through training, programmes and operations commitments. Country plans have also been developed initially in Afghanistan, DRC and Nepal as well as a commitment to provide political support to strengthen implementation of 1325 by multilateral and regional organisations such as the UN, EU and NATO.

The NAP is due to be reviewed internally in August 2011 resulting in a progress report to Parliament in October 2011.

Recommendations for the UK Government:

- Use the NAP to integrate a gendered understanding of conflict which recognises the different impact of conflict on women and men in all UK analysis of conflict-affected and potential conflict areas and the planning of interventions in conflict and fragile states.

CHAMPION ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS OVERSEAS

The Champion on Violence Against Women and Girls Overseas provides a mechanism for coordination across government on women, peace and security. However, to be effective the post must be appropriately resourced and given the authority to ensure coherence across the international departments.

Recommendations for the UK Government:

- Establish formal mechanisms to ensure the Champion influences all relevant Government agendas, including discussions in the National Security Council and DFID's work on fragile and conflict-affected states.

CROSS-GOVERNMENT COORDINATION

There are a number of parallel processes that influence the UK's work in fragile and conflict-affected states.

The Government has recently developed or consulted on a number of relevant strategies:

1. The Cross-Government Violence against Women and Girls Strategy—led by the Home Office.
2. The DFID Gender Strategy.
3. The implementation of the 1325 NAP—led by FCO.
4. Building Stability Overseas Strategy—led by the FCO.

Policy coherence between these different strategies will ensure greater impact. Efficiencies can also be achieved through sharing knowledge, best practice and considering joint mechanisms for implementation and monitoring.

The National Security Council meanwhile plays a strategic role across the whole of the UK Government's international agenda which influences how different strategies are implemented and delivered at departmental level.

The NAP requires a Cross Whitehall group (comprised of FCO, DFID, MOD and Stabilisation Unit) to meet quarterly to coordinate the Government's activity and progress against the NAP. This group can be used as a mechanism to inform and monitor the development of the Government's work on conflict and fragile states in defence, diplomatic and development activity.

Recommendations for the UK Government:

- Ensure a member of the National Security Council has explicit responsibility for women, peace and security to ensure gender perspectives are taken into account in all discussions.
- Clarify lines of responsibility within government departments including the appointment of senior staff to champion women's rights in each of the international departments (following the DFID model of gender champions).
- Ensure responsibility for implementation of the NAP sits with senior civil servants.

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- Clearly stipulate how the Cross Whitehall group coordinating the Government's activity and progress against the NAP on 1325 could be used as a mechanism to inform and monitor the integration of a gender perspective into all UK defence, diplomatic and development activity.

BUILDING THE EVIDENCE-BASE

Within the NAP on SCR 1325, the UK Government has committed to commission research on gender and conflict. Research gaps identified in the NAP include SSR, security and justice, stabilisation, impact of conflict and effective female participation in peacebuilding.

The findings of this research will be crucial to inform the future development of the UK's foreign, defence and development policy. A commitment to increase the UK's support to conflict prevention and poverty reduction therefore needs to include the allocation of resources to research to develop an evidence base and to ensure policy is informed by lessons learnt and best practice.

Recommendations for the UK Government:

- Deliver on the commitment to further research on women and conflict made in the NAP so that foreign, defence and development policy continues to be informed by a robust evidence base and lessons learnt on women, peace and security.

WOMEN'S INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN DECISION MAKING AND PEACEBUILDING

Key to building stability overseas is the participation of women in all decision-making and peace processes—as the evidence cited above informs us. Yet over the past 25 years, only one in forty peace agreement signatories have been women. The UK's interventions in fragile and conflicted-affected states will be most successful where they think long term and include the needs, skills and experiences of the whole of society.⁸

It is helpful to draw on lessons learned by international actors, donors and fragile states themselves about what works best in these environments. Within this, a dedicated focus on the experiences of women, whose voices are often absent from key decision-making positions within international institutions, donors and national governments, will provide new and telling insights for generating real and lasting peace. Evidence shows what a difference it makes when women play a central role in building sustainable peace through their participation in peace negotiations and governance processes.⁹

Many women are actively blocked, through violence against them for example, from participating in their communities, politics and in taking decisions in leadership positions. Women's participation in the community and politics during and post conflict should not incur a penalty; women should not have to trade their rights to freedom, dignity, personal security or life in order to influence the decisions that affect them.

Recommendations for the UK Government:

- Establish how the UK will support women's meaningful participation in local, provincial and national politics and peace processes through the FCO, DFID and the MoD.
- Link the objectives for UK diplomatic, defence and development interventions to outcomes on women's political empowerment by ensuring that women's political leadership is championed, supported and invested in as a key performance indicator (KPI) of these departments' work and particularly in conflict settings, ensuring that women are involved in peace negotiations.
- Directly support women's organisations to get their voices heard with key decision-makers nationally and internationally.

ACTIONAID'S EXPERIENCE: ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR WOMEN (AJW)

ActionAid is working to ensure women in conflict/post-conflict contexts have access to justice. The two AJW projects currently being implemented by ActionAid cover seven African countries: Somaliland, Liberia, Uganda, Nigeria, Burundi, DRC and Uganda. The project works to enhance the capacity of affected women to advocate for access to justice through sensitising women, traditional leaders and communities on legal rights; providing legal aid clinics and working with women's organisations to educate women on their legal rights; and analysis of customary law with a view to making it more sensitive to the needs and rights of women and girls. The project also works to increase supply of justice for women by bringing about pro-women government policies, judicial system reform and changes in cultural practices at national, local and community levels. This includes advocacy on legal rights for women (including CEDAW, the Maputo Protocol, and UN Resolutions

⁸ See for example *SCR 1325 and Women's Participation: Operational Guidelines for Conflict Resolution and Peace Processes*, Initiative on Quiet Diplomacy, 2010; *What the Women Say: Participation and UNSCR 1325: A Case Study Assessment by the International Civil Society Action Network and the MIT Center for International Studies*, 2010.

⁹ UNIFEM (2002) *Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-Building*; Jennifer F. Klot (2007) 'Women and Peacebuilding': <http://www.un.org/peace/peacebuilding/Working%20Group%20on%20Lessons%20Learned/WGLLbackgroundpaper%2029.01.08.pdf>

1325, 1820, 1860 and 1888) and facilitation of capacity building trainings and workshops for judicial institutions in order to enhance women and girls' access to justice.¹⁰

July 2011

Written evidence from CARE International UK

CARE International UK is pleased to contribute to this inquiry. CARE is at the forefront of efforts by the humanitarian and development sector to work more effectively in and on conflict. This includes our leading role in the BOND Conflict Policy working group, the DFID-funded Conflict Sensitivity Consortium and a European Commission-funded 19-agency effort to improve peace-building impact.

This submission is drawn from CARE's experience in over 70 countries around the world, including from programmes we are supporting in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi. Some of the recommendations are however of wider relevance. This submission covers the following areas:

1. Aid delivery in fragile states
2. Civil military relations

Development Issues to consider in fragile states:

3. The relationship between peace-making and peace-building (**Burundi**)
4. Reintegration and Rehabilitation of ex combatants (**DRC**)
5. Women and state building (Lessons from **Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda**)
6. A focus on "results"

1. Aid delivery in fragile states

There is no doubt that development makes important contributions to the promotion of stability and security abroad, and thus indirectly contributes to security in the UK. However, the linkage between national security and development policy must be carefully framed or it risks undermining the very basis for safe and effective delivery of aid.

Experience under the Bush administration provides salutary lessons. During that period, US aid policy, funding and the role of USAID were reframed in terms of a National Security Strategy and counter-terror objectives. These shifts contributed to undermining the credibility of US assistance in the eyes of both host governments and, more importantly, local populations and armed groups in aid recipient countries. Many of CARE's staff reported a decrease in local acceptance of US assistance, and by extension, of the NGOs known to be implementing partners of the US government. These trends compromised their safety and security, resulting in attacks on our staff and assets in some instances, and the withdrawal of programmes in some regions of conflict-affected countries, including Somalia and Pakistan.

A CARE programme on youth employment and empowerment in the Sahel region provides one example. As part of the national security agenda, US government responsibility for funding this programme was transferred from USAID to the US Department for Defence under its Trans-Sahel Counter-Terror budget, and the budget and contracts were reframed in terms of counter-terror objectives. This meant that CARE was no longer able to explain the programme to the local community recipients, as framing the project in this way was not acceptable to them. As a consequence, CARE was forced to end the programme and our good work and relations with the community, including the intended beneficiaries—poor, marginalised and disaffected youths—were undermined.

CARE recognises the importance of coherence within government. However, coordination between DFID and other government departments should be framed in. Humanitarian and development efforts, especially in contexts affected by instability, are complex and politically sensitive. For this reason, DFID's mandate and lead role in UK aid policy should be maintained and remain distinct from UK national security agendas.

2. Civil-military relations

Whilst not of direct relation to the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda, the UK's current approach to civil-military relations is important to consider given the desire of the Stabilisation Unit to enhance its ability to play a preventive role—the beginnings of which are suggested by the first deployment of a "Stabilisation Response Team" (SRT) to Libya.

CARE recognises the important contribution that military forces can make in providing assistance and protection to civilians affected by violence. To this end, we have invested considerably in promoting effective dialogue and, in some contexts, coordination and cooperation, with military forces. However, these efforts must always be carefully managed and communicated. The basis on which CARE and other NGOs can operate safely and effectively in conflict-affected countries is carefully negotiated community acceptance. For this

¹⁰ For personal testimonials from women involved in some of ActionAid's projects violence against women and girls in conflict situations, please see ActionAid (2010) *Her stories*: http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/her_stories_-_case_studies_from_actionaids_violence_against_women_project.pdf

reason, it is critical that we maintain our independence, impartiality and distinction from military forces and any political agendas tied to the conflict.

Dialogue and coordination does not require integration. NGOs should not be declared part of any “unity of effort” under the Comprehensive Approach. Separation between the military and NGOs should be clearly articulated in policy, funding and any public communications which might be monitored by parties to the conflict, for example in Afghanistan. There is a huge contrast in the vast numbers of military staff dedicated to civil-military coordination (CIMIC) in comparison to the negligible capacity on the humanitarian, and especially NGO, side. DFID should provide funding to fill this gap so that NGOs with current operational experience in conflict affected countries can engage in pre-deployment trainings and exercises, as well as dialogue at the policy and operational levels.

DEVELOPMENT ISSUES TO CONSIDER IN FRAGILE STATES

3. The relationship between peace-making and peace building

The UK government has an interest in ensuring that a stronger relationship between peace-making and peace-building is secured, not least because of the high costs of sustaining lengthy peacekeeping operations or military interventions. Too often however, high level political and military processes are not inclusive of the views of the wider population. Whilst this might be necessary in moments of crisis, longer term stability requires the establishment of more inclusive settlements.

Grassroots level peacebuilding initiatives, such as the “Peace Clubs” supported by CARE in Burundi, have had some success in preventing communal level violence, particularly during electoral periods and during the return of IDPs and others (including previous perpetrators of violence within those communities) in the years following the formal peace agreement. The “Peace Clubs” focus on developing skills within the community to mediate in local conflicts, such as land disputes, to link with local authorities and to foster reconciliation between people from different sides of the conflict. However, these local level initiatives suffer from not being fed into national level peace processes. In addition, the funding required to sustain long term peace building efforts is often not available in the years following a peace agreement.

Linking grassroots efforts with national or regional peace efforts should be recognised as a priority for HMG and there should be closer coordination between DFID and FCO on the relationship between peace-making and peace-building more broadly. In programme terms peace-building should be identified as a priority for the conflict pools to try to secure a more holistic response by HMG.

4. Reintegration and reinsertion of ex combatants

CARE is a multi-mandate agency delivering both humanitarian and development programmes across conflict and post-conflict phases. Over time, our programmes often evolve from basic life-saving assistance to programmes that support livelihoods, such as small-scale income generation projects, micro-credit and village savings and loans associations.

As part of these recovery efforts, we have worked to address the reintegration and reinsertion of ex-combatants. A key challenge remains the short-term nature of funding for such interventions, especially as donors shift their funding from humanitarian programmes delivered through NGOs to bilateral development grants to national governments. For example, in DRC, CARE is one of the main partners of UNDP’s reintegration programme for ex-combatants, many of them children. The funding currently available through this programme only allows CARE to support its beneficiaries for up to six months with vocational skills training and a basic “reinsertion package”. In several contexts, staff have also underlined the challenges arising from the political approach pursued by national governments, who emphasise reintegration as a process of disarmament, subjugation and asserting state authority, with inadequate attention on addressing the stigma confronting ex-combatants and their longer-term needs.

Based on this experience, CARE believes that reintegration and reinsertion programmes should be planned over a longer period spanning from one to five years. The initial phase should centre on immediate resettlement needs, including psychosocial support and reconciliation initiatives, while later phases would focus on sustainable, context appropriate and market-informed skills development, including mentoring. This approach should be complemented by wider macro-economic policies, educational sector reforms, legal reforms and targeted efforts that can stimulate job creation by the government and private sector to absorb skilled ex-combatants. All of the above requires increased and longer-term funding, and partnership with experienced non-governmental agencies as well as government and UN partners, to ensure the sustainable integration of ex-combatants into civilian life.

5. Women in state-building

CARE believes strongly that protecting and empowering women in conflict and fragile states is essential to securing more sustainable peace. UN statistics have made it clear—since 1992 only 2% of women have been engaged in peace negotiations.

CARE is currently delivering a three year gender based violence advocacy project in the Great Lakes region (Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda) to empower women to hold their governments to account and provide support to victims of sexual violence. Initial findings show that the women who have become involved in influencing policy makers at the local and national levels on these issues are those that are already engaged in economic activities or part of other CARE supported village savings and loans schemes. This clearly suggests that strengthening women's access to economic opportunities will also improve their ability to have a voice in peacemaking. In Burundi, 20% of households are female headed due to their husbands not returning after war. However, legally women are prevented from inheriting land, often making them economically dependent on male relatives. Livelihoods programmes need to go hand in hand with supporting programmes that enable women to secure their rights and lobby for an end to discriminatory laws and practices.

The high levels of impunity for sexual violence in the region require that security and justice reforms must be focussed on trying to ensure better access to justice for women. In Uganda for example CARE has found that women's physical distance from the police and health services are major obstacles in bringing cases to court. (In addition again because land is mostly owned by men women chose not to bring their husbands to court if they have been abused.) The UN's "mobile courts" being trialled in DRC to decrease levels of impunity for rape survivors are one model that DFID might consider further supporting.

The UK government published its revised tri departmental "National Action Plan on Women Peace and Security" last December. It clearly sets out how the UK intends to use its defence, diplomacy and development policies to protect women from violence and empower them to participate in conflict resolution. CARE believes that if the commitments in the report are to be implemented and improved by the time the NAP is reviewed this Autumn, that greater senior level buy-in across the three departments is required.

6. Defining "results" in conflict

CARE welcomes the renewed emphasis placed by this government on achieving and demonstrating the results of international assistance. We have invested considerably in piloting new initiatives and measurement techniques in conflict-settings and gathering lessons to inform our work and that of peer agencies and donors. CARE currently manages an inter-agency project on peace building evaluation, involving International Alert and local agencies, in Nepal, Uganda and DRC, piloting innovative but simple approaches to their monitoring and evaluation. The tools developed as a result of this project will assist civil society actors and governments and contribute to a body of knowledge on measuring peace building impact. One obvious challenge is that some of the most important contributions of our programmes to peace, stability and recovery are not tangible, physical outputs that can be easily captured with quantitative measures. We caution against an overemphasis on such indicators of progress in stabilisation efforts.

CARE also coordinates the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, comprising 35 agencies in the UK, Kenya, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka. From this consortium and our internal work at CARE, we have developed innovative approaches to ensuring interventions in unstable environments are sensitive to their effects on the underlying conflict. DFID funding and policy should recognise that while "Do No Harm" is an easy slogan to cite, it requires dedicated resources and time to be implemented effectively. From a value for money perspective, by investing in strong organisational processes with built-in conflict-sensitive approaches, DFID will contribute to maximising the impact and sustainability of aid interventions. DFID should also build on existing multi-donor Processes to promote conflict sensitivity, such as the multi-donor evaluations of Implementation of the OECD DAC principles on good international engagement in fragile states. DFID should consider how the UK can promote conflict sensitivity not only for aid programmes but also other government-sponsored interventions in fragile countries. Other government departments, such as the MOD and DTI, should also assess how the methodologies developed through conflict sensitive approaches can inform their own efforts.

September 2011

Written evidence from Christian Aid

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Christian Aid is a Christian organization that insists the world can and must be swiftly changed to one where everyone can live a full life, free from poverty. We work globally in over 40 countries for profound change that eradicates the causes of poverty, striving to achieve equality, dignity and freedom for all, regardless of faith or nationality. We are part of a wider movement for social justice. We provide urgent, practical and effective assistance where need is great, tackling the effects of poverty as well as its root causes.

1.2 Christian Aid's programmes in DRC, Rwanda and Burundi (the "Great Lakes region") began in the 1960s, supporting churches in Rwanda to meet the needs of rural communities. Today we work in all three countries, supporting our local partners' efforts to tackle the underlying causes of poverty and instability. ==

1.3 We welcome this opportunity to provide written evidence on "Working Effectively in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States". We have included specific recommendations for UK government (HMG) action in their bilateral and multilateral aid programmes, and in their diplomatic efforts in the Great Lakes. In responding

to your call for evidence, we have identified areas where HMG could increase policy coherence, both cross-government and in the interest of achieving a coherent, conflict-sensitive approach across the Great Lakes region. We have also identified priorities for HMG in each country.

2. STATE FRAGILITY AND DEVELOPMENT: THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

2.1 The Great Lakes region continues to suffer the consequences of conflict and political upheaval. Millions of civilian lives have been lost as a consequence of war and genocide since the early 1990s. The conflict in the DRC is the most deadly since the Second World War. Today there are over two million Internally Displaced People (IDPs) across the three countries and hundreds of thousands of refugees.ⁱ

2.2 The eastern provinces of DRC remain volatile owing to the ongoing presence of various local and foreign armed groups and the massive deployment of the ill-disciplined and abusive Congolese Army (FARDC). The FARDC is composed of former rebel and militia groups. Soldiers receive their salaries at best irregularly and lack proper training and equipment. The army is abusive, its effectiveness constrained by endemic corruption, the involvement of the army in the mining sector and the existence of parallel chains of command.

2.3 The region as a whole has suffered from chronic political instability over the years, and is still emerging from decades of authoritarian and unaccountable rule. All three countries have experienced extreme domestic political violence and have seen attacks on politicians, journalists and civil society leaders alike, as well as mass civilian killings. Increasing democratic space, state accountability and promoting participatory citizenship are central for achieving long term stability and should become top priority for DFID's work in the region.

2.4 A strong civil society, empowered citizenry and improved state-citizen accountability, supported by a clear consistent long term strategy by external partners, are key for lasting stability peace in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi. As Secretary of State Andrew Mitchell has pointed out: "Building an accountable state means putting the development of inclusive politics at the very heart of our response".ⁱⁱ

2.5 In this context, as a major bilateral donor and diplomatic actor in the region, the UK has an important role to play in helping address state fragility, improve security and avoid renewed conflict in the Great Lakes. Crucially, this requires not only effective aid delivery, but also policy coherence across HMG to address the underlying political and economic drivers of poverty and instability. This must include effective bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and measures to address capital flight and tax avoidance.

3. ADDRESSING STATE FRAGILITY AND INSECURITY IN THE GREAT LAKES—SOME GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR UK POLICY RESPONSE

3.1 HMG must recognise and reinforce international human rights law in all its actions and in its support to the DRC, Burundi and Rwandan governments. HMG should identify strategies to support these states to reinforce the rule of law and support peace building. Specific suggestions on how this can be achieved are set out below.

3.2 In addressing insecurity and supporting sustainable development in the Great Lakes region, HMG should take account of all interests, including the local, national and regional political settlement. This requires a realistic and conflict-sensitive long-term engagement.

3.3 HMG must have clear, integrated strategies for capacity building in the Great Lakes for economic and social development and the creation of strong, accountable institutions in the interests of ensuring long-term stability.

3.4 At the same time HMG should recognise that stability alone is not automatically a good thing. The perceived short-term benefits of providing support to authoritarian governments may lead to long-term costs. DFID should consider carefully whether, and in what forms, aid should be delivered to authoritarian states to meet the long-term interests of poor citizens. HMG should develop special strategies for its interactions with such states and support societal structures that can check authoritarian tendencies, especially civil society organisations (CSOs) and independent media.

3.5 HMG should recognise that stable and inclusive states, in which citizens are able to hold their governments to account, provide the best environments for peace and poverty eradication and are most capable of coping with shocks, whether conflicts or natural disasters. HMG's analysis of the threats to peace and security in the Great Lakes region should include the impact of economic, social and political inequalities and marginalisation that can create a sense of injustice and grievances that can be easily manipulated by insurgent groups.

3.6 In addition, HMG should promote international measures to ensure that UK and global companies are not undermining poverty reduction goals by maximising their profits through negotiating tax exemptions, skewed profit sharing arrangements, or cutting corners on property rights, human rights, environmental and labour standards.

3.7 HMG must always condemn actions that violate international human rights and humanitarian law whether by state or non-state actors. However, dialogue with groups who have used violence to try to achieve change is also necessary. The difficulties and sensitivities in engaging with "illegal" groups whose ideologies and

tactics may be abhorrent are not underestimated. Nevertheless, as the UK learnt regarding Northern Ireland, trying to forge peace without them is unlikely to be successful.

4. A COHERENT REGIONAL APPROACH TO PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE GREAT LAKES

4.1 The region's history shows us that domestic strife and instability in one country can spill-over and affect neighboring states, given porous borders and cross-border dynamics. By the same measure, positive spillover is also possible. All three countries have a long way to go in improving state-citizen relations and increasing the voice of citizens.

4.2 DFID should support civil society organizations (CSOs) to strengthen the voice and participation of civilians who have suffered from insecurity, but who remain key change agents, resilient in building a just future. A coherent regional approach to state building must include support to civil society and not only state institutions.

4.3 DFID's prioritization of civil society strengthening in the DRC, as part of its stabilization strategy is welcome. This approach should be extended to Rwanda and Burundi.

4.4 The UK is the largest bilateral donor to Rwanda, but has invested relatively little in supporting CSOs as key development actors. DFID is working mainly with the state through direct budget support. DFID should draw from its programmes in DRC and invest in mechanisms to support Rwandan civil society.

4.5 *Support Burundian development, reconstruction and peace building efforts as an essential part of a coherent regional approach.* If Burundi's post-conflict stabilization process falters this would have implications for both DRC and Rwanda. HMG should safeguard its investment in the region by maintaining a bilateral development programme to help respond to the enormous needs and challenges Burundi faces.

4.6 *DFID should review its recent decision to end bilateral aid to Burundi and invest in funding mechanisms to enable poor Burundians to benefit from UK aid.* Christian Aid will provide further detail in our submission for the IDC's inquiry on "The closure of DFID's aid programme in Burundi".

4.7 *Beyond aid, HMG should use its influence and engage in effective bilateral and multilateral diplomatic efforts to consolidate peace and better governance.* All countries of the region are signatories to international human rights commitments—HMG should support the region to uphold their commitments and make progress in building accountable governance.

4.8 It is regrettable that neither Burundi nor Rwanda were included in the "Countries of Concern" section of the Foreign & Commonwealth Office's Human Rights and Democracy report for 2010, in spite of worrying developments in both countries during the period in question. That the DRC was included but not the other two countries indicates that HMG lacks a coherent approach to democracy and human rights in the region. FCO should include all three countries in future reports and make clear its commitment to human rights and democracy in Rwanda and Burundi, as well as DRC.

4.9 As a matter of urgency, the UK should urge for an appointment to be made to fill the EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes role.

4.10 HMG should help protect civil society space so that civil society and media can play their role as a citizen-based counterweight as follows: (i) work with EU partners to agree a common plan for the implementation of the EU Guidelines for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders in Rwanda and Burundi. This has already been done in DRC by the UK and other EC delegations and this good practice should be replicated in neighbouring countries; (ii) help end impunity for attacks and threats against civil society actors and journalists by always pressing for the perpetrators to be identified and brought to justice; and (iii) put in place an emergency fund for human rights activists and their families, aimed at assisting them in situations of immediate risk and following an assault.

5. STRENGTHENING STATE JUSTICE AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONS AND ADDRESSING REGIONAL CROSS-BORDER SECURITY CONCERNS AND CONFLICT SYSTEMS

5.1 As discussed above, HMG should develop a coherent approach to human rights and democracy in the region. This is a key means of addressing the underlying drivers of instability and avoiding renewed conflict in future. In addition, the UK should promote more effective security sector reform in the DRC and increased investment in community-led voluntary demobilisation and repatriation programmes.

5.2 HMG should increase the coordination and effectiveness of UK, EU and UN security sector reform initiatives. It should co-ordinate diplomatic efforts to garner Congolese political will to address army corruption and integrate any future military operations into the FARDC chain of command. Empowering faith based groups and local communities to address impunity, army abuse and improve civil-military relations are a vital part of security sector reform (SSR).

5.3 The Congolese army (FARDC) is abusive. The prevailing culture of impunity in the DRC has a corrosive effect on the integrity and effectiveness of the army. Yet engaging with FARDC is key to establishing peace. It is not just a question of stamping out army indiscipline, it is also about helping FARDC to realise its

potential. A national army that works in the people's interests has a key role to play in building a strong and democratic Congolese state.

5.4 DFID's SSR strategy should include support to churches and local community initiatives to address army abuse and improve relations between civilians and the Congolese army. Christian Aid partners have experienceⁱⁱⁱ which may be useful for shaping a more community-driven approach to SSR in future. As an accompanying measure, DFID should also support community efforts to help individuals bring rape cases to court and provide psychosocial care to rape sufferers. Given the essential role of women within communities, community-led approaches provide a means of empowering women and involving them more effectively in state building initiatives in the security and justice sectors.

5.5 Improve multilateral, UN efforts in favour of the voluntary repatriation of Rwandans in eastern DRC and lasting demobilisation and sustainable reintegration of refugees and ex-combatants.

5.6 The UK is supporting MONUSCO (the UN Stabilisation Mission in the Congo)'s DDRRR (Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration) programme in the DRC. HMG should promote dissuasion through more effective consultation with armed groups, particularly the FDLR (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda)^{iv} rebels, as stakeholders in the demobilisation process. This would contribute to a more realistic and strategic approach to DDRRR.^v

5.7 DFID and other donors should prioritise effective reintegration programmes for civilian and ex-combatant returnees including: i) the promotion of job creation for young people across the region and ii) exploring strategies for community-led reintegration programmes and iii) setting up long term refugee reintegration programmes in Rwanda to help improve conditions and incentives for returnees from DRC and elsewhere. Faith-based groups are well placed to support reintegration at local level.

5.8 HMG should work with UNHCR (the UN refugee agency) to promote the voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees still in exile and the search for alternative solutions for those who may not be able to return. This will require diplomatic engagement with UNHCR and the Government of Rwanda (GoR) to ensure that discussions of the cessation clause: (i) include careful consideration of refugees' concerns; (ii) objective assessment of the case for the cessation clause to be invoked and (iii) are contingent on the implementation of the roadmap agreed by UNCHR and the GoR.^{vi}

5.9 HMG must call on governments of the region to comply with international refugee law and end the practice of forced repatriation.^{viii} More generally, diplomatic efforts are required to encourage the Governments of the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi—and other signatory states—to implement commitments made in the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes.^{viii}

6. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO HELP CONSOLIDATE PEACE IN BURUNDI

6.1 After 13 years of brutal civil war, in which hundreds of thousands of civilians were killed and many fled into exile, Burundi has made progress towards peace and reconciliation. However, it is one of the poorest countries in the world, peace is fragile and the ingredients for renewed conflict are still present. The country is still very vulnerable and needs continued external support for peace consolidation.

6.2 There has been a revival of dissident Burundian armed groups and an increase in political tension following the political opposition's boycotting of the 2010 elections.^{ix} The parliament and other institutions are now controlled by the CNDD-FDD ruling party and opposition leaders remain in exile. Since the elections, there have been continued violations of human rights, political intimidation, politically-motivated attacks and extra-judicial killings.

6.3 Burundi has reached a crossroads and needs effective international support more than ever to help make progress on human, political and civil rights. HMG should invest in timely preventative diplomatic action to promote peace consolidation, good governance and avert renewed instability and conflict. In coordination with other international partners, the UK should intensify diplomatic efforts to encourage political dialogue between the government and opposition and end the current violence. Other measures should include strengthening the rule of law and addressing corruption.

7. STRENGTHEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND PROMOTE SHARED ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RWANDA

7.1 Governance in Rwanda is characterised by a stable and effective but highly centralised and authoritarian state. Rwanda is achieving good results in relation to the Millennium Development Goals and economic growth, but insufficient progress has been made in creating an open and democratic society.^x Power remains centralised within the ruling political party which retains tight control on public life and economic activity. Freedom of expression is restricted.

7.2 Active civil society engagement has been hindered by repressive legislation and government intervention, as well as Rwanda's limited experience of state-citizen consultation and the emphasis on upwards, rather than downwards, accountability. Self-censorship is widely practiced. Greater pluralism, diversity of opinion, freedom of expression and association would help create a more favourable environment for civil society and citizen participation.

7.3 DFID's funding mechanisms have tended to reinforce the disparities between state and civil society. As the biggest bilateral donor to Rwanda, DFID has provided aid mostly in the form of direct budget support to the Government of Rwanda, or else through multilateral agencies, for over ten years and has made relatively little support available for civil society.

7.4 *DFID should support the role of civil society in Rwanda as a means of building an inclusive and democratic society and promoting civil and political rights.* This can be achieved by establishing funding mechanisms to provide substantial material and moral support for CSO strengthening. As a donor, the UK can also help find spaces for CSOs to engage in public debate and policy monitoring. DFID should learn from its own practice elsewhere in the region and consider, for example, the creation of a flexible funding mechanism along the lines of the DRC Civil Society Fund.

7.5 *Tangible poverty reduction at grassroots level is needed to strengthen social cohesion.* DFID can contribute to more equitable economic growth in Rwanda by supporting pro-poor investment in agriculture and other rural sectors, including increased financial support to small-scale farmers and handicraft co-operatives. The UK can also support policies to promote the growth of micro-enterprises and the pursuit of economic growth strategies beyond the capital, Kigali. Increased support to civil society budget transparency programmes would strengthen pro-poor participatory policy-making. Increased CSO participation in the national budget-planning process is also an important indicator of improved civil society space.

7.6 *UK diplomacy and foreign policy must better support of civil and political rights in Rwanda.* The UK should use its significant influence with the GoR, and within the donor community, to consistently call attention to the importance of human, civil and political rights, in line with international norms and Rwandan law. The UK should capitalise on its good relationship with Rwanda to help lift restrictions on freedom of expression and political participation and promote free and transparent elections in future.

8. DRC ELECTIONS: URGENTLY SUPPORT A MEANINGFUL DEMOCRATIC PROCESS THROUGH CIVIC EDUCATION AND EFFECTIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE RUN-UP TO ELECTIONS THIS YEAR

8.1 Decades of dictatorship and misrule, followed by civil war and foreign military occupation, contributed to the near-total collapse of the Congolese state. With massive international accompaniment, the DRC organised its first free and transparent elections in 2006. Since then state effectiveness and legitimacy has been compromised by endemic corruption. The state is yet to extend its authority across the entire territory as national borders remain porous and armed groups continue to operate in the east. These factors constrain the state's delivery of security and other public goods. Lasting stability in the Congo requires strengthening the state, including the instruments and processes to guarantee rule of law. Democratic participation through elections is a key part of the state building process.

8.2 *DFID should support civic education work by civil society to accompany the elections so that CSOs play their complementary and unique role in promoting citizen participation.* As a matter of urgency, DFID should work with other donors to provide sufficient support to the existing CSO civic education frameworks.

8.3 The UK is well-placed to lead effective diplomatic action in the run-up to elections to help preserve democratic space, especially for civil society and the independent media. The appointment of a new EU Special Representative for the Great Lakes would greatly improve coordination and multilateral efforts in support of free and fair elections, as would effective international observation and monitoring.

8.4 Local elections are key for consolidating democratic governance and for contributing to the renewal of politics, particularly through the emergence of a new grassroots leadership. HMG should use its influence and resources to help ensure local elections are organised as an essential part of the current electoral cycle in the Congo.

9. Act for good governance in the mining sector in DRC—and beyond

9.1 Ensure that UK policy does not facilitate capital flight and tax avoidance by international investors in DRC, particularly in the natural resource sector.

9.2 DFID's efforts to support mining governance reform, particularly through PROMINES and the Civil Society Fund, are welcome. However, HMG must also be sure that it is doing enough to promote good governance through the work of other departments including HM Treasury, BIS and MoJ. Lack of transparency around mining revenues in DRC has made it extremely hard for Congolese civil society to hold the government to account for its use of these revenues.

9.3 There is strong evidence to suggest that companies' use of tax havens, and accounting practices such as transfer mispricing and thin capitalisation, is depriving the DRC of millions of dollars a year in tax revenues. UK support for mandatory country by country reporting of tax payments by multinational companies, both for extractive industries and more broadly, would do a good deal to increase transparency. HMG should press for global action on this at the November 2011 G20 Summit.

9.4 HMG should work with other EU member states and the European Commission to bring in due diligence reporting requirements for companies trading in minerals linked with the conflict in eastern DRC, and support certification initiatives such as that proposed by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region.

9.5 HMG should support EU legislation obliging European companies trading in or using cassiterite, wolframite, coltan and gold or their derivatives to report on the due diligence measures they have undertaken to trace the mine of origin and to ensure that the minerals do not benefit armed groups, including the Congolese army. Building on the UK “Dodd Frank” Act, the EU is now considering transparency measures for the extractives sector within its review of the Transparency Directive. To challenge both government corruption and tax abuse, the UK government should push the EU to require the disclosure of payments to governments as well as underlying financial details such as costs, intra-company trade and production volumes on a country by country basis.

9.6 HMG should offer support to certification efforts that are being developed within the DRC and the wider region. A certification system is an important complement to legislative initiatives, as it can facilitate companies’ due diligence efforts and create a distinguishable legal trade circuit. However, the success of any certification system will depend on the willingness and ability to implement it consistently on the ground. Most notably the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) is developing a region-wide initiative to certify and track exports and imports of certain minerals, which could help to reduce smuggling. The EU and its Member States should make a strong political and financial commitment to ensure sufficient local capacity for implementation of the ICGLR system.

REFERENCES

ⁱ UNHCR statistical snapshot on IDP and refugee numbers in the region

<i>Countries</i>	<i>Refugees from</i>	<i>Refugees in</i>	<i>IDPs</i>
Burundi	94,239	24,967	100,000
DRC	455,852	185,809	2,052,677
Rwanda	129,109	54,016	0

January 2010 <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45a6c6.html>

ⁱⁱ Secretary of State for International Development, Rt Hon Andrew Mitchell, MP, “*Development in a Conflicted World*”, Speech at the Royal College of Defence Studies, 16 September 2010.

ⁱⁱⁱ See Christian Aid post on the Guardian Poverty Matters blog “*The Congolese army must be taught to serve its communities*” Tuesday 4 January 2011.

^{iv} The FDLR is a Rwandan armed rebel group operating in eastern DRC, created and led by remnants of the former Rwandan army in exile in DRC since 1994, a minority of whom are suspected of involvement in the 1994 genocide. Like other armed groups in eastern DRC, the FDLR is suspected of grave human rights abuse and of carrying out terrorist acts against civilians.

^v In early 2009, the sudden *rapprochement* between the Congolese and Rwandan Heads of State was hailed internationally as a remarkable breakthrough and opportunity for improving security in the region. Joint DRC-Rwanda military operations were launched against the FDLR in eastern DRC with disastrous humanitarian consequences, displacing many hundreds of thousands of civilians. The UN-backed operations demonstrated once again that this long-standing crisis cannot be solved militarily; practical and political non-military solutions must be found.

See Christian Aid press releases of November 2009 “Congo crisis made worse by UN-backed military operation” and March 2010 “Ongoing presence of armed groups in eastern Congo fuels use of rape as a weapon of war”.

^{vi} The roadmap included commitments to (i) actively enhance voluntary repatriation of Rwandan refugees, (ii) Implement effective reintegration projects to make returns sustainable and (iii) secure rights for Rwandan refugees who are unable or unwilling to return, through regularizing their stay in their current country of residence, or confirming their need for continued international protection. (“RWANDA: Group refugee status could be lifted by late 2011” IRIN report 11 November 2009).

^{vii} Governments of the region have at times pursued a policy of forced repatriation, in violation of the principle of *non-refoulement* enshrined in the 1951 Refugee convention. In 2005, the Rwandan and Burundian authorities were accused by the UN of violating international law by forcibly repatriating 5,000 Rwandan refugees UN News Centre report 14 June 2005. In July 2010 Over 1,000 Rwandan refugees were forcibly repatriated from Uganda through “gunpoint” operations IRIN news report.

^{viii} The Great Lakes Stability Pact entered into force in 2008 after ratification by national legislatures. It includes far-reaching commitments, on human rights, protecting civilians, democratic governance and non-aggression, which are yet to be fully implemented.

^{ix} “BURUNDI: Veering off the path of peaceful power-sharing” Irin News, 27 August 2010.

^x For background: “It’s Time to Open Up” a 2004 Christian Aid report on government accountability, human rights and freedom of speech in Rwanda. For a more recent analysis read EurAc’s March 2011 Memorandum to the EU on Rwanda: “*Contributing to an increase in democratic space in Rwanda through a collective and coherent approach*”.

May 2011

Written evidence from The Congolese Movement for Change (CMC)

1. My submission is a result of hard work by the CMC a UK based pressure group appealing for a change in UK foreign policy towards the DRC, a group of mature professionals who have watched their beloved country sink in a morass of dishonesty and corruption.

2. For more than a decade, the UK has been providing funds and support towards rebuilding the infrastructure and establishing democracy in the DRC. In spite of this the country has shifted further towards becoming a failed state. There has been the incessant plundering of mineral resources, the horrific number of rapes of men, women and children, human rights violations of all kinds and a complete failure to protect the equatorial forest, the environment and the many endangered species.

3. Furthermore the ongoing illegal mining of uranium*in the DRC could potentially have catastrophic implications, were this raw material to find its way into the hands of terrorist organizations. That such illicit activities have been allowed to continue without action being taken by the United Kingdom and other members of the UN Security Council, presents a serious threat to peace and security among those nations compliant with Chapter VII of the UN Charter and indeed to DFID aid. Today, Congo has become a haven for criminality, continuing to play host to innumerable atrocities whilst the efforts of the International Community to intervene have for the most part proved both insufficient and ineffective. The shift from a two round to a one round electoral process only aggravates further the DRC problem, taking us further towards a situation similar to those witnessed recently in Tunisia, Egypt and Ivory Coast.

Our present submission, which we hope to elaborate upon at a later date through a verbal presentation, will include all the very points your committee requires to bring a historical change much awaited by the people of Congo.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The most effective mechanisms for delivering aid and the role of DFID’s focus on results in fragile and conflict affected states:

The deployment of Aid: A change of approach

4. This group has for the past five years acknowledged efforts made by DFID to sustain its aid to the Great Lakes Region and in particular to the DRC. The assertion that the delivery of aid must be a multilateral operation requiring the cooperation of UN Peace Keeping Forces, suggests an acceptance that peace is not sustainable. Should Development aid not be withheld until a level of peace is achieved? Eg should Rwanda be such a major recipient of support whilst still known to be undertaking cross border raids? Even in the war on AIDS the provision of the anti-retro viral drugs necessary to win this war are in the hands of the corrupt governments. The DRC with a population still living way below poverty line and nowhere near the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), should be subject to mechanisms calling for development aid to be channelled through UK based NGOs, in order to prevent these invaluable contributions from filtering into the local economy where they become the currency of corruption. Encouraging local government to involve more staff equipped with democratic values, integrity and professionalism as well as working in partnership with the DRC government would be the best ingredients for improvement.

Challenges of working in fragile states

5. Setting up delegated DFID offices has brought advantages including better alignment, flexibility and stronger influencing. Yet this has also brought demands in terms of staffing and security. Devolution has resulted in tensions between HQ policy evolution and local priorities. Some global initiatives have undermined country-driven approaches.

6. Operating in a fragile state is typically more labour-intensive than elsewhere although the actual percentage of administration costs over total programme spend is generally in balance with non-fragile states. Some DFID offices have adapted well and developed good procedures.

7. Conditions in fragile states make monitoring and evaluation difficult in terms of field access, weak data, and linking DFID’s actions to non-linear peace processes as well as political stability and human security. Strategies are better prepared now, with sound analysis and indicators, however, monitoring plans have been weaker. There are good examples of adapted monitoring systems that use various sources of information for conflict, social impact and context monitoring.

Multilateral Strategies for long term Stability and Conflict Resolution

8. It appears to date that the DFID has been in good working relationship with various multilateral organisations given the fact that none of them has raised concerns about DFID ethic and code of conduct in dealing with the Congolese government to implement different projects of development in the DRC. However, we would like to see the UK influence promote a more integrated approach with local organisations from the civil society and human rights organisations in term of needs assessment and in some areas in term of implementation of those projects ie the farming sector and the police.

9. Most DFID offices have pursued security and development objectives, and broadened their governance programmes to include democratic politics and/or security sector reforms. Other interventions, such as mining in DRC and counter narcotics in Afghanistan, were chosen because their links to the conflict. Outside selected humanitarian assistance and community-recovery projects, conflict analysis was rarely used in practice to shape development programmes.

10. We would like to see the DFID together with international organisations draw a kind of a detailed road map that establishes major reforms needed in the country that the private and public actors would use to achieving social, political and economical developments.

Linking security with development

11. We believe that a new approach is needed in term of policing and security reforms because we would like to see the UK government identify and mobilise support of UK trained soldiers and police in order to get them involved gradually in any military strategy that would be needed on the ground.

12. DFID has supported dialogue and reconciliation, from grassroots initiatives to support for high-level peace negotiations. Despite a high reputational risk, DFID also earmarked significant funding towards the organisation of the upcoming November elections. This included reinforcing civic participation (notably of women) and working with the media. Most, but not all, elections were deemed a success. Efforts should be made to implement secure conditions whereby civic participation in elections and media commentary can thrive without fear of reprisals.

13. DFID can now claim a comparative advantage in security and justice reform, with increased emphasis on human security and accountability. Results have been mixed and there is a need for a more political realism in what can be achieved.

14. Performance in Sierra Leone shows that an integrated approach to peace building and state building, in which DFID, as part of wider HMG efforts and alongside other donors, carefully balance their choice of interventions, can be effective.

Treatment of Armed Groups: Dialogue, Transparency and Justice

15. More efforts should be made to initiate a dialogue with the militia and various rebel factions in order to achieve a lasting solution to the conflict. They should be part of the solution. The participation of the Congolese Government is also very important, they should be encouraged to take part in the negotiations; DFID, as an official UK Government body, is well placed to facilitate this. Furthermore, with presidential elections to be held later this year, the opposition parties must also be engaged to this end. Our group is well placed to assist in this dialogue.

16. Given the complexity of the conflict in the region the UK government should surely promote a long term strategy to organise Dialogue Conferences between Rwanda and Burundi governments and the respective opposition groups both within and beyond their borders if we want to see credible, durable and viable peace and stability in the Great Lakes Region.

17. We also strongly believe that perpetrators should be held accountable for all their crimes. The International Community should send a strong message to make them understand that Impunity is not an acceptable option.

Support for Community driven initiatives

18. The DFID is helping the DRC to plan in line with capacity, accountability and responsiveness. It focuses on accountability as the most important starting point in promoting good governance in DRC, by supporting and continuing to support public organisations and communities directly through many ways. It is doing much more at the grassroots end of political governance working with organisations that train citizens groups in the management of budgets and monitoring them to make sure the money is spent. Greater consideration and should be given and resources allocated to the support a free press and media in developing countries and offering much more support in areas like human rights, parliaments and trade unions.

19. Strategically, DFID continues to see community organizations in DRC as a key factor in holding the government to account. The role of community organizations is about to become better mainstreamed as a cross-cutting issue at sector levels and he's on his program actions, aims to increase the ability of community watchdogs organisations to hold the police, defence and justice sectors to account. Other partners have credited

DFID for effectively advocating for the involvement of community groups; for instance in the committee on police reform. Funds were also allocated to the UNDP program to allow greater scrutiny by parliament into acts perpetrated by the government on human rights matters.

20. We can also say that the support of DFID to the media in DRC, with a grant to the Hironnelle Foundation to launch RADIO OKAPI, has is very effective and crucial until now. DFID support for community radio initiatives has provided an opportunity to hold local government to account, with its main purpose being the establishment of a credible, accurate and reliable broadcasting network on regional and national levels.

21. In education, through an investment of 55 million pounds over five years, DFID is supporting the construction of some schools and a programme to provide free education in primary schools; which is an absolute priority for the country priorities with a value of 55 millions of pound over five years.

In mining it focuses upon supporting good governance by working at a local level. For extractive industries, transparency initiatives are therefore seen as appropriate.

Creating Conditions for the well-being of Women.

22. Based on all the evidence gathered from various sources, we believe that DFID action in the DRC is having a positive impact. We understand that DFID works in partnership with various international bodies, organisations, charities and non- governmental organisations such as WFWI (Women for Women International); in providing women with the right to education, opportunities for micro-finance loans, encouraging participation in community programmes, offering not only financial but also emotional support; empowering women to be self sufficient an independent, capable of providing for of their families. All these projects are to be commended, however much more can and should be done.

23. Women for Women International is calling on the international community to do more eg improve the security of women, address mental issues, invest more in women and involve men in developing and implementing solutions.

24. Economic empowerment programmes are excellent but women in the DRC need first and foremost justice, peace and security. Unless the International community identifies the root of the problems faced, peace in RDC will be a long time coming programmes of economic empowerment to women may amount to nothing. Prevention is better than the cure!

Tackling Corruption: Aid a waste of money?

25. A recent article in the “Times” expressed reservations about European Union aid programmes to developing countries “that gives money to corrupt governments without checking how the money is spent.” According to the article, “British aid cash is being spent on empty medical centres, jets for despots and palaces”. Our question is for how long can we afford to waste taxpayer’s money on corrupt regimes around the world at a time of economic austerity? Why can’t we put this money to better use? We sincerely hope that the UK Government will stick to their promise when they announced a “new focus on transparency and value for money” and apply this approach to the delivery of aid in the RDC.

The Impact of Previous Investment

26. DFID is involved in many different sectors in the DRC; including the Health programme, where DFID has worked alongside some very committed NGO’s to provide a basic package of health services as promoted by the government. Aspects include the provision of malaria bed nets and a vaccination programme valued at £31 million over three years, and others like clean water and sanitation programmes well supported by DFID through the allocation of £24 million over four years. Even infrastructure has been the recipient of £38 million over five years in order to promote its development.

27. However, the good initiatives of DFID have been received with mixed views, in part because it reflects a UK political mandate and in part because there are concerns over its funding arrangements and ways of working.

28. It can also be said that despite the good intentions of DFID’s work in the DRC, one should point out the difficulties faced on the ground, which stand in the way of most reconstruction and development projects; hurdles which must be overcome in order to respond to the country’s needs. These include lack of support for the humanitarian community (NGOs) and a sub-standard action plan and inappropriate allocation of funds. One should also note the UNDP’s poor track record at managing civil society support as a particular risk to future democracy and accountability.

CONCLUSION

29. In conclusion, we have witnessed the effectiveness of DFID in its support for civil society and communities in the DRC across various sectors, including education, health, water, sanitation, media, mining etc. Despite DFID goodwill and a firm commitment towards rebuilding our country, despite spending millions of pounds on numerous projects, our concern is that on the whole, the country continues to suffer as though nothing had been done. People live in severe poverty on pitiful wages, impunity and lack of justice prevail and

despite a slogan of Zero Tolerance slogans, corruption is omnipresent. Human Rights are non-existent (state sponsored assassinations and arbitrary arrests being common place). Levels of Education continue to fall as nothing has been done by the State to provide free primary education, whilst many are without clean drinking water. These are only a few of the many ways in which the poor governance of the country is manifested. Therefore the country needs now, more than ever, the strong institutions, operated by strong and conscientious people necessary to build a new and viable DRC and we think this is the best time for UK government to think about a real change in DRC.

MAJOR DFID RECOMMENDATIONS

The main report contains a range of recommendations in Chapter 8. Some of the most critical are:

- (a) DFID's regional directors should renew their commitment to have more realistic expectations of what can be achieved within a five-10 year timeframe. Identifying government weakness as a main risk within programmes, only to express this again as a reason for weak programme performance should be avoided.
- (b) DFID should act as a bridge between partners who exhibit different levels of alignment to the principles of engagement in fragile states as well as the principles of aid effectiveness. DFID should be better prepared to address sensitive issues such as human rights abuse, corruption and injustice.
- (c) DFID should increase the use of joint funding mechanisms as a means to share risk and bring significant resources, but it must improve the speed of operation, establish clear procedures and ensure more local ownership.
- (d) DFID's political and economic policy teams should review guidance on providing budget support within a fragile state setting, and learn from recent experience of shadow alignment and delivery in specific sector or regions to reduce political and fiduciary risk.
- (e) In their work with multilaterals in fragile settings, DFID country teams should give priority to the delivery of improved services rather than to using this relationship to pursue a reform agenda with that agency.
- (f) DFID's International Dept. should develop stronger approaches and provide more resources to working with non-traditional partners (such as China, India, and Saudi Arabia).
- (g) Where DFID expands its funding in fragile states, its Directors for Human Resources and Regional Divisions must match this with earlier build up and better sequencing of staff with sufficient seniority and experience.
- (h) DFID country teams in fragile states can improve monitoring and evaluation by designing more measurable, risk-focused, monitoring tools, looking at context and social impact.
- (i) Improved Consultation: Aid projects should be designed, managed and funded taking into account the opinion of the recipient countries, the needs expressed by the population of DRC.
- (j) There should be a cuts made to Administrative expenses and salaries for staff who are involved in any given aid project as this amounts to 5.4% of the entire aid. Internally, Recipient countries need to be consulted first. They are in a much better position to determine what their priorities are in light of the suffering of their people. DFID should create a mixed monitoring control committee once aid project s have been funded.

There should be Trade Incentives and greater emphasis given to self sufficiency. DFID should promote projects and concessions designed to break the cycle of total dependence upon foreign aid and encourage countries in the South to boost their failed economies. For instance incentives for export of their agricultural produce could help to alleviate poverty in these fragile states. A cooperative farm system might be a way forward.

We will be more specific on this during our presentation.

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May 2011

Written evidence from First Quantum Materials

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

FQM fully supports the Select Committee's work, however, we must caution that we are limited in what we can currently discuss due to international arbitrations at the ICC and ICSID, as well as legal proceedings in the British Virgin Islands, and therefore our submission is necessarily limited to publicly available information.

As the largest single tax payer in the DRC in 2009, and with a significant track record of investment there and in other African countries, FQM has considerable experience of operating in fragile and conflict affected states. The recent illegal taking of our assets in the DRC and the subsequent engagement with the UK government, the Canadian government, the EU, the World Bank, and others has given FQM a useful perspective to offer the Select Committee, particularly in relation to the business and investment climate in such countries and its impact upon the UK Government's ability to achieve its development goals.

Apart from creating meaningful employment in the DRC, FQM continues to contribute directly to various DRC initiatives to improve school systems, potable water, and hospitals in areas surrounding our projects, even though those projects are no longer operating. FQM has built schools and clinics at its mine sites in the DRC for its employees, their families and the local population. The company has also rebuilt hospitals, supplied clean drinking water, repaired roads and initiated malaria and HIV programs as well as highly successful agricultural programs for local farmers.

Following the illegal removal of FQM's assets the DRC people suffered an immediate loss of approximately 3,000 local jobs, direct losses for hundreds of local contractors, and the devastating impact on the thousands of families these jobs and contracts support; the immediate loss of over \$75 million in annual taxes, royalties, imports duties; the immediate combined loss of 4% of the DRC's GNP; and the future loss of 320 MW of hydro-electric power, rehabilitation of roads, financial support for malaria and HIV awareness campaigns, environmental remediation, and development of local business.

FQM offers our experience as a case study to the Select Committee in order to better understand the relationship between international development priorities and international investment. It is our belief that improving governance and transparency while supporting and protecting sound, long term investment in fragile states should be a key development priority of the UK Government.

We make a number of suggestions in our submission, including the need for the UK Government, led by DfID, to adopt a more flexible, fast moving and pragmatic approach in order to reach key development goals. Particular effort should be made to resolve disputes that are damaging investor confidence and resulting in thousands of lost jobs and the halting of infrastructural improvements on the ground.

Finally, FQM would encourage the Select Committee to call for evidence all those concerned and connected with this particular case study. It offers an ideal opportunity to understand the contribution that long term investment can make to development priorities. It equally offers an opportunity for DFID and the UK Government to learn and ensure that they are better placed to support the needs of ethical companies operating in fragile and conflict affected states in the future.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 First Quantum Minerals Ltd. ("FQM") is a growing mining and metals company engaged in mineral exploration, development and mining. The Company produces LME grade "A" copper cathode, copper in concentrate, gold and sulphuric acid. FQM's current operations are the Kansanshi copper-gold mine in Zambia and the Guelb Moghrein copper-gold mine in Mauritania.

1.2 Until 18 months ago, FQM was the largest tax payer in the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), over 10 times bigger than the next biggest tax payer in the mining sector in 2009. However, beginning in August 2009 the DRC government began to unlawfully take over FQM’s various assets in the country. By September 2010, FQM had been excluded from each of its three projects in the DRC.

1.3 Apart from its tax payments and the creation of meaningful employment in the DRC, FQM also contributes directly to various DRC initiatives to improve its infrastructure, school systems, potable water, and hospitals. FQM has built schools and clinics at its mine sites in the DRC for local populations, as well as its employees. The company has also rebuilt hospitals, supplied clean drinking water, repaired roads and initiated malaria and HIV programs.

1.4 FQM has a strong track record of commitment to the principles of good corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. Over the 14 years of operation in the DRC, FQM has sought to contribute to sustainable economic development in ways that would enhance and encourage the long term development of the DRC.

1.5 It is with concern that FQM notes that the DRC will not achieve a single Millennium Development Goal. Despite the wealth of mineral deposits in the DRC, its people remain some of the poorest in the world. FQM has invested over \$1 billion into the DRC since 2001. Recently we made an investment of \$1.5 billion into neighbouring Zambia.

1.6 It is our belief in order to work effectively in fragile and conflict affected states like the DRC the Department for International Development (“DFID”) must work in conjunction with a broad range of stakeholders to ensure the benefits of long term, sound investment in these countries supports and enhances UK development goals. It is insight into this critical area and FQM’s experience as a case study that we would like to offer the International Development Select Committee.

2. FIRST QUANTUM MINERALS’ EXPERIENCE IN THE DRC

2.1 FQM had developed three main projects in the country: the Frontier mine—the largest operating copper mine in the DRC; the Kolwezi tailings project (the “Kolwezi Project”)—which was shut down three quarters of the way through construction; and the Lonshi mine which provided substantial tax and royalties revenue to the DRC during a difficult period of civil war.

2.2 At the Kolwezi Project, FQM was partnered with the International Finance Corporation (“IFC”) (a member of the World Bank Group) and the South African Industrial Development Corporation (“IDC”), whose involvement underlines the integrity of the project. The Kolwezi Project was also delivered in partnership with the DRC government and the state owned mining firm, Gécamines.

2.3 The Kolwezi Project involved the construction of a copper and cobalt processing plant and associated facilities to process tailings in Katanga province of the DRC. The retreatment of tailings would result in a large environmental clean-up of a currently highly degraded site.

2.4 *What the Kolwezi Project delivered to the DRC:*

2.4.1 A high technology investment of more than USD \$593 million for the initial phase including the construction of a plant, which was 75% complete at time of illegal taking and was on schedule for commissioning in the first part of 2010.

2.4.2 1,000 jobs (of which more than 700 were Congolese) during the construction phase and 700 jobs (Congolese) during the operational phase.

2.4.3 Expected USD \$150 to \$300 million in revenue per year for the DRC over the 20+ year term of the Kolwezi Project, in the form of taxes, royalties, dividends and other revenues.

2.5 In 2007, President Kabila’s government decided to review over 60 mining deals that had been agreed during the DRC civil war or under the transitional Kabila government which followed the end of the war. The DRC stated that its concern was that many of those deals were agreed to through special relationship and with insufficient transparency. There was no basis for concern about the Kolwezi Project. It had been entered into in 2004 after the civil war, and following a lengthy series of transparent negotiations, with the participation and approval of IFC and IDC, and under the regulatory regime of the new DRC Mining Code sponsored by the World Bank. Despite these features, the DRC Government announced that the Project would be included in the review.

2.6 Although we were under no legal or contractual obligation to do so, FQM and its partners, IFC and IDC, held extensive discussions with the Ministry of Mines, Gécamines and other DRC Government representatives to reach a satisfactory conclusion and allow us to move on with the Project for the benefit of all parties. We were fully committed to negotiating with the DRC Government in good faith and throughout the process were willing to do so.

2.7 By early March 2009, FQM believed that the parties had reached agreement on the material terms for an amended agreement. FQM awaited formal approval from the DRC Government so that the parties could conclude a written amendment to the agreement. That approval never came. On 4 August 2009, the DRC Council of Minister convened an extraordinary meeting and resolved to cancel the Kolwezi Project. The

decision was made on completely spurious grounds, and FQM was given no notice of the meeting but instead learned of it from local media the following day. The actions of the DRC left us no option but to pursue international arbitration in January 2010 after a further six months of fruitless efforts to negotiate a resolution to the impasse.

2.8 During a mining conference in South Africa in February 2010, the DRC Minister of Mines threatened FQM that should the international arbitration over the Kolwezi Project not be withdrawn, FQM's other projects in the DRC would be impacted.

2.9 Regrettably, the DRC carried through out its threat and FQM's other operations in the DRC were impacted in retaliation for our commencing international arbitration. FQM had discovered and developed the Lonshi and Frontier mines between 2000 and 2007. Construction of Frontier began in April 2006 and was completed in September 2007. Commercial production was reached as of 2 November 2007.

2.10 The Frontier mine was expected to produce 1.43 million tonnes of copper in concentrate averaging 75,000 tonnes of copper in concentrate per year over its 19 year mine life. The Frontier mine was the biggest DRC copper producer in 2008 (87kT) and 2009 (92kT). Frontier paid \$54 million in taxes alone for 2009, and contributed over \$70 million in 2009 including royalties, import duties etc.

2.11 Despite political pressure from countries such as Canada and institutions such as the World Bank in the wake of the illegal taking of the Kolwezi Project, the DRC has not reversed its decision on the Kolwezi Project. Instead, the DRC began to systematically strip FQM of all its assets in the DRC.

2.12 In March 2010, the DRC court issued a USD \$12 billion judgment against FQM's subsidiary, CMD, and the joint venture company responsible for the Kolwezi Project, KMT. The DRC then used this judgment as the basis for asking its courts to appoint a liquidator over KMT with the power to sell off its assets.

2.13 In May 2010, FQM's mining titles to its Lonshi and Frontier mines were ordered withdrawn by the DRC Supreme Court. The reasons cited for withdrawal are completely unfounded and without legal merit. Several months later, the DRC seized these mines and excluded FQM.

2.14 In August 2010, the Kolwezi licence was transferred to a new joint venture controlled by shell companies incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, which were in turn controlled by Israeli businessman Dan Gertler, known to be a close associate of President Kabila. Despite our pleas to all the large miners to avoid interfering with the Kolwezi Project and the on-going international arbitration—it was acquired by Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC) in August 2010.

2.15 ENRC is a London-listed FTSE 100 company which should adhere to the highest standards of corporate governance. The senior Independent Director at ENRC, Sir Richard Sykes has publicly defended the deal (see Appendix 1: *The Sunday Times*, "Caught in Congo conflict" 31.10.10) (*not printed here*).

2.16 The impact of the actions of the DRC Government against FQM are real and tangible:

- immediate loss of approximately 3,000 local jobs, direct losses for hundreds of local contractors, and the devastating impact on the thousands of families these jobs and contracts support;
- immediate loss of over \$75 million in annual taxes, royalties, import duties;
- immediate combined loss of 4% of DRC's GNP;
- immediate loss of 90,000 tonnes of copper concentrate per year destined for world markets;
- future loss of 320 MW of hydro-electric power, rehabilitation of roads, financial support for malaria and HIV awareness campaigns, environmental remediation, and development of local business;
- future loss of estimated \$8.5 Billion in taxes, royalties, dividends and import duties to the DRC over 20+ years from FQM's combined operations;
- future loss of 2,250 local jobs, direct and indirect economic benefits, and related alleviation of poverty;
- future loss of an additional global supply of 70,000 tonnes of copper and 13,500 tonnes of cobalt per year; and
- the potential of incurring an additional several billion dollars in state liabilities resulting from two international arbitral awards.

2.17 This case was covered in depth by a speech delivered to Parliament by Eric Joyce MP on 5 April 2011 (see Appendix 2) (*not printed here*).

3. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WAY DFID OPERATES AND FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 The DRC remains a country of extraordinary resource potential. Recent events have highlighted the need to improve the business environment if the country is ever going to fulfil that potential and if DFID is to meet any of its key development goals in the country.

3.2 DFID will commit over £109 million in funding to projects in the DRC this year. A pragmatic, flexible and determined approach needs to be adopted because real progress needs to be made on meeting development goals to be confident that taxpayers' money is being spent wisely.

3.3 It is unclear if efforts to improve transparency in the DRC mining sector have been effective. DFID co-funded the PROMINES project with the World Bank, at a total cost of over \$40 million to the UK. The project is designed to help increase transparency and governance issues in the DRC and lead to the DRC signing the EITI.

3.4. Despite direct aid support to improve transparency and support sound and sustainable investment political risk insurance in the DRC has risen from a typical annual premium in from 2% to 2.8% of investment under cover—a rise of 40%.

3.5 By contrast, Zambia has embraced good governance and transparency initiatives and, as a result, is receiving significant inward investment. Not least from First Quantum—recently we announced an investment of \$1.5 to \$2 billion at our Sentinel project in Zambia. Sentinel is expected to produce up to 300,000 tonnes per annum of copper at the expanded level and will create over 2,000 jobs in a region close to the DRC border.

3.6 It is therefore FQM's belief that the UK Government must make protecting and encouraging sound and sustainable investment in the emerging economies of fragile states a key development policy. International Development—working alongside international investment—will be critical to meeting UK and international development goals in the DRC and other similar countries.

3.7 FQM believes too many governments and businesses turn a blind eye to corruption, accepting it as a way of life in Africa. If the business environment is ever to improve, this must stop. DFID is in a unique position to take a lead on these issues. The failure of corporate governance in companies such as ENRC has arguably facilitated thousands of jobs being lost and millions of dollars in lost tax revenue to the DRC. ENRC is a FTSE 100 company and more pressure must be brought to bear on the board of management at London listed companies to account for their actions, especially involving fragile states.

3.8 FQM encourages the Select Committee and the Department for International Development to take a lead on sending a clear message to the management of UK listed firms that the UK will not tolerate the facilitation of corruption in conflict affected states like the DRC.

3.9 Finally, FQM already operates under a stringent regulatory regime in Canada and the UK. In addition, the Dodd Frank style legislation is being considered by UK officials at a European level. FQM would be supportive of any such measures that increased transparency and supported sound investment in fragile states

3.10 Corruption on the ground in developing countries and moral ambivalence in the boardrooms of major corporations are a damaging combination and difficult to control.

3.11 There are no easy solutions but DFID must work with other government departments and other governments to be swifter and stronger in responding to corruption. A willingness to work together to find practical solutions in order to keep business confidence can allow continued international investment into some of the most exciting but challenging economies in the world.

May 2011

Written evidence from Marie Stopes International

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the largest international family planning organisations in the world, Marie Stopes International (MSI) uses multiple delivery channels to reach its clients, including static clinics, community volunteers, work-based initiatives and refugee/IDP camps. This approach to service delivery has enabled the organisation to reach millions of underserved people and provide vital morbidity- and mortality-preventing services. In 2010 MSI served 7 million family planning clients.

As a sexual and reproductive health and rights specialist agency, MSI's written evidence is made with respect to the linkages between DFID's new Framework for Results for improving reproductive, maternal and newborn health (RMNH) in the developing world, and its work in fragile states and humanitarian settings. This submission addresses two of the three key areas identified in the IDSC press release pertaining to this inquiry:

- The key development priorities DFID and other Government Departments should be addressing in fragile and conflict-affected states;
- The most effective mechanisms for delivering aid and the role of DFID's focus on results in fragile and conflict affected states.

MSI congratulates DFID on the inclusion of RMNH among its key development priorities in fragile and conflict-affected states. In this submission, MSI presents evidence that working with non-state providers to reach clients in fragile and conflict-affected states can be one of the most effective mechanisms for delivering RMNH services and achieving results in these circumstances. Evidence is drawn from MSI's experience of working in fragile and conflict-affected states, including through the RAISE Initiative. Furthermore, this

submission highlights mechanisms that can serve the key dual objectives of meeting immediate needs and building state capacity. Suggestions are given for mechanisms for delivering aid in fragile states with negligible private sector and fragile states with a stronger private sector, including the Basic Package of Health Services, outreach, social franchising and voucher schemes.

We congratulate DFID on its decision to address health in fragile and conflict-affected states. We also applaud its global leadership on addressing unsafe abortion and reducing unmet need for family planning. We commend DFID for its support of the Health in Fragile States Network which has contributed to the growing evidence base of the value of addressing health in CAF states, both as a component of state-building and to address the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).¹¹

1. *Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health—a key development priority in conflict-affected and fragile states*

“Fragile state” is a term given to situations in which, usually as a result of prolonged conflict, the government cannot or will not provide the services or stewardship needed to ensure equitable access to essential public services including healthcare.¹² Fragile states are home to one sixth of the world’s population, or one billion people, yet, they account for a third of maternal deaths and half of the world’s infant deaths. Addressing RMNH in fragile states is essential in pursuing the Millennium Development Goals. Progress towards MDG5 in fragile states is negative.¹³

1.1 Conflict and humanitarian crises complicate access to RMNH, and RMNH needs are particularly acute in countries emerging from conflict or natural disaster. Health systems in these countries are often characterised by damaged infrastructure, limited human resources and lack of capacity to provide health services, including RMNH.

1.2 The 2008 Millennium Development Report, identified the large and growing unmet need for family planning in sub-Saharan Africa and associated high fertility rates in that region to be undermining “related goals, such as reducing child mortality, hunger and malnutrition, and increasing primary education enrolment”.

1.3 Reproductive health related conditions remain the lead cause of death and illness for women in developing countries. From this high baseline, evidence from a variety of conflicts show that maternal mortality ratios increase sharply in conflict settings. The more heavily conflict affected eastern DRC, for example, has a maternal mortality rate of 1174 per 100,000 live births as opposed 811 in western DRC.¹⁴ Similarly, while the lifetime risk of dying in pregnancy or childbirth in Sub-Saharan Africa is 1 in 31, in DRC this increases to 1 in 24 and in Sierra Leone to 1 in 21.¹⁵

1.4 High incidence of rape in conflict affected settings—sometimes as a tactic of war—also point to the heightened need for sexual and reproductive health services. The UN Security Council Resolution 1888 (2009) affirms that “effective steps to prevent and respond to acts of sexual violence can significantly contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security”,¹⁶ and demands the cessation of sexual violence with immediate effect, yet there is no action plan or dedicated budget to either attempt to mitigate gender based violence or to provide clinical services for its survivors.

1.5 In many fragile and conflict-affected states user fees, payable at the point of service delivery, may be a barrier to services, particularly for the poor and underserved.

2. *Funding for Reproductive Maternal and Newborn Health in Conflict Affected and Fragile States*

2.1 The World Bank recommends that international assistance is sustained for a minimum of 15 years to support long-term institutional transformations.¹⁷ However, volatility of aid flows is a major problem in fragile states, with aid flows twice as volatile as those to other developing countries.

2.2 A study to track disbursements of funding for reproductive health in eighteen conflict-affected countries found that funding for reproductive maternal and newborn health makes up approximately two percent of ODA to conflict affected countries included in the study, of which approximately 50% was for HIV/AIDS activities and less than 2% was for family planning.¹⁸

¹¹ Health System Reconstruction: Can it Contribute to State Building? Health in Fragile States Network. October 2008. http://www.healthandfragilestates.org/index2.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=32&Itemid=38 (Accessed 11 May 2011)

¹² High Level Forum on the Health MDGs: An overview note, Paris 14–15 November 2005, p.1 (<http://www.hlfhealthmdgs.org/Documents/HealthFragileStates.pdf>)

¹³ World Bank global monitoring Report 2009 p 17. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGLOMONREP2009/Resources/5924349-1239742507025/GMR09_book.pdf (accessed 11 May 2011)

¹⁴ Coghlan, B. et al (2006). “Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A nation wide survey” in *The Lancet* 367 (9504):44–5 [http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736\(06\)67923-3/fulltext](http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(06)67923-3/fulltext)

¹⁵ Trends in Maternal Mortality: 1990–2008, WHO 2010. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2010/9789241500265_eng.pdf (Accessed 11 May 2011)

¹⁶ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1888 (2009) September 2009, pp 3

¹⁷ World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, The World Bank, pp 194

¹⁸ Patel P, Roberts B., Guy S., Lee-Jones L., Conteh L., 2009. Tracking Official Development Assistance for Reproductive Health in Conflict-Affected Countries. *PLoS Medicine*, 6(6): e1000090 doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1000090

2.3 An update of this study, which tracked official development assistance as recorded in the Creditor Reporting System and Financial Tracking System, found that DfID was the second largest bilateral donor for RH in absolute USD terms—\$59.29 million in 2009, which represents approximately 3% of DFID ODA for that year.¹⁹

3. *Mechanisms for Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health Delivery*

The main challenge in addressing health needs in fragile states is to respond to immediate basic health needs while ensuring long-term institution building for strengthening the health system. A combination of weak health systems, lack of government leadership and poor health indicators make it imperative to build state capacity, while at the same time delivering core services.

Where state capacity is far from the level required for universal access to essential services, contracting non-state actors for service delivery represents an effective route for meeting immediate health needs. We present the Basic Package of Health Services, outreach, social franchising and voucher schemes as delivery models.

3.1 *Basic Package of Health Services*

3.1.1 In many post-conflict states there are large gaps in access to services. The Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS), which comprises the key human resources, facilities and equipment needed for the provision of basic health services allows for the rapid scale up of services whilst strengthening government capacity. By defining a strong role for government, as has been the case in Afghanistan and Southern Sudan, in managing the contracts with non-state providers, the system strengthens state capacity to provide public services through non-state providers.

3.1.2 An extensive evaluation found that in weaker health systems, districts that contracted out services to the not state sector delivered care more efficiently and equitably than those that remained under government control.²⁰

3.1.3 The BPHS can use non-state sector expertise to provide rapid expansion of health services, in contrast to often delayed expansion of state health provision. It is an effective method of delivering services in countries that have weak public health systems and very few private sector health providers. The work can be contracted out to non governmental organisations or some services can be supported or provided by the state. For example, the Afghanistan Ministry of Public Health is contracted to provide BPHS through existing government mechanisms in 3 of the country's 34 provinces.

3.2 *Outreach*

3.2.1 Outreach has proved a very effective mechanism for delivering family planning services in fragile states, particularly in rural and remote areas. Distance to health facilities can be a barrier to accessing services. By taking the service to the client, rural populations are able to access health services which would otherwise be too far for them to reach.


3.2.2. By working with the district health officials and working in existing health facilities, the outreach services are aligned with national government agenda and priorities.

3.2.3. The data presented in Figure 1 below, show the increase in knowledge and use of family planning in five districts in northern Uganda served by mobile outreach teams.²¹ Marie Stopes Uganda provided mobile outreach services at government health centres, providing long term and permanent methods of family planning. The differences in spontaneous knowledge and ever use of family planning are statistically significant difference between baseline (in 2007) and endline (in 2010).

¹⁹ Internal Report Tracking Official Development Assistance for RH in Conflict Affected Countries 2003–09. Methodology described in: Patel P, Roberts B, Conteh L, Guy S, Lee-Jones L. A review of global mechanisms for tracking official development assistance for health in countries affected by armed conflict. *Health Policy, Volume 100, Issues 2–3, May 2011, pp. 116–124*

²⁰ Bhushan I et al (2002) in Palmer N, Strong L, Wali A and Sondorp E, Contracting out health services in fragile states, *British Medical Journal* 2006;332;pp.718–721

²¹ Summary Report of The RAISE Initiative Evaluation in Northern Uganda. Marie Stopes Uganda, December 2010

Figure 1**KEY INDICATORS FOR FAMILY PLANNING KNOWLEDGE AND USE IN FIVE DISTRICTS IN NORTHERN UGANDA**

3.3 Social Franchising

3.3.1 In many fragile and conflict-affected states such as Sierra Leone a diverse array of small, independent health care providers operating within the private sector offer services where state capacity is unable to meet local requirements alone. In such settings, programmes that harness these private providers to deliver key services at a requisite quality level and at an affordable fee to low-income users have been demonstrated to rapidly improve access to RMNH services.

3.3.2 In DRC, Population Services International affiliate organisation Association de Santé Familiale (ASF) has developed a social franchise called *Reseau Confiance* which delivers a variety of family planning services. The network, which aims to reach women in the lowest wealth quintile, covers 10 of the 11 provinces in the DRC and is further expanding. Despite challenges in meeting the demand and a low retention rate of clinicians and pharmacists that affects the system as a whole, the franchise has succeeded in providing over 1.4 million clients with family planning services from 2009–10 (inclusive). Other successes include the establishment of a hotline and the training of clinical staff in the insertion and removal of implants.

3.4 Voucher Schemes

3.4.1 As mentioned above, user fees may be a barrier to the utilisation of health services. Subsidising services, either through support to providers (supply side) or patients (demand side) can be an effective alternative to user fees.

3.4.2 Voucher schemes enable governments and private providers to work together to provide, regulate and monitor services which are free at the point of delivery. In Uganda, for example, MSI worked as a management agency with donors including KfW, the Government of Uganda and the World Bank to ensure that vouchers for STI and maternal health services were provided to women at a significantly reduced fixed cost. Established voucher schemes are providing good results, such as that in Kenya which ensured that 60,000 babies were safely delivered and 12,000 long acting family planning services were provided between June 2006 and October 2008

BlueStar Sierra Leone

The Marie Stopes BlueStar Healthcare Network in Sierra Leone has been able to reach young, marginalised and poor men and women through a combination of social franchise mechanisms and a voucher scheme. Through networks of independent providers such as the ones described above, MSI is able to ensure that good quality services can be made available at a very low price to targeted groups in the community through the use of vouchers.

To date, this approach of utilising non-state providers has generally been perceived as a “stop gap measure” required only until a comprehensive, nationwide network of government-run health outlets has been developed. Given how far many fragile and conflict-affected states are from providing universal access to health care

through government-run outlets, we urge DFID to recognise the role of non-state providers in meeting long-term health needs.

According to a recent World Bank report on conflict, security and development, reducing the risk of continuing cycles of violence requires a willingness to try new ways of doing business in humanitarian, development, security and mediation assistance in order to help build national legitimacy. Countries that have experienced fragility, it reports, have often succeeded in early confidence building measures through a pragmatic blending of policy tools and by calling on non-state capacity, both civic and international.²² The report maintains that the private sector is crucial for long term development in countries coping with violence. “Outreach to the private sector can help build a sense of the long term, which is critical for planning, investment in the future, and sustainable growth”.²³

4. Capacity Building

4.1 Capacity building of state and non state providers is essential to enable and expand the provider base for health service delivery.

4.2 Working through existing mechanisms such as the country Health Cluster as well as with individual government ministries and professional bodies will enable gaps and training needs to be identified and addressed.

4.3 Training of service providers in clinical skills is an essential gap which needs to be addressed.


4.4 Training of relevant government officials as well as direct service providers is effective in ensuring support at the administrative level for newly skilled providers.

CARE INCREASES UPTAKE OF FAMILY PLANNING DRC

Working with community mobilisers, local organisations the government at district, provincial and national levels, CARE was able to improve access to reproductive health services in Maniema health zone, Kasongo. Through training of health workers in short and long term methods of family planning combined with a multi-pronged behaviour change communication strategy, ever use of contraception significantly increased.

Figure 2

KEY INDICATORS FOR FAMILY PLANNING KNOWLEDGE AND USE IN MANIEMA HEALTH ZONE, DRC



RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Continue to show leadership in RMNH, including addressing unsafe abortion.

Recommendation 2: Strengthen mechanisms such as the BPHS, outreach, social franchising and voucher schemes which are effective vehicles for delivering health services.

²² World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, The World Bank, pp 118

²³ World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development, The World Bank, pp 122

Recommendation 3: Increase leadership in exploring how governments in fragile states, through forming partnerships and contracts with non-state providers, can develop state capacity and guarantee the provision of public services.

Recommendation 4: Support country level health cluster to develop and implement policies which will increase access to health services. All relevant actors, including WHO, UNICEF, WFP and UNFPA, international NGOs and national governments need to take responsibility for the implementation of RH services in fragile and conflict-affected states

Recommendation 5: Assess local capacities and identify how best to build upon and use these capacities to ensure a long-term, sustainable strategy for health service delivery and health system rebuilding. A systematic approach to local capacity building should include SRH clinical training and supervision, organisational strengthening, and network building.

Recommendation 6: Continue to show commitment to addressing health in conflict affected and fragile states, with long term funding. And to ensure that RMNH services are available to vulnerable populations, such as internally displaced the urban poor and those living in remote and rural areas.

May 2011

Written evidence from Merlin

1. Merlin is pleased to submit this response to the International Development Select Committee's inquiry on working effectively in fragile states.

2. Merlin is the only UK specialist agency, which responds worldwide with vital healthcare and medical relief for vulnerable people caught up in natural disasters, conflict and disease and health system collapse. Merlin's aim is to ensure that vulnerable people who are excluded from exercising their right to health have equitable access to appropriate and effective healthcare.

3. Key Points highlighted by this submission:

- I. Merlin welcomes the prioritisation of health and humanitarian need in addition to other critical areas in DRC as set out in the recent Bilateral Aid Review (DFID, 2011). We look forward to the forthcoming DRC country strategy—translating those commitments into action.
- II. There is no single “one size fits all” mechanism to deliver aid in fragile states. Aid mechanisms should seek to deliver: longer term predictable aid, be flexible enough to adequately support the relief to recovery transition, have strong administrative structures, be able to ensure financial probity and be based on accurate assessed need.
- III. Investment in and support to national institutions to deliver services is critical. For the health system this means meeting essential health needs and supporting the capacity of the state to deliver on its responsibilities. A strong effective health system is critical to a country's resilience.
- IV. Merlin welcomes DFID's focus on governance and security; strengthening security in DRC is an essential element to improving health outcomes in the longer term, particularly in eastern provinces.
- V. Merlin is developing guidance for health NGOs on engagement in fragile states.

KEY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES IN CONFLICT AND FRAGILE STATES

4. Merlin welcomes and strongly supports DFID's commitment to the Democratic Republic of Congo as set out in the department's Bilateral Aid Review (DFID, 2011). In that review, DFID announced six priority areas for engagement in DRC: Health; water and sanitation; humanitarian needs; governance and security; poverty, hunger and vulnerability; wealth creation; and, education. From Merlin's perspective the coalition government's prioritisation of fragile states is *critical* to progress against and achievement of the health-related MDGs. The reality is that, despite significant and sustained global political and financial investment in health generally over the past decade, in countries like DRC health indicators are worsening.

5. Merlin has worked in DRC since 1997 and during that time has witnessed successive humanitarian crises in the conflict-affected eastern provinces and despite pockets of improved access to health care and an improvement in the indicator for maternal health, there has been a decline in the overall national health situation for the Congolese people. In 1997 the mortality rate for under-five year-olds was 185 (per 1,000 live births); by 2010 this had increased to 199. Average life expectancy has fallen over the same period from 52.2 years to 48 and DRC has slipped down the Human Development Index from 142 to 168 (out of 169 countries).

THE MOST EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS FOR DELIVERING AID

6. Merlin supports the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review's (Ashdown, 2011) finding that from a funding perspective, the humanitarian system is not serving the needs of affected people as well as it might. Merlin's experience is that there is no “one size fits all” funding mechanism that meets the needs of all conflict affected and fragile states, but factors that contribute to an appropriate funding environment:

(a) Funding that supports a longer-term vision and is predictable

- (i) In conflict affected or fragile states where chronic crises occur over years, or even decades, six and 12 month humanitarian funding cycles are frequently inadequate. Health outcomes will not be improved through short term intervention alone; there is need for longer term planning and investment.
- (ii) In Maniema Province, DRC DFID has provided humanitarian funding to Merlin to support Kindu Hospital since 2002. However, until 2009 this project was funded through successive 12 month tranches requiring a viable exit strategy. In Kindu this means that a valuable period each year has been spent planning for a potential withdrawal of healthcare provision and leading to interruptions to normal activities such as staff training and the rehabilitation of the maternity and surgical wards (Merlin, 2007). Predictable and timely disbursements would mitigate disruptions such as these and longer-term planning would offer better value for money for donors than short term successive projects.

(b) Funding that is flexible, needs based and adequately supports the transition from relief to recovery

- (i) In DRC Merlin's programmes cover a range of geographical areas with very different levels of development status. Maniema province for example has shown greater levels of stability than North Kivu in the east allowing a shift to development programming which is crucial for supporting lasting peace. North Kivu in contrast remains highly unstable with continuing humanitarian needs of Internally Displaced Populations (IDPs).

(c) Effective administration and financial probity are critical

- (i) DFID currently disburses humanitarian aid to DRC through the pooled fund (PF) mechanism (the Common Humanitarian Fund). The PF applies to projects included under the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP) which outlines the annual strategic and operational plan for the UN and partners' humanitarian assistance in the DRC. However successive administrative challenges, poor working financial practices and delays in clearing funds has led Merlin to reluctantly withdraw from the process and we no longer apply for money from the PF in Maniema province. If the PF is to be an effective mechanism in DRC it is essential that its performance and internal processes are effectively and systematically monitored and reviewed.

DFID'S EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN GOVERNANCE AND NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS TO DELIVER SERVICES

7. The recent HERR highlighted the importance of strengthening resilience at country level—so that countries can better prepare for, cope with and respond to humanitarian emergencies. Merlin believes that a strong effective health system is critical to a country's resilience. In conflict affected and fragile states, building-in resilience requires action by DFID in three key areas:

(a) Support to strengthen the stewardship and management functions of the health systems

- (i) Long term sustainable delivery of health care requires that the state is able to take responsibility for the performance of the health system. In DRC although the Ministry of Health is responsible, in principle, for policy stewardship of the health system, in practice in some Provinces enforcement is poor and the Ministry lacks autonomy and capacity to decide, orient and direct health policy. Merlin is currently working with the Ministry of health to support its national health financing strategy process. In April Merlin supported the MoH to host a workshop to take forward the results of its February stakeholder's meeting; helping to clarify the "road-map" process and assign roles for different stakeholders.

(b) Support to national health planning, particularly in human resources for health

- (i) A comprehensive health plan, encompassing human resources planning, is a fundamental feature of an equitable health system and critical to its resilience in all countries. Merlin's Hands Up for Health Workers campaign is advocating for national health workforce plans in fragile states and would urge DFID to take action to support workforce plans at national level.

(c) Support to communities to build resilience in health

- (i) Community level health structures play a critical role in supporting the delivery of health care, particularly during times of crisis.

8. Merlin welcomes DFID's support to governance and security (DFID's support to the certification process for mining goods is essential to this). Across the Kivu provinces in the east, insecurity and violence remains a constant for large sections of the public, particularly women, and this insecurity continues both to create humanitarian needs and negatively impact on humanitarian access. Over 1.7 million internally displaced people remain unable to return home and getting assistance to the most vulnerable IDPs and those communities that host them is becoming ever more challenging. In 2010, UN OCHA documented 202 attacks in DRC against humanitarian worker a 10% increase from 2009 (ONGI, 2011).

9. Merlin is calling for the protection of health and humanitarian workers in conflict situations. Although health workers are legally protected under International Humanitarian Law, increasingly they are targeted by warring factions with little or no legal redress. At this year's World Health Assembly Merlin will be calling for support for health workers and urging DFID to lobby other WHO members to strengthen international compliance with Geneva Conventions to protect health and humanitarian workers in situations of conflict. A report carried out by Merlin looking at the impact of insecurity on health workers across 13 countries affected by conflict in the last 5 years found that almost all those interviewed said that personal security was constantly in their thoughts. 85% said that they felt insecurity "significantly impacted" on their ability to do their work (Newport, 2010). In 2008, 260 humanitarian aid workers were killed, injured, or seriously injured in violent attacks (HPG, 2009)—but even this figure doesn't reflect the full extent of the issue as many incidents against health workers are simply unrecorded.

WORKING EFFECTIVELY IN DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENTS: DFID STAFFING

10. The Committee has previously looked at the conditions of service of UK (DFID) staff in insecure environments such as Afghanistan; the challenges faced and the need to build up a cadre of staff with experience of living in insecure environments (House of Commons, 2008). Merlin concurs with the view that this experience is critical—enabling DFID staff to better understand the complexity of the challenges facing humanitarian actors at district and local levels in very remote locations. In 2010 DFID visited Merlin's project site (Kindu) in Maniema province. This visit was critical in that it helped DFID to better understand the huge logistical constraints in Maniema Province, the exceptionally low capacity of the health system and often negative influence exerted by local officials. Many of the Ministry of Health facilities—which Merlin supports—are extremely remote; some populations are accessible only by motorbike and fuel is not readily available; failures in the cold chain result in significant losses (even when they are reported). Visits are also valuable to both parties in that they can improve performance levels—identifying issues early that need to be addressed.

OTHER

11. The Committee may wish to be aware that, based on learning from our health programmes, Merlin is currently in the final stages of publishing guidance for NGOs "core principles for engagement by NGOs in fragile states". Merlin would be happy to share this with the Committee in due course.

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May 2011

Written evidence from Peace Direct

1. A NEW APPROACH TO AID IN CONFLICT-AFFECTED STATES

1.1 Peace Direct practices and promotes an unusual approach to aid delivery in conflict-affected and fragile states. We seek out successful local peacebuilding organisations, and fund them to carry out peacebuilding programmes they define and direct themselves. This gives them power over their own solutions and futures, and has distinct benefits in value-for-money, sustainability and effectiveness.

1.2 We call this approach "locally led peacebuilding" (LLP) and it is the core concept that informs this paper. We believe it has wider lessons for how all types of aid might be delivered in the future.

1.3 This is a fundamental break with the prevailing practice, in which international players decide priorities and utilise their own knowledge and personnel first—an expensive and slow procedure that leaves too little behind afterwards. The statistic that 40% of conflicts restart within 10 years of a formal peace treaty is indicative of the failings of this top-down, outsider-led approach.

1.4 Our goal is to help to bring about a world in which local people lead in the peaceful resolution of their own conflicts. To this end, we advocate that local capacity should be assessed and deployed first, with appropriate external support; and “outsiders” from the international community should be deployed only where local capacity is unavailable. In this scenario, a significant percentage of donor funds should be allocated to locally-led programmes, wherever possible.

1.5 DFID gave us an 18 month core grant in 2009–11, to explore our approach and to pool lessons from all of our peacebuilders at a series of knowledge-sharing conferences. Currently we fund a wide variety of peacebuilding initiatives in Sudan, DRC, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Kashmir, as well as closer to home in east London. Our insights are based on this experience.

CASE STUDY: COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL ORGANISATIONS IN DRC

The most recent quarterly report of the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS) in DRC highlights the failure to operationalise a new tribunal for South Kivu. Despite \$8.05 million allocated by 12 of the world’s biggest donors, a magistrate has not been found to occupy the new building in Bukavu.

At the same time, Peace Direct’s local partner, FOCHI, has created five local courts which are fully operational and supported by the local magistrate in Uvira. FOCHI estimates that this cost only £25,000, of which 60% was provided by the community in voluntary donations. FOCHI further estimates that the cost of maintaining the courts will be met 90% by voluntary donations.

During the same period, the existing operational magistrate dealt with only 8 out of 2,000 cases last year, and charged costs so high as to exclude most people in South Kivu.

This example shows the low cost, high effectiveness and sustainability of enabling local organisations to find their own solutions, which draw on local knowledge and community “buy-in”. By comparison, the internationally led option was slow, costly, ineffective and exclusive of the beneficiary community. The FOCHI project was supported by Peace Direct with DFID funding.

2. CRITIQUE OF DFID’S APPROACH

2.1 In our experience, DFID pays too little attention to the potential of locally led, grassroots organisations, while over-emphasising the value of building the capacity of national governments.

2.2 Clearly, DFID is not responsible for the continued fighting and suffering in eastern DRC. Nevertheless, DFID shares responsibility for an international approach that has treated DRC as a post-conflict state and failed to address the ongoing local causes of instability and fighting in the east. The national-level approach adopted by DFID and other international donors (including the UN) has ignored many of the local causes of conflict, such as land disputes and localised ethnic conflicts. The failure to address these root causes of violence and instability in DRC means that fighting and a humanitarian catastrophe continue, almost a decade since the signing of the various peace agreements.

2.3 In many conflict-affected states, central government has little reach outside of the main towns, or not into the conflict zone itself. In such scenarios, the main effective agents for peacebuilding are civil society organisations (CSOs), particularly local peacebuilders (LPBs). By focussing on national government, DFID is neglecting this existing capacity. Its emphasis on national government comes at the expense of building up capacity at different levels of government and within civil society. Presumably, the logic of this is that failed states fail because governments are not capable enough. Unfortunately, this ignores the fact that many failed states fail because the wrong people are in government or the government may lack legitimacy. Failed states are often characterised by oppression, corruption, self-interested politicians and a propensity to incite violence to divide society. Yet these are the people and institutions that DFID often chooses to support. It does not need to be this way. If a small proportion of the expenditure spent on government institutions was passed directly to inexpensive CSOs, DFID could impact effectively at both national and grassroots levels.

2.4 This would work during the primary phases of a conflict, when LPBs are the main indigenous force working to build and maintain peace. It would also work in the secondary, post-conflict phase, when national government may become more engaged and needs to be held to account by the community. In that secondary phase, LPBs that had received proper support could provide the nucleus for an experienced and reliable civil society to develop and flourish, at little further expense.

2.5 This would create a better transition from weak to strong government, as it is in the most vulnerable areas that civil society and social networks fill the gaps of the national government—resolving conflicts, supporting the neediest and providing basic services. When a government is visibly filling those gaps, civil society still needs support to move from “service deliverers” to “service monitors”, empowered to hold the government to account.

CASE STUDY: VALUE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN BURUNDI AND SOMALILAND

In Burundi, where ethnic conflict has become a political conflict, local civil society was able to keep peacebuilding on the UN and government agenda, despite resistance from the ruling party. If this had not happened, the government would have persuaded donors to focus on its priorities and not the priorities of local people. Such ability for a government to influence donor spending is dangerous where corruption is rife and politically motivated murders are a daily occurrence in communities.

*In Somaliland, as cited in our booklet *Ripples Into Waves*, a strong government was viewed as a predatory government by citizens. Encouraging the dispersion of power by supporting lower tiers of government and the development of inclusive civil society institutions, means that governments need to have regard to other representative organisations, such as trade unions, media, legal networks, faith organisations and business. This reduces the likelihood that large sections of the population will continue to feel excluded from power or will eventually return to using force to achieve their ends.*

2.6 Therefore there needs to be a better way of maintaining and strengthening the existing civil society before, and in parallel with, giving support to the government. Our central recommendation is that in every fragile state, DFID should allocate a proportion of funds specifically for strengthening local civil society. With an initial focus on LPBs, this fund could support civil society through the transition to holding governments to account as the country itself transitions to a more stable state.

3. KEY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES FOR DFID AND OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

3.1 *Support to local organisations can fill the gaps until government is ready*

We agree with the moves of DFID towards security and justice and its acknowledgement of the importance of local organisations. However, the latter is not always put into practice, with DFID resources still favouring government institutions which remain ineffective. Support to local organisations in parallel to central support could provide a better transition, with governments taking on responsibility from civil society when it is ready, as outlined above.

3.2 *Increase support to local organisations*

Providing aid to targeted local organisations can create a foundation from which other CSOs can be supported. Creating collaborative local networks and providing grants specifically to local organisations needs to increase.

CASE STUDY: TARGETTED AID TO LOCAL PEACEBUILDERS IN DRC

The support from DFID to the FSC Fund in DRC is welcome, providing regular small grants specifically to local organisations. More of this is needed, but the grants must be released quickly for it to be really useful in creating new ways of working that are suitable to the fast pace and urgency of fragile states.

3.3 *Stay connected with civil society*

In DRC, the UN and DFID still seem to view local organisations as not their priority, instead seeing it as someone else's responsibility—STAREC in the case of the UN and Christian Aid in the case of DFID's FSC Fund. In the latter case, this may make sense in terms of overcoming DFID's administrative limitations on many small grants but it distances DFID further from local civil society. This could lead to an unnatural focus on national government. DFID needs to ensure that it is connected to local civil society outside the main towns.

CASE STUDY: PLATFORMS FOR PEACE IN DRC

Peace Direct is supporting a network of 20 LPBs across the east of DRC. These local peacebuilders come from very rural areas in the heat of the conflict. They have conducted joint conflict analyses, developed strategies for local conflicts and proposed impressive collaborated projects. They provide excellent centres of information and could act as a constant conflict analysis resource at a very low cost: the South Kivu focal point has met 10 times, had 18 exchange visits and spent 6 days analysing the conflict for a total cost of less than \$4,000. They have created a platform of local peacebuilders with which the international community can engage. Involvement of DFID in this process would be welcome, an excellent opportunity to share knowledge and expertise and a means for DFID to identify LPBs that it would like to support.

Peace Direct has had discussions with FCO in Pakistan about replicating a similar model there.

4. MOST EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS FOR DELIVERING AID, AND RESULTS-FOCUSED AID

4.1 *Maintaining support for local peacebuilding*

PD recommends that a proportion of funding to fragile states is given specifically to support genuinely locally led initiatives. The amount may be specific to each country, but might comprise for example 10%. This would encourage more agencies to adopt the LLP approach and diversify the projects that DFID would support, as they would be highly context specific. It is recommended that local peacebuilders would be the first priority to build a functioning civil society during conflict. This would prioritise peace as a pre-requisite for

development and ensure a country emerges from conflict with a viable civil society that can support the government and hold it accountable.

CASE STUDY: ONGOING FUNDING FOR LPBs

The CHSF grant issued to Peace Direct was designed specifically for local peacebuilding and enabled a model of working which has been very successful. However, no similar grant has replaced that. We suggest that this kind of work is funded on an ongoing basis; that a proportion of funds in any fragile state is provided to local peacebuilding as standard; and that DFID HQ has a fund which promotes greater awareness of local peacebuilding globally.

4.2 Ensuring appropriate funding arrangements

Funding needs to be planned to meet the conflict needs of an area and the capacities of local organisations.

4.2.1 Often the issuing of grants can be exceptionally slow, to the point it can be useless for some peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities. “Rapid Response Funds” (RRF) can be deployed to allow local organisations to respond immediately to emerging conflicts.

CASE STUDY: RAPID RESPONSE FUNDING IN SUDAN

In Sudan, an unrestricted RRF to a local peacebuilding network has successfully supported very localised and cost-effective initiatives. These have not only resolved conflicts before they became violent, but they have strengthened civil society in those areas. Community-based organisations (CBOs) and individuals have access to a maximum of \$3,000 per initiative, and are mentored to implement the initiatives themselves, fostering a wider and stronger civil society.

In 2010, 13 significant conflicts were resolved by local CBOs, at a total cost of \$35,000, with a further 23 resolved at no cost. The unrestricted nature of the RRF meant that responses to conflict were versatile and appropriate, whilst strengthening very local CBOs by giving them the opportunity to implement solutions developed with the beneficiaries, leading to greater credibility within the communities.

4.2.2 Giving local organisations the ability to manage sub-grants, through relatively small unrestricted grants, would enable greater ownership of projects, strengthen civil society in an organic way, and provide a mechanism that encourages a diversified response.

4.2.3 DFID should ensure that its criteria for funding organisations maintain their rigor without using criteria that are likely to exclude smaller organisations. This may mean at times being prepared to take more risks in funding new partners, but it should allow for greater peacebuilding impact in the long term.

4.3 Identifying local capacity

Better assessment of existing capacities needs to be made from an early stage and civil society should not be seen as a nice “extra”, but instead as essential for rehabilitating a fragile state and holding governments to account. Analysing this capacity would enable DFID to better realise who was filling the gaps of government, providing outside expertise only where absolutely necessary. Such assessments are an essential step to identifying how local efforts can be scaled up.

CASE STUDY: IDENTIFYING SUCCESSFUL LOCAL PARTNERS

With DFID funding, our information website Insight on Conflict (www.insightonconflict.org) has identified over 500 local peacebuilders in 20 different countries. This is an essential first step to understanding what capacity exists and how it can be supported. IoC coverage of a new region costs approximately £2,000 to set up in the first year and £1,500 per year to maintain after that.

4.4 Scaling-up from local to national scale

DFID needs to give the opportunity for local organisations to prove that they are capable of working on a large scale. As the examples in our booklet Ripples into Waves demonstrate, LPBs can have a huge impact. Peace Direct recommends that DFID identifies three pilot areas to work with a network of local peacebuilders, develop joint conflict analyses at a local level and support collaborative but locally-led projects.

CASE STUDY: LOCAL PEACEBUILDING ON A NATIONAL SCALE

Our booklet Ripples Into Waves (appended) shows case studies of four countries where LPBs have made a national impact: Kenya, Somaliland, Mozambique and Guyana. It can be read on the Stabilisation Unit website at http://www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk/stabilisation-and-conflict-resources/geographic/search_result.html

5. HOW WELL DOES DFID SUPPORT CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND COMMUNITIES DIRECTLY?

5.1 There is still a big divide between funding structures and local organisations. Channelling funds through international intermediary organisations needs to be accompanied by a structure that keeps DFID connected to local civil society—this can be done through regular shared conflict analyses with local organisations.

5.2 More unrestricted funding needs to be provided to local capacities so that they can make their own decisions. In doing so, it creates an important process that develops communities and civil society together.

6. IS DFID ORGANISED TO WORK EFFECTIVELY IN DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENTS?

6.1 In DRC, there is not a single representative of HMG based in the entire east of the country, the region that continues to suffer from militia fighting and the worst impacts of the war. DFID should appoint a civil society liaison officer to support and engage with the networks and joint conflict analyses described above. It should also assess whether similar gaps exist in other conflict-affected states. A presence in the capital city is not always sufficient.

6.2 DFID's evaluation move from "attribution" to "contribution" is welcome, but more work needs to be done on monitoring and evaluation, to make it more accessible and less dependent on quantification. All agencies struggle with this aspect, and efforts by DFID recently to engage INGOs in developing this together have been welcome and should continue.

May 2011

Written evidence from Saferworld

INTRODUCTION

1. Saferworld strongly welcomes the decision of the International Development Select Committee to hold an inquiry into DFID's work in conflict-affected and fragile states. Saferworld has been working to prevent violent conflict and build peace in an increasing number of conflict-affected contexts for over 20 years. Our work in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa has been focused primarily in Uganda, Kenya and South Sudan. Whilst we currently do not have in-country programmes in Rwanda, Burundi or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), we have undertaken assignments in all three countries and believe our experiences in the broader region and globally have helped us to develop useful insights into the challenges of working in conflict-affected and fragile contexts. This submission draws on this experience and suggests areas for further investigation by the IDC in the course of its enquiry. We hope the Committee find these insights useful in assessing both DFID's and HMG's work in this area.

2. The case for Her Majesty's Government (HMG) paying increased attention to development in conflict-affected and fragile states (CAFS) is strong. The World Bank's *World Development Report 2011* clearly sets out the role of conflict in undermining development, describing insecurity as "a primary development challenge of our time."²⁴ According to the Bank, an estimated 1.5 billion people live in conflict-affected and fragile states and so far none of these states has met any of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).²⁵ Saferworld's own research calculated that armed conflict cost Africa around \$284 billion between 1990 and 2005—which is almost as much as the total amount of aid the continent received in the same period.²⁶ A significant proportion of UK overseas aid is directed towards CAFS and it is therefore right to scrutinise the use and impact of this aid with rigour.

Q1. Key development priorities for DFID and other government departments in CAFS

3. Saferworld broadly supports the priorities set out in recent HMG statements and documents on approaches to conflict and fragility. We believe DFID's "Peacebuilding and Statebuilding" approach²⁷—which prioritises support for inclusive political settlements, addressing underlying causes of conflict and fragility, supporting core state survival functions and helping states to meet the expectations of their citizens—provides a credible model for the role of international development actors focused on poverty-reduction in helping to address conflict and fragility in the developing world.

4. Saferworld further believes that HMG's commitment to significantly increase support for conflict prevention, outlined in the Strategic Defence and Security Review and in recent speeches by the Secretary of State for International Development is a positive step.²⁸ We look forward to the publication of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy which, we anticipate, will articulate more fully and give more detail on HMG's approach to conflict prevention. However, as stated in previous submissions²⁹, we believe the way the money is spent is equally if not more important than the amount itself. With this in mind, Saferworld proposes the

²⁴ World Bank, *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development* (2011), p 1.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ IANSA, Oxfam International and Saferworld, *Africa's missing billions: international arms flows and the cost of conflict* (2007), p 3.

²⁷ Presentation by DFID representative to BOND Conflict Policy Group, 11 February 2011.

²⁸ HM Government, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review* (2010), p44, paragraph 4.B.2; Andrew Mitchell, 'Development in a Conflicted World', <http://www.DFID.gov.uk/Media-Room/Speeches-and-articles/2010/Development-in-a-Conflicted-World/>.

²⁹ Saferworld, *Now for How: Turning Commitments into Action* (2009), [http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Now%20for%20how%20-%20Saferworld%20response%20to%20DFID%20White%20Paper%20\(August%202009\).pdf](http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/Now%20for%20how%20-%20Saferworld%20response%20to%20DFID%20White%20Paper%20(August%202009).pdf).

following two development priorities as being of particular importance for DFID and other HMG Government departments:

(i) “Upstream” conflict prevention and building resilient societies

5. While the ultimate goal of DFID’s work is poverty reduction, it is clear that, insofar as violent conflict undermines development, efforts to prevent it can make an important contribution to poverty reduction. Conflict prevention is therefore not only a legitimate goal in its own right but a necessary one for DFID if it is to make real progress towards its poverty reduction objectives.

6. As noted above, there has been a strong commitment to conflict prevention in a number of statements and policy commitments of the Coalition Government. As an organisation that has been involved in work to prevent conflict over the last 20 years, Saferworld has and continues to urge those committed to preventing violent conflict to understand these efforts as long-term in nature and fundamentally directed towards building resilient societies capable of managing conflicts peacefully.

7. If the international community is to be successful at preventing conflict “upstream”, interventions must, first, be based on a thorough understanding of the factors which are generating conflict within or between particular societies and, secondly, focus directly on these drivers of conflict. Violent conflict and insecurity are a product of dynamics within societies that can, with time and effort, be understood and influenced. Identifying the most relevant drivers of conflict in a particular context—such as people’s experiences of insecurity, social and economic exclusion and political injustice, for example—and directing interventions to address these drivers, will give DFID and others a much more realistic chance of success in these contexts.

8. It is crucial that the social, political and economic tensions identified in HMG’s in-depth analysis are addressed, primarily through efforts to build more responsive and accountable governments and more inclusive societies. This, in turn, means actively seeking the views and perceptions of those affected by and participating in conflict and involving affected communities in the design and delivery of appropriate responses. This is not.

9. With this in mind, Saferworld would argue that supporting the development of a stronger relationship between state institutions and broader society should be a key priority for DFID in CAFS. When implementing this, a balance should be struck between providing support to build state capacity and support to build the capacity of citizens and civil society to participate actively in political processes and to hold their governments to account. Saferworld recommends that the IDC conduct further analysis of the way HMG currently strikes this balance in Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo during its forthcoming field visit.

10. An upstream approach to conflict prevention should be defined by DFID as one that seeks to support democratic principles, good governance, social justice and human rights. HMG should be consistent, principled and strategic in offering real dividends to governments who support these ambitions and withholding them from those who do not.

11. Upstream conflict prevention should also, crucially, not be limited by timeframes rooted in target setting or budgetary cycles. DFID and others must accept the reality that societal change is a generational endeavour.

(ii) Prioritising support for effective and accountable security and justice services for vulnerable populations in conflict-affected and fragile contexts

12. Insecurity is, in itself, often a key driver of conflict. People also need paths to address their grievances in a non-violent way. For example, when members of a community feel insecure or wronged, they may be more likely to obtain weapons to protect themselves with or exact revenge, which, in turn, increases the likelihood that disputes may escalate into violence. Addressing insecurity therefore is a crucial element of preventing conflict in CAFS. If economic and social development are to be achieved, providing basic levels of security and access to justice are pre-requisites. States which are effective in providing high quality security and justice services also enjoy greater legitimacy as a result, and are better able to foster positive relations with their citizens.

13. To successfully address these challenges, security and justice programming must be based on the needs of those people actually affected by insecurity. Institutions that effectively respond to people’s security needs and are accountable to those they serve are more likely to succeed not only in the provision of basic levels of security, but also in the broader aim of strengthening the social contract between citizens and the state.

14. In addition to our work with authorities and security services, Saferworld’s experience of working at the community level, particularly on policing issues, has led us to identify a number of success criteria for programming in this area.

15. Firstly, it is important that we do not presuppose what makes communities feel unsafe or insecure, or restrict our definition of what constitutes “promoting security” to a narrow set of interventions. Saferworld has worked in a number of contexts to firstly identify the security priorities of particular communities, and then to establish regular fora in which community members and officials from the police, judiciary and local authorities can come together to discuss security issues and plan responses. Working with communities to help them identify and define their own security needs and develop appropriate solutions should be seen as a priority in

security and justice programming. This approach should inform and complement national level attempts to develop and reform security and justice institutions.

16. Secondly, DFID should be focused on both supporting the institutions that provide security and justice services, but also and equally importantly, on empowering civil society groups and communities to become involved in the oversight and decision-making of how their security and justice services are designed and delivered and hold their governments to account accordingly. A real commitment to supporting accountability is a valuable long-term investment over a range of sectors and policy areas.

17. Thirdly, in efforts to reform and develop security and justice systems, it is necessary to engage with a variety of actors. In many CAFS, those providing *de facto* security and access to justice do so on a non-statutory basis alongside (or in the absence of) state services. Any attempt to build, reform or develop formal security and justice institutions must recognise the existing and potential roles that informal structures such as paralegal committees and “traditional” mechanisms play and assess how these can be complemented by, or integrated into development efforts. In this regard, HMG must strike a realistic balance between its statebuilding agenda and the actual provision of security and justice in fragile environments. It should also be noted that the absorption of traditional mechanisms and actors into formal state structures may not be the route “traditional leaders” and community members will want to take or find most useful.

18. Lastly, as mentioned above, the types of change identified above are not likely to happen within the timeframes that many development programmes are designed for and restricted to. Both the development of effective institutions and the building of capacity at the community level to ensure those institutions are held to account are long-term endeavours that require investment to develop trust, confidence and legitimacy. A longer term approach will also increase the depth of intelligence on a particular context and therefore the HMG’s understanding of the most effective role it can play.

Q2. *The most effective mechanisms for delivering aid, and measuring results in CAFS*

Aid effectiveness

19. International assistance which is properly conceived and delivered has enormous potential to address the underlying causes of conflict and fragility. However, the current international aid architecture is not set up to realise this potential. Instead, a system that is excessively focused on support for the state risks entrenching the power imbalances and dynamics of exclusion which often generate violent conflict.

20. Aid effectiveness is clearly a very important and current issue both in the UK and globally. Over the past five years, Saferworld has undertaken various assessments of donor policy and aid effectiveness in CAFS (for example, Sri Lanka, Georgia, Uganda, Nepal, South Sudan). While we are broadly supportive of the aid effectiveness agenda, we are concerned with how it is currently being interpreted and implemented in fragile and conflict-affected environments.

21. This concern stems from what we would see as a selective and “overly-statist” interpretation of aid effectiveness principles. The “ownership” principle, which enjoys broad international support and was outlined in the *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness*, states that “partner countries [should] exercise effective leadership over their development policies, and strategies and co-ordinate development actions.”³⁰ However, “ownership” in this context is too often interpreted as lying with the state and not a combination of the state and its people. This in turn can lead to an approach which prioritises the “supply” side of governance—the state’s capacity for delivering services—over support which can encourage “demand” for good governance from communities and broader society.

22. Further concerns arise when an uncritical push for “alignment” between donor support and recipient countries’ national development strategies can—and in conflict-affected contexts often does—mean aligning with one of the actors in a conflict. Instead, Saferworld would encourage donors to apply the principle of alignment only for those governments pursuing inclusive and democratic policies, respect for human rights and international humanitarian law, anti-corruption measures and better governance.

23. Saferworld would recommend the IDC include an element of further assessment of how these concerns play out in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC during its field visit.

Results

24. In relation to DFID’s focus on results, Saferworld understands that there is a political imperative to demonstrate that UK taxpayers’ money is spent effectively. However, HMG should be careful to ensure that the drive to identify tangible results within fixed timeframes does not override a commitment to programmes which are, by their nature, long-term, and whose shorter-term impacts may be difficult to measure. Many of the points raised below are drawn from a new chapter on the Monitoring and Evaluation of Security and Justice programmes in the OECD DAC Handbook for Security System Reform which Saferworld was commissioned to produce.³¹

³⁰ OECD, *Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* (2008).

³¹ OECD, *OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform* (2007).

25. It is important to ensure that the way DFID measures impact is realistic and avoids falling between the twin traps of the “unattributable” (for example HMG’s 2007 conflict PSA indicator of “a downward trend in the number of conflicts globally”) and the limited realm of the easily quantifiable (counting the number of workshops held or training programmes delivered). Policies and programmes aimed at promoting changes in institutional and individual policies, attitudes and behaviour are often difficult to quantify meaningfully and require qualitative indicators to accurately assess, as much as quantitative ones.

26. Developing ways of assessing impact is widely and rightly recognised as challenging. Saferworld believes that a key part of such evaluation could be the measuring of public perceptions of safety and security in CAFS, undertaken through a co-ordinated range of activities such as large scale surveys, key informant interviews and in-depth assessments at a local level,³² along with corresponding qualitative assessment of elite behaviours (such as attitudes towards the media and opening of political space).

27. As upstream conflict prevention is such a long-term endeavour, assessing the quality of the *process*—whilst in no way a substitute for rigorous assessment of impact—will be important in ensuring that conflict prevention efforts “stay the course”. In this regard, and given the importance of inclusion and participation in successful security-building, Saferworld believes that it would be valuable to include an assessment of how well conflict-affected communities have been included in the planning, implementation and monitoring of the UK’s development and conflict prevention work in such process evaluations.

28. HMG will need access to funds where the tolerance rate for programme “failure” (as a result of attempts to work creatively in rapidly changing and unpredictable contexts) is set at a level that does not stifle innovation. If there is an expectation that a project which does not meet all of its specified objectives is automatically a “failure” it is likely to lead to the setting of very simplistic objectives that do not get to grips with the tough issues which need to be addressed.

29. Saferworld suggests that the Conflict Prevention Pool could be a useful resource in this regard, although we would highlight that HMG should provide an explicitly preventative focus to the Pool to protect against the way it has historically been used less to finance efforts to *prevent* conflict and more often to finance the UK’s *response*.

Q3. *Whether DFID works effectively in CAFS*

30. As stated above, Saferworld believes that DFID’s “Peacebuilding and Statebuilding” approach provides a good model for development assistance to CAFS, and indeed covers a number of the points made in this submission. We will therefore focus on the challenges to implementation that will ultimately affect the success or otherwise of this approach. In making a judgement on DFID’s effectiveness in these contexts, the Committee should consider the following implementation issues.

31. Translating commitments into action on the ground requires capacity, either within HMG or from outside. Without a clear idea of who will put HMG policy into practice and how, it is difficult to see how even the best strategies can achieve tangible impact. Saferworld recognises that HMG has faced serious pressure to “do more with less”. One response to this has been an increase in the outsourcing of HMG programmes, from design through to delivery and evaluation. While such an approach can fill vital capacity gaps and in some cases deliver better value for money, it should not be seen as an automatic choice or an easy option.

32. Implementing commitments to upstream conflict prevention will require HMG to critically assess the capacities and added-value of all available potential partners and devise a system to maximise their use. This could consist of consultation and ultimately the development of guidelines for HMG staff on when and which elements of programme design and delivery it is appropriate to outsource to external actors, and which areas require more hands-on strategic management from HMG. On the ground, finding the right partners requires ongoing recognition from HMG of the need to invest in developing staff to know the context well and giving them the authority to take political decisions and manage programmes flexibly.

33. Furthermore, the management and co-ordination of security-related programmes is inherently difficult, even when all functions are kept in-house. When many activities are outsourced, often to more than one actor, this adds an extra layer of complexity for donors, who bear ultimate responsibility for the programme. Negotiating the politically sensitive areas of policy and practice these programmes touch upon—as well as ensuring that they are integrated within wider national conflict prevention and poverty reduction strategies—will need sustained and proactive management as well as effective monitoring and evaluation.

Q4. *How well DFID works with multilateral organisations and non-traditional donors in CAFS*

34. The UK cannot often “go it alone”, and supporting societies to manage their conflicts without violence will, of course, require working in a co-ordinated and coherent way with international partners.

35. Multilateral institutions in particular have the potential to provide increased legitimacy, co-ordination and political consensus to conflict prevention efforts but there is work to be done before some are able to fulfil

³² See, for instance: Saferworld’s series of annual public perceptions surveys tracking changing perceptions of security and justice provision in Nepal (*Treading water?* (2010); *On track for improved security?* (2009); *Public safety and policing in Nepal* (2008)) and findings of selected district assessments (*Security and justice in Nepal, March 2010*), or—from Kosovo—*A matter of trust* (2010).

this potential. Saferworld therefore welcomes DFID's recent multilateral aid review (MAR) and particularly its conclusion that many multilateral organisations need to improve their performance in fragile states. However, we believe HMG can further build on this review, primarily by evaluating the impact multilateral institutions have on prospects for promoting peace and sustainable security.

UN

36. HMG's recognition in the SDSR that the UN has "primary responsibility for international peace and security" is a welcome recognition of the importance of effective working relationships between DFID and the UN, particularly in CAFS. However the relationship between DFID and the UN in pursuing a conflict prevention agenda suffers from a number of challenges that apply to the UN system more broadly. These include a lack of integration between the UN's own political, security, development, humanitarian and human rights efforts; weak co-ordination with NATO and other multilateral organisations such as the EU; and a failure to ensure conflict prevention plays a central role in UN efforts to foster global peace and security alongside more effective peacekeeping and peacebuilding. An effective working relationship between DFID and the UN in these contexts would undoubtedly benefit from efforts to address these more fundamental challenges. In the meantime, the commitments made in the MAR to supporting improvements in UNDP's work in conflict-affected countries, and ongoing support to the work supported by the Peacebuilding Fund are positive developments.

EU

37. The development of the European External Action Service (EEAS) provides an opportunity for the UK to push for more effective EU approaches to conflict prevention. This should include building a coalition of EU members that can encourage the EU to take a more systematic analysis of conflict dynamics within EU planning processes and address these through its Country Strategy Papers whilst using its political, trade and security policies to leverage the promotion of human rights and good governance. Further attention should continue to be given to ensuring the institutional development of the EEAS results in an approach that is effective in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The effectiveness of the EEAS in preventing and reducing violent conflict will be an important factor in determining how effectively the EU more broadly is able to deliver successful upstream conflict prevention and so, at least in the short- to medium-term, certainly warrants significant attention.

Emerging and regional powers

38. Several significant emerging and regional powers, such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa now play a far more significant role on the global stage than before. This includes injecting significant resources into developing countries, among them those affected by conflict and fragility, which in turn gives them considerable political leverage. These actors are increasingly likely to be in a position where they can reinforce or undermine the UK's own conflict prevention efforts. Engaging with them should therefore be a priority for HMG. It will require detailed analysis of the motives, modalities and impact of their development aid as well as their commercial, military and diplomatic engagements in CAFS. This analysis would help DFID and HMG understand the opportunities to promote peace and stability as well as providing a platform for stronger partnerships with a range of international actors. This in turn could serve as a basis for dialogue between the UK and other states to help define and develop ways of working towards shared peace and security objectives.

39. The UK and DFID in particular should also explore areas where the UK and non-traditional donors can undertake joint co-operative action. Initially these could be practical, small-scale "on the ground" projects that can be used as entry points to broader, strategic co-operation and norm-building in the longer-term. For instance, DFID already supports joint peacekeeping training and could develop further co-operative possibilities, for example, support to management of small arms stockpiles in conflict-affected countries.

40. Information about the role of emerging and regional powers as "alternative" donors in CAFS can be sensitive to gather. Saferworld suggests that this may be an interesting area of further research for the IDC during its field visit to Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC.

Q5. *Cross-Government working in fragile and conflict-affected states and regions*

41. Saferworld welcomes the initiative by the IDC to look at cross-government co-ordination. Clearly the potential for other departments beyond DFID to have both positive and negative impact on conflicts in the developing world means that it is important for a cross-governmental approach to be taken during this inquiry. However given there is currently no select committee with responsibility for looking across HMG at this broad impact, it is welcome that the IDC has taken the initiative to do so. In the medium term, Saferworld would point to the success of the Committees on Arms Export Controls, and suggest that this offers a good model for how multiple committees might joint together to form a committee which has a specific mandate to look at conflict issues.

42. Whilst context should always dictate approach, and it is not suggested that HMG adopt a "template" for addressing conflict, it may be helpful to give some indicative areas of how different departments could play a role in upstream conflict prevention. The following is a far from an exhaustive description.

MoD

43. The UK provides training for the armed forces of other countries and should ensure that it uses these to embed respect for such issues as human rights, democratic oversight, gender equality and the accountability of security forces. These trainings could also be used to identify champions for change and develop an ongoing relationship with these individuals.

44. The UK's defence community also has a key role, amongst other departments, in Security Sector Reform; Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration; and Defence Transformation programmes—but *not only as part of post-conflict stabilisation operations*. Long-term programmes to promote the democratic reform of security forces are an important tool for upstream conflict prevention. Not only does the defence community have expertise to add to these efforts but, in many contexts, HMG defence officials may enjoy greater traction in working to support reforms than their civilian counterparts.

FCO

45. The responses needed to address the underlying causes of conflict and fragility are often likely to be politically sensitive. By working to a shared strategy, and placing conflict prevention objectives firmly on the list of diplomats' priorities, HMG could ensure that its diplomatic service is both incentivised and empowered to provide high-level political support to conflict prevention efforts in-country, regionally and internationally.

46. The FCO leads the UK's engagement with many of the international processes underway to address drivers of violent conflict. By recognising the importance of these initiatives to upstream conflict prevention within the BSOS, additional political impetus can be given to the UK's efforts to secure successful outcomes from them.

DFID

47. DFID has a significant role to play through the way that its programmes in conflict-affected and fragile countries address underlying causes of conflict and fragility. Saferworld believes that DFID's "Peacebuilding and Statebuilding" approach provides a credible model for the role of poverty-focused international development in helping to build stability overseas.

48. Internationally, DFID can also use the reputation that it has built itself as a credible "pro-poor" actor with particular expertise in developing innovative ways of meeting the needs of conflict-affected populations to work with other donors and international institutions to advocate for the development and uptake of more appropriate ways to "do development" in countries affected by conflict and insecurity.

BIS

49. The UK is an important trading nation and Saferworld believes the UK's trading positions with other countries provide the possibility of a strong material incentive for promoting the uptake of democratic principles, human rights and social justice and so should be seen as a key component in upstream conflict prevention efforts: as should the full and proper implementation of controls on the UK's defence and security exports.

STABILISATION UNIT

50. "Stabilisation" efforts should be seen as one step in a longer process and attention given to how they can best lay the ground for, and hand over to, longer-term work. As such, although the Stabilisation Unit may specialise in immediate or "hot" stabilisation, it will be important to ensure this kind of work is integrated into HMG's broader strategic approach to any given country.

May 2011

Written evidence from Save the Children UK

INTRODUCTION

1. Save the Children is the world's leading independent children's rights organisation. We're outraged that millions of children are still denied proper healthcare, food, education and protection and we're determined to change that.

2. This submission has been drafted on the basis of Save the Children's work responding to emergencies and delivering essential services in fragile states around the world, including most recently in Pakistan, Ivory Coast and Haiti. Save the Children has built an international reputation for delivering education to children living in conflict-affected fragile states, which took place in the context of its international campaign Rewrite the Future, which aimed to enable three million children living in fragile states to go to school.

3. We have been working in Rwanda since 1994, when we helped trace parents or relatives of children who had become separated from their families and successfully reunited 40,000 children with family members. Since then, working together with local government and community-based organisations, we've helped thousands of

former child soldiers return to their communities and provided them with education and training so that they can earn a living. We work mainly in the North province, in Gicumbi district, and in three refugee camps. We're helping communities develop ways to protect their children and also working with the government to ensure that its policies take full account of children's needs.

4. We started work in the DRC in 1994, helping children who had fled the genocide in neighbouring Rwanda. We then began to work with Congolese children. Today we work in five of the country's 26 provinces: Kasai Oriental, North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Kinshasa, where we've helped reunite thousands of children with their families. Working with local and international partners, we're getting children back to school, providing them with healthcare, and protecting them from exploitation and abuse.

SUMMARY OF KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

5. In order to keep the balance between developmental and humanitarian work, it is important that the Department for International Development (DFID) keeps a tight focus on addressing the greatest need through its work, and does not allow a stabilisation agenda to draw them into focussing more on specific areas, groups or countries that are deemed strategically important at the expense of those in greater need.

6. The nature of funding in emergencies, and the Pooled Fund and the cluster system, can stifle innovation and prevent a transition to development work and early recovery activities; this can be avoided by increasing the proportion of funding dedicated to bilateral support.

7. The increased emphasis on "value for money" in DFID's work can be beneficial in maintaining accountability to both British taxpayers and the intended beneficiaries of DFID's work. However, this is only true as long as the nuanced understanding of value for money espoused in the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) is maintained; that is, avoiding a simplistic "cost per beneficiary" approach to focus on making the right choices to ensure maximum benefit over the long term and investing in appropriate levels of quality needed. This also extends to funding for staff safety and security.

8. As the HERR noted, it is particularly important to respond specifically to the needs of children in fragile states. This is true because their needs are specific and different to those of adults, and hence under-addressed; but it is also important as fragile states often consist of young populations, where children represent a majority of those affected by conflict or humanitarian disasters.

STATE FRAGILITY AND DEVELOPMENT

9. Fragile states are home to one fifth of the population of developing countries but contain a third of those living in extreme poverty, half of children who are not in primary school, and half of children who die before the age of five.³³

10. State fragility is a major barrier to development. Fragile states tend to have the greatest levels of income poverty, the highest rates of maternal and child mortality and malnutrition, the lowest levels of school enrolment and education indicators, and the worst-quality public services. They also tend to be characterised by high levels of violence and insecurity. While state fragility has moved up the international development agenda over the last 10 years, a much more concerted effort is required to tackle the complex development challenges that these states represent. Furthermore, a greater concerted effort must take place to build the capacity of civil society organizations to deliver projects that benefit communities, particularly in areas affected by conflict.

11. The role of the Department for International Development (DFID) in fragile states across Whitehall has been highlighted in previous DFID policies, and is likely to be increased through the Building Stability Overseas Strategy and the Department's role in the Stabilisation Unit. This could be helpful in emphasising the rights of children in fragile states.

12. Such a dividend for children can only be assured if the developmental and humanitarian objectives of DFID's work are protected. There should be separate indicators of success to measure progress towards reducing poverty and humanitarian suffering, as distinct from security objectives. This is just one element by which DFID can support independent humanitarian and development actors.

WORKING TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY IN DRC AND ELSEWHERE

13. Across the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the humanitarian and development situation is severe. Children and their families living in conflict-affected provinces, particularly North and South Kivu and Orientale, have complex and extensive humanitarian needs. The displacement of over two million internally displaced people (IDPs) adds to the challenges. As previous DFID policy statements have recognised, development and security are linked: violent conflict destroys life and development, while slow or uneven development fuels fragility and conflict.³⁴ The DRC has more than five million children out of school, with more than two-thirds of children living in conflict-affected areas remaining out of school or never enrolling in school. In rural parts of North Kivu, there are approximately 600,000 IDPs (although this was reported to be

³³ Using DFID definition of fragile states; Save the Children (2010) "Fragile States", p 4.

³⁴ Taken from DFID (2010) "Synthesis of country programme evaluations conducted in fragile states", p 6.

as high as 1.8 million in May 2009)³⁵ and only 34% of children have access to basic education, compared with 52% nationally.³⁶

14. DFID's approach to humanitarian and recovery needs must reflect the overall state fragility and poverty present in the DRC, as well as needs exacerbated by the conflict. Malnutrition is an underlying cause in nearly half (48%) of all child deaths in the DRC;³⁷ even in the five provinces that are not affected by conflict, malnutrition still claims the lives of 700 children every day, according to the Ministry of Health.³⁸ The number of malnourished children in East Kasai is nearly three times as high as the number in North Kivu.³⁹

15. The Pooled Fund, to which the UK gave \$47 million, put 27% of its funding into North Kivu and just 5% into the two Kasai provinces, East and West, from January to November 2010. The Humanitarian Action Plan for 2011 noted a "very high concentration" of funding overall in conflict-affected provinces.⁴⁰ The cause of malnutrition is underdevelopment and the needs that exist exceed humanitarian thresholds. There is, therefore, an imperative to respond which is not being met by recovery and development funds.

16. There are clearly huge needs in the conflict-affected areas of the DRC. In other countries, however, there is a risk that funding will be directed according to security priorities, rather than on the basis of need. This not only potentially violates recipients' rights, but is a short-termist approach to stability. In Sudan, the focus of aid budgets (both humanitarian and developmental) on the crisis in Darfur resulted in insufficient investment in South Sudan, where the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement had brought a limited period of stability. Failure to capitalise on the opportunities in the South at that time, including investing in security and development programming, affected the achievement of substantial peace dividends. The democratic dividend has so far contributed to peace, but the developmental dividend, the equitable and reliable provision of basic services, has yet to come. DFID should focus on addressing needs wherever they are and not be led by the stabilisation agenda to focus on a specific area, group, or country if there are greater needs elsewhere.

17. A similar scenario can be seen in Afghanistan, where aid has been explicitly used as a tool to obtain security in areas of ongoing conflict. This focus has meant that areas that were relatively stable, and offered greater potential for development, have been neglected.⁴¹ In some cases these areas have then become increasingly unstable, just as decision-makers are coming to the view that the "demonstration effect" of investing in poor but stable areas has significant value.

THE IMPACT OF FUNDING STRUCTURES

18. While the DRC Pooled Fund comprises only 15% of total humanitarian funding, its relative accessibility and transparency make it an attractive donor. The UK put 70% of its £42 million humanitarian funding to the UK into the Pooled Fund in 2010, comprising 62% of the total Fund.⁴² This "demand and supply" equation gives the Pooled Fund significant weight, presenting a number of tensions that need to be managed.

19. The Pooled Fund is allocated according to the Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP), which is compiled through the cluster system. For well-run clusters, this provides an opportunity for all actors to contribute to an impartial and useful overview of humanitarian needs. Where cluster leadership is weaker, however, an incentive emerges for humanitarian actors to engage in the clusters in order to get funding for their organisations in the future, rather than simply for the benefits of improving the quality and coordination of the overall humanitarian community's response. If clusters are not well-led (ie focussed on identifying and filling the gaps in humanitarian response, and on improving the quality of that response) then they can become a forum instead for organisational fundraising: the HAP is compiled through the clusters, so an incentive to focus on fundraising rather than quality and coordination can skew the clusters and therefore the Humanitarian Action Plan away from a more reliable picture of the humanitarian needs.

20. DFID has a responsibility as a major donor and supporter of the Humanitarian Reform process to ensure Cluster Lead Agencies provide clusters in chronic emergencies such as the DRC with the right staff and resources for quality, needs-based cluster leadership in line with the Principles of Partnership (equality of humanitarian agencies, transparency, result-oriented approach, responsibility and complementarity), agreed by UN and non-UN humanitarian agencies in 2007.

21. By concentrating funding in the DRC Pooled Fund, as with any country-specific pooled funding mechanism, DFID is limiting its contributions to funding for transitional or early recovery activities. The life-saving mandate of the Pooled Fund, and the time and monetary value limits on Pooled Fund allocations, exclude funding for medium-term interventions that address the causes of humanitarian needs. The limited scope of life-saving criteria also proscribes key intervention areas, including education. Since other major

³⁵ Save the Children, Barriers to Accessing Education in Conflict-Affected Fragile States: DRC (2009).

³⁶ Education for All -Global Monitoring Report "The hidden crisis: armed conflict and education" 2011, pg 158.

³⁷ International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), "Global Hunger Index. The challenge of hunger: focus on crisis of child undernutrition", <http://www.ifpri.org/publication/2010-global-hungerindex>, 2010

³⁸ UNICEF Hunger Index, 2003.

³⁹ Humanitarian Action Plan 2011, p 42.

⁴⁰ Humanitarian Action Plan 2011, p 8.

⁴¹ ODI (2011) "Security, humanitarian action and development: navigating a shared space for international engagement in fragile states", p 3.

⁴² Humanitarian Action Plan 2011, p 9.

donors such as the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) have similar restrictions, NGOs can find it difficult to obtain funding for long term activities.

22. Over-reliance on the Pooled Fund can also stifle innovation: the Pooled Fund has strict regulations on the kind of timeframes and activities it can fund. If donors concentrate their funding in the Pooled Fund, this then crowds out funding for less conventional approaches or more expensive responses in hard-to-reach areas. In order to address this, DFID should increase the proportion of its funding dedicated to bilateral support, particularly for transitional and early recovery activities.

23. The need for increasing bilateral support to cover gaps in Pooled Funds is exemplified in education interventions. In 2009, for example, global funding for humanitarian appeals only covered 19% of the needs for education.⁴³ Overall, education accounts for a small share of humanitarian appeals, and an even smaller share of the appeals that get funded.⁴⁴ This severe under-funding is a particular issue in the DRC, where humanitarian aid requests for education in the HAP totalled just US\$25 million in 2009, of which only 15% had been delivered by the middle of 2010. As a result of this, many schools serving displaced children are threatened with closure because of shifting donor priorities and short-term budgeting.⁴⁵

DEFINING VALUE FOR MONEY AND QUALITY AID

24. In these austere financial times, DFID's prioritisation of value for money, including in operational plans for fragile states, represents an understandable effort to ensure accountability both to beneficiaries and to UK taxpayers. Indeed, to the extent that efforts to assure value for money increase DFID's accountability to these two constituencies, they can help to improve the effectiveness of DFID's work in fragile states. However, concerns about value for money should not preclude high-quality assistance being provided, based on the local context and needs.

25. This view was reflected in the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR), which recognised that in the early hours of response—when the priority is to save lives—value for money should not be an overriding concern. The HERR includes a dynamic definition of “value for money”, arguing that “value for money is about the optimal use of resources to achieve the intended outcomes. It is about the optimum combination of costs and quality of the goods and services to meet the needs of beneficiaries. As in all other areas of HMG spending, it is not just about the lowest cost”.⁴⁶

26. DFID has also shown an understanding of this; despite considering a “unit cost per beneficiary” approach during the 2010 Pakistan floods, it recognised the flaws of comparing projects with radically different overheads (eg a protection programme with a shelter programme). As DFID further develops its strategies for working in fragile states, a key method to ensure the “optimal use of resources” while not reducing the quality of programming would be to lay out a transparent framework for assessing programmes on value for money. The HERR also makes recommendations in this regard, which are applicable to DFID's wider non-humanitarian programming, calling on DFID to:

“Build up a library of results, costs of inputs, outputs and outcomes from different countries and regions and different types of disasters in order to be able to carry out effective unit cost analysis and enable fast evidence based decision-making. Share this where appropriate with other donors.”⁴⁷

*Approaching “Value for Money” Effectively: DFID's Response to the Samangan Earthquake*⁴⁸

27. Value for money is often best attained through investment in quality, rather than on reducing costs per item, as DFID demonstrated in Samangan, Afghanistan in 2009. In response to an earthquake in the region, DFID provided winterised tents, which were very well received by beneficiaries. These were high value items (the cost of 1500 tents totalled 250 000 GBP, including flights) and are very hard to obtain in the first phase of an emergency.

In this instance, DFID clearly focused on quality where it is was needed in an emergency response. Winterised shelter, although expensive, has multiple impacts on other sectors, such as allowing families to go back to work (livelihoods); reducing the risk of child trafficking and attacks on women (protection); and supporting human dignity. The tents are also life-saving in limiting exposure and preventing some weather-related respiratory infections. A strict cost-per-beneficiary approach might have ruled out this successful and important decision, so DFID staff are to be commended for recognizing and supporting the quality needed.

⁴³ Global Education Cluster, Education and Inter Agency Appeals, Funding Review March 2010.

⁴⁴ Education for All -Global Monitoring Report “The hidden crisis: armed conflict and education” (Summary Document), 2011, pg 31.

⁴⁵ Education for All -Global Monitoring Report (Summary Document), 2011, pg 31.

⁴⁶ Humanitarian Emergency Response Review, 28 March 2011, p 51.

⁴⁷ HERR, p 55.

⁴⁸ Save the Children submission to the HERR, December 2010.

Staff security costs: not an optional extra

28. “Value for money” is also sometimes cited a reason for cutting “overheads”. However, these overheads often include vital funding for staff safety and security. Fragile states, even those not affected by political conflict, are often insecure and difficult places in which to work. These factors increase operating costs in ensuring the safety, security, and mobility of staff. Development work in fragile states requires more expensive programme support—such as transport and security overheads—than similar work undertaken in more stable development contexts.

29. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA)’s recent report into the delivery of aid in high-risk areas, “To Stay and Deliver”, notes that “over the last decade aid worker casualties have tripled, reaching over 100 deaths per year.”⁴⁹ The same report demonstrates that the prevailing funding environment is not conducive to effectively meeting security costs, noting “that the ‘safety and security’ line in appeals, where it exists as a standalone line, remains the most under-funded of all the sectors.” It goes on to suggest that “common security needs are not well articulated and security actors do not know how to fundraise for them”.⁵⁰

30. As DFID mainstreams a “value for money” approach into its operational planning in fragile states, it must work to alleviate the strains on funding for safety and security. In operational plans, it should recognise that professional staff security for NGOs will require increasing investment in staff recruitment of senior managers, as well as travel, training, and supplies, such as communications equipment. Proposals supported by DFID in fragile contexts should be encouraged to have an adequate budget line for security to cover these requirements.

RESPONDING TO THE SPECIFIC NEEDS OF CHILDREN: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE DRC

31. In considering its approach to fragile states, DFID’s effectiveness will be coloured in part by whether it addresses the specific needs of children. Responding to the different needs of children in fragile states is not merely a case of addressing the needs of a particular vulnerable group, though this is important. Rather, addressing the needs of children often means addressing the needs of the majority. This was recognised by the HERR, which argued that “children, defined by those under the age of 18, make up at least 50% of affected populations in most of the emergencies around the world. Humanitarian assistance that does not assess and address the needs of children may be ignoring the majority—and would therefore potentially be failing to have the greatest impact”.⁵¹

32. Too often, donor responses are “child-blind”. To ensure that it works effectively in fragile states, DFID must ensure that its priorities and practices do not fall into this trap. One example of where donors and other actors, including local and national authorities and the UN, have traditionally failed to address the needs of children, is in responding to gender-based violence, including sexual violence, against children. This problem is particularly acute in the DRC.

33. The brutal conflict that has ravaged the DRC has been called “a war against women”, with DFID recognising that the DRC has been described as “the worst country in the world to be a woman”.⁵² Given the extent to which sexual violence has marked the conduct of the conflict in the DRC, rape has been described as “the war within the war”.⁵³ It is therefore right that amongst its five “top priorities” for DRC, DFID cites:

- “Protecting innocent civilians and reducing sexual violence by helping turn the police into an accountable, community based service”.
- “Improving basic health services and bringing maternal care and family planning services to hundreds of thousands of women”.⁵⁴

34. In order to respond effectively to the needs of survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), however, DFID must ensure that it responds to the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children, whose needs may not be met by services targeted at adults. Given the extent to which children have been victims of SGBV in DRC, it is vital that child-specific services are developed as part of a wider range of responses. SGBV against children in DRC is an area that has not received sufficient attention and its root causes are often poorly understood. Specialised responses that cater to the specific needs of child survivors of sexual violence have therefore been slow to appear. This gap has developed in spite of the fact that a March 2009 UN report found that 45–60% of rape survivors were under 17 years old, and that of these, 10% are less than 10 years old.⁵⁵

35. Gender-based violence against children in the DRC may take the form of sexual exploitation (including transactional sex), prostitution, sexual violence and rape and sexual slavery. A full analysis and deep understanding of SGBV is crucial to guide effective working in the DRC. In addition to the types of sexual

⁴⁹ OCHA, *To Stay and Deliver*, 2011, p 1.

⁵⁰ OCHA, *To Stay and Deliver*, 2011, p 33.

⁵¹ Humanitarian Emergency Response Review, 28 March 2011, p 29.

⁵² <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/where-we-work/africa-west—central/congo-democratic-republic/?tab=0>

⁵³ Sir John Holmes, cited in Gittleman, J, “Rape Epidemic Raises Trauma of Congo War”, *New York Times*, 7 October 2007.

⁵⁴ <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/where-we-work/africa-west—central/congo-democratic-republic/?tab=0>

⁵⁵ UNSG Report (S/2009/160) March 2009, para 69 states that during the reporting period of the cases of rape reported to them 35 to 50% were aged between 10 and 17 years of age and in addition a further 10% of cases were under the age of 10.

violence enumerated above, other types of gender-based violence against children have been exacerbated by the conflict. Often, pre-existing discriminatory practices such as early marriage, forced marriage and domestic violence are at the root of problems. Moreover, due to the fear of becoming victims of rape and sexual violence, particularly on the way to schools, girls miss out on essential years of education, which sets further obstacles in achieving gender parity in education. Moreover, while there has been a reported reduction in the percentage of rapes committed by armed men, forthcoming research by Save the Children suggests that abuse by civilians is increasing.

36. To meet its objectives of protecting civilians and reducing sexual violence, DFID must recognise some of the flaws in current response mechanisms and address the specific needs of children.

37. Responding to gender-based violence—the failure of response to address children’s needs in the DRC:

- Community-based approaches are often inadequate to deal with the scale of violence experienced by children, especially when parents and communities themselves are suffering because of the conflict. Prevention mechanisms often focus exclusively on rape, rather than other forms of gender-based violence.
- *Reporting*: despite the establishment of a number of reporting mechanisms, reporting of SGBV has not significantly increased due to geographical constraints, fear of reprisals and impunity, and fees and legal obstacles.
- *Medical Response*: Smaller medical facilities in remote towns and villages do not have the capacity to respond fully to SGBV cases. Of particular concern is the fact that special training is not given on the specific needs of child survivors.
- *Psychosocial*: Many NGOs intervene in the area of psychosocial support for survivors. However, direct one-to-one counselling sessions are limited to only a few centralised locations, and for the most part last only a short time, with less importance placed on mental than on physical health. Some clinics or hospitals informed us that they only referred the most traumatised of cases for counselling; but it only once counselling sessions have commenced that it is possible to judge the level of psychological impact, especially with children.
- *Legal response*: Once a case is referred to police services or the judicial system there are certain key blocks to response to a child rape cases: lack of payment for civil servants leads to bribe requests; there is a lack of services adapted to children’s needs; and children are required to testify directly in front of the perpetrator.

There are certain concrete steps that DFID should take to improve its effectiveness in preventing and responding to sexual and gender-based violence, including against children, in the DRC.

38. Prevention activities should adequately take into account the needs of children and address root causes of GBV:

- Donors should support the DRC government, UN agencies and NGOs in highlighting the impact of discrimination and SGBV on children, particularly girls, in eastern DRC; this could include integrating campaigns for girls’ education into SGBV prevention programming and better links between education programmes and SGBV prevention.
- Information about SGBV should be collected more systematically in order to help support responses, including disaggregation by age and other factors.
- Donors should support work with communities and community based organizations (CBOs) to address negative attitudes towards women; early marriage; behaviours expected of girls that put them at risk; and other discriminatory practices.

39. DFID should support service providers to respond to the needs of children, and understand that their needs will not be met through the provision of generic SGBV services:

- The DRC government should ensure that national protocols are developed to ensure appropriate response to the needs of child survivors of SGBV. Barriers to reporting should also be addressed, through means such as stricter confidentiality among service providers, fee waivers, and other methods to prevent shame or further exploitation.
- The DRC government, UN agencies and NGOs should ensure that medical, psychosocial and legal practitioners are trained in how to deliver integrated services designed for the specific needs of children.
- The establishment of community-based child-to-child reporting networks should be supported to ensure that violence against those without parents, or whose parents are the perpetrators, does not go unreported.

40. DFID and the wider UK government also have a key role to play in international efforts to end impunity for SGBV in the DRC:

- The DRC government should report back to donors on progress made specifically in reporting, investigating and prosecuting allegations of SGBV by all perpetrators. Further, the government should ensure that the 2009 Child Protection Law is understood and enforced, in particular in relation to the prohibition of child marriage.
- The international community should provide wider support for ending the impunity of SGBV perpetrators and ensuring justice for the survivors of SGBV perpetrated by non-armed actors.
- The parts of the international community who are supporting the national government, national security sector reform and the DRC government must continuously reinforce zero tolerance of abuses of civilians by the DRC armed forces (FARDC) and the various armed groups that have been integrated into the army.

May 2011

Written evidence from Social Development Direct

CREDENTIALS

I have over 15 years experience in working on violence against women and related issues in fragile and conflict-affected states. My country experience includes: Afghanistan, the Balkans, Burundi, Cambodia, Côte d'Ivoire, Darfur (Sudan), Liberia, the Southern Caucasus, Rwanda and Sierra Leone. I have worked for the UK Government in many countries, most latterly as Senior Justice Adviser to the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Helmand, Afghanistan. I was also the Senior Human Rights Adviser in the Conflict and Humanitarian Department (now the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department) of the Department for International Development and was the Gender Adviser in a consultancy role to the UK Stabilisation Unit. I have worked for the UN in many countries, including UN DPKO, Department of Political Affairs, UN Women/UNIFEM, UNICEF and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Since 2005, I have provided specialist training for staff members of the UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs, the Stabilisation Unit and DFID CHASE on the implementation of UNSC Resolutions on women, peace and security.

I am currently the CEO of Social Development Direct. Although I write this in my personal capacity, I have the benefit of knowledge resulting from our work.

Annex A consists of a summary of points arising from an analysis of DFID Country Office Operational Plans conducted by Social Development Direct.

This submission is based on an understanding of violence against women in fragile and conflict-affected states across the globe, rather than specifically on the countries of particular concern to the IDC.

BACKGROUND ISSUES

Who is affected? Women and girls are the victims of gender-based VAW in FACS. Women who are associated with the “other side” in an armed conflict can be targeted because of their real or perceived allegiance, to send a message to the men of the other party or opportunistically (soldiers passing through a village will usually rape the women and girls). Sexual violence may be held out as a reward to members of an armed group or armed force.⁵⁶

Poverty, marginalisation and discrimination or social exclusion on the basis of factors such as race, ethnicity, tribe or geography may make women more vulnerable to attack on the basis of their gender. We also know, however, that in situations of genocide, where the elite tend to be targeted first, women who are positions of power or influence may be especially targeted. Although they are targeted on the basis of their ethnicity or position within the social structure, the violence enacted against them is gender-based—possibly to “bring them down a peg”. Please see **Recommendation 1** below.

Girls (under 18) are particularly vulnerable to VAW. Perpetrators of violence against women in conflict situations do not stop to consider the age of the girl or woman. Although VAW is perpetrated against women of advanced years (often even very old women), girls are targeted because they are sexually attractive (and can become “trophy”) because they are of child-bearing age (commanders who have fathered multiple babies gain more status as “real men”), because they are useful in other ways (eg in armed groups, girls can be sexual slaves/“wives” and fighters, cooks, logisticians etc). Please see **Recommendation 2** below.

Why? Violence against women and girls in times of conflict or other fragility does not arise without precedent. It is both a form of discrimination against women and girls⁵⁷ and is a result of gender-based discrimination. For example, the men who rape women in the DR Congo are accustomed to thinking of women

⁵⁶ The difference between armed forces and armed groups is that the former consists of the military elements of a national state whereas an armed group is not. Ref Article 4, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict.

⁵⁷ General Comment 19, CEDAW Committee.

as commodities, as of less value than men and as objects for fun.⁵⁸ In conflict situations, male members of armed groups or armed forces tend to immediately consider rape when they meet women from the “other side” or as a consequence of their fighting actions. I have not been in one conflict-affected country where women say that rape or other violence against women or girls did not exist “before the war”. They always describe an escalation in the violence or a change in the nature of violence, but never that it arose for the first time in situations of violent conflict. Please see **Recommendation 3** below.

Prevention or protection?

The international community—particularly at operational level (please see Annex A for a summary of recommendations arising from an analysis of DFID Country Office Operational Plans), has tended to focus on support, care or response to the impact of violence against women. Response, after-care and palliative treatment is crucial to women’s survival of violence and stabilisation and cohesion. For instance, after the genocide in Rwanda, women who had been infected with HIV were dying while some of the perpetrators held in the ICTR received anti-retro viral (ARV) treatment to keep them well for their trials. Civil society (AVEGA and others) raised this issue with DFID and other donors, resulting in a programme of support to victims of rape who were HIV +.

At the same time, after-care does not prevent rape or other forms of violence against women. Nor is it sufficient. Sometimes, people can recover quickly from human rights violations (such as forced displacement) if they can be returned to a position of status quo ante. VAW is not such. Women who have been raped or had their sexual parts mutilated may carry that with them for the rest of their lives. While the impact of the violence is deeply personal, it goes further than the individual, threatening to destabilise entire communities and preventing those women from participating in public life, peace building and state building.

It could also be that we have failed to take action to prevent violence against women in conflict or other times of fragility because there is a level of violence which is considered acceptable or tolerable. Women have always been singled out for particular types of violence in conflict and there can be a feeling of inevitability and defeatism about prevention. In Darfur in 2004–05, women and girls in camps for internally displaced persons risked rape by the “Janjaweed” (government-allied armed groups) every day in the course of collecting firewood because it was considered “too dangerous” for men to go out of the camps. While international agencies tried to find ways to *reduce* the need for firewood, there was little concerted effort to ensure that women did not have to leave the camps at all, or to protect the women who had to leave the safe perimeters.

Make violence against women “mission-critical”: In Afghanistan, DR Congo and many other fragile states where the international community has a deep involvement, violence against women is not yet regarded as “mission critical”, yet there are opportunities to do so. In DR Congo, for instance, the close liaison and programming links between DFID and the IRC programme on sexual violence are an excellent start. In Afghanistan, on the other hand, it is lamentable that DFID programming pays little attention to violence against women, despite the gross violations of women’s rights that continue across that country.

Women remain invisible from public life because of discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion and so are not the immediate partners for international intervention. Their information, contribution and capacities are not considered important—not because the international actors are misogynist but simply because women are not present in public life. Women do, however, want to be present in public life and have as much to offer as men. A lesson can be learned here from the UN Security Council who now, as a matter of routine, ensures that when conducting country missions, they meet with women’s representatives.⁵⁹ Please see **Recommendation 4** below.

RECOMMENDATIONS

As stated above, international interventions on violence against women tend to focus on “care and support”. It is necessary, in my view, to place interventions within a broader framework of integrating gender into all peacebuilding, state-building and humanitarian programming. International actors should not be coy about addressing gender-based discrimination in these contexts. Tackling violence against women can be a catalyst both for addressing gender-based discrimination **and** for addressing wider issues. Examples here include (i) *Security Sector Reform* (eg efforts to ensure that the police are equipped to deal with violence against women leads to police being better equipped to investigate all serious crimes, to respond appropriately to community demands and—at the very basic level—have sufficient transport and infrastructure to perform their work professionally), (ii) *Humanitarian programming* (eg consulting women and men about how to prevent and address violence against women and girls leads to improved management of refugee/IDP camps, more efficient delivery of humanitarian assistance (food, shelter, water, sanitation, education) and enables women to adopt roles that empower them and allow them to better contribute to the recovery of their communities) and (iii) *Prison sector reform* (eg where girls and boys or women and men are in prison together, there will be sexual violence. Addressing this by providing better facilities for children and adults in conflict with the law results in improved prison conditions for everyone, an audit of who is in prison and why and an improved system for the rule of law).

⁵⁸ “The Greatest Silence” Lisa Jackson Films.

⁵⁹ Ambassador Chowdry (Bangladesh) ensured that when the UNSC visited Kosovo, they met with women’s organisations’ although it meant scheduling a meeting for 11.00 pm. Since then, UNSC missions routinely meet with women’s organisations.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

I co-authored the *Post-Conflict Needs Assessment: PCNA Tool-kit Note on Integrating Gender Perspectives* (Annex B), which identifies **six principles**. I adopt these here for addressing violence against women:

1. *Recovery needs differ by gender and age* and should be taken into account. This is at the heart of gender mainstreaming (as described by ECOSOC). Women's, girls', boys' and men's needs are different from each others. Effective programming *actively* takes this into account, as well as addressing the differing capacities and opportunities presented by women, men, girls and boys. For instance, violence against women varies in its form and prevalence—which can help governments and their partners to identify the causes and nature of fragility (eg the inscribing of hate messages and demands on women's bodies in Mexico in the conflict between drug gangs and the government tell us).
2. *Gendered marginalisation must be consciously reversed*: In order to tackle violence against women, it is crucial to address the underlying causes, namely gender-based discrimination and social exclusion. Cultural considerations are important here, for which international actors should follow the lead of women and women's organisations in the material country. Efforts to combat violence against women constitute the **opposite** of imposing external values on a local culture. It means listening to solutions that women and men themselves have identified.
3. *Violence against women must be addressed from the start and adequate resources allocated*: Conflict and early warning indicators of fragility or violent conflict often include an escalation of violence against women or a change in the types of violence against women. This can be either within the home (eg Serbia in the run-up to the war in the 1990s) or in the community (eg Rwanda—attacks on Tutsi school-girls, propaganda inciting violence against Tutsi women from 1992 onwards). Acknowledging these changes means creating the opportunities for women to approach and be heard by international as well as national actors. Response should be investigative and immediate—delay can be fatal. This necessitates having adequate gender expertise within international agencies (including bilateral donors) to be able to recognise the signs and to liaise effectively with women's organisations; they will bring this information forward.
4. *Expertise on violence against women cannot be assumed. It must be recruited or commissioned*. Even where there are gender advisers in position, they must be able to recognise and respond to violence against women and to be aware of the connections between women's participation in public life and violence against women. Responsibility for addressing violence against women should not lie with the gender adviser, however. Team leaders, heads of mission, substantive advisers should all have violence against women and gender generally included in their terms of reference and job specifications. The specific terms will need to be context-led. For instance, a Stabilisation Adviser deployed to the DR Congo should automatically have violence against women included in her/ his ToR as a main component.
5. *Cultural sensitivity should not be a cover for violence against women or any other form of discrimination*. In many cases, pragmatism in conflict-affected societies overrides traditional practices (eg where men have migrated or have left their homes to join armed groups, women take on traditionally "male" roles). International interventions should use these opportunities, in collaboration with women and men from the affected communities. In efforts to ensure cultural sensitivity, international actors need to be careful about whose notion of "culture" is accepted, and not reinforce or exacerbate existing or pre-existing discrimination. Drivers of conflict may have interests in promulgating particular notions of "culture" or "tradition" that do not resonate with the rest of the community—particularly women and girls.
6. *Gender-balance*. While the presence alone of women in prominent positions in international agencies does not guarantee any or appropriate attention to violence against women, a good gender balance is a prerequisite for tackling violence against women. Women in positions of influence in international agencies set a role model both for women and for men who may be reluctant to accept that women can take up these roles. It is sometimes easier for women and sometimes easier for men to challenge violence against women or other discriminatory practices.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS (FROM THE TEXT ABOVE)

1. International agencies should be alert to signs of increased or changing types or prevalence of violence against women—including violence or the threat of violence against women in influential or elite positions, as well as those in more marginalised sectors of society. At the same time, steps should be taken to find out about the experiences of those without immediate access to international decision-makers. Innovative measures such as interactive radio programmes and asking for statistics from hotlines, safe spaces for women and teachers should be made standard practice in fragile or conflict-affected states.

2. Violence against girls needs to be addressed as a matter of the utmost urgency. Girls are children and so are entitled to protection under the terms of the Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as other international and national law and policy. No matter what the cultural or national notions of girls reaching womanhood, they are children until they are 18 years old. Donors and bilateral agencies can provide support

to child protection agencies and insist that the latter address violence against girls in all their programming (eg schools, vaccination initiatives, child DDR).

3. Addressing violence against women means addressing underlying issues of gender-based discrimination. This does not need to be a longer-term activity but can be tackled in the earliest stages of stabilisation or before violent conflict takes hold. For instance, in Sierra Leone after the rebel incursion into Freetown in 1999, there were thousands of girls made pregnant by rape. They were all excluded from school because of discriminatory legislation that prevented girls with children or pregnant girls from attending mainstream schools. As well as providing alternative education as a matter of urgency, the UN helped the new government to repeal these discriminatory provisions. Initiatives to improve, for instance, the rule of law should include addressing violence against women as a catalytic approach and as a matter of routine, thus.

4. HMG fact-finding and investigative missions should include, as a matter of routine, meeting with women's organisations and representatives. The mainstreaming of violence against women also means that monitoring and evaluation indicators should make explicit reference to reducing the incidence and improving the response to violence against women and girls. This cross-references with the need for expertise in the area (above).

July 2011

Written evidence from Fiona Lloyd-Davies, Studio 9 Films

INTRODUCTION: FIONA LLOYD-DAVIES

I am a journalist, photographer and film maker and have worked in eastern DRC since 2001. I have been making films, current affairs programmes and documentaries for the BBC, Channel 4 and Al Jazeera English for the last 19 years. The main focuses of these films is human rights issues in areas of conflict and have taken me to work in places such as Bosnia, Iraq, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo and many other locations. My film about Honour Killing in Pakistan *License to Kill* for BBC2 in 2001 brought a change in the law in Pakistan and was awarded a Royal Television Society award for Best International Journalism. I received a second RTS award in 2005 for the films I made with Salam Pax, the Baghdad Blogger, for BBC2's News night programme, showing everyday life for Iraqis. Between 2003–06 we made over 20 films for News night.

I first visited eastern DRC during the war in October 2001 when I went to Shabunda in South Kivu. I reported that 70% of the women had been raped. Since then I have continued to return to Eastern Congo, making films and reporting for News night, BBC3 and Al Jazeera; as well as for print and NGO's. Today I find that most women have now been raped four or five times and their children from rape have been raped too. Women and girls now expect to be raped.

I am currently making a film for Al Jazeera English, the third broadcast film in the last 18 months from Eastern DRC (the other two were for the BBC and were broadcast in 2010 and 2011). The focus of my work has been mainly on sexual violence against women, but I have also worked closely on issues about child soldiers and the demobilization of militias.

My continuing visits to Eastern DRC, mean that I have been, and continue to work, closely with a number of grass roots organizations in rural areas, who are operating outside of the main towns of Goma and Bukavu.

Examples of my work can be seen at the following links:

Women's Voices from DRC 2011

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mp2_Ps5phdo

Some examples of photographs from DRC: 2001–11

<http://studio9films.co.uk/pages/photos1a.html>

Newsnight: Bunia 2003

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yE8iwNnob4I&playnext=1&list=PLC3574844B8924F10>

BBC 2010 and repeated 2011—"The World's Most Dangerous Place for Women"

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/bbcthree/2010/03/the-worlds-most-dangerous-place-for-women.shtml>

BBC 2010—"Stacey Dooley Investigates...Kids with Guns"

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00v781z>

INFORMATION

I: *Rebecca Masika Katusva*

Since 2009 I have filmed with and done extensive interviews with a woman survivor of rape who has started her own centre to help other women. Rebecca Masika Katusva has been gang raped four times since 1998. On the first occasion her husband was brutally murdered in front of her and her two young daughters were also raped. She has suffered extensive physical and psychological injuries herself.

II: *The Centre*

She has set up her own centre on the outskirts of the small market town Minova, in South Kivu, to help other survivors. The location is rural but through her system of volunteers she has outreach to a wide area in South Kivu. She receives small and irregular funds from various sources but despite the insecurity of finance, has created a centre that has and continues to help many thousands of women, children and men, who have experienced and survived sexual violence, rape, and severe physical injury. At present she has 19 children living with her aged from six months to 15 years old. Some are orphans, children from rape who have been rejected and young girls who have been raped and rejected by their families. The centre has been running for 10 years and has helped over 6,000 women. Last year she was awarded the Ginetta Sagan Award by Amnesty International.

<http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-mission-and-the-movement/the-ginetta-sagan-fund/ginetta-sagan-award-winners/page.do?id=1104610>

III: *The Centre comprises*

- a listening room;
- clear and precise records of who has come to the centre, with a brief history of each person (name, date of incident, numbers and if possible identity of perpetrators);
- rooms where she and her family live but also where she puts up new arrivals;
- food;
- medical care;
- informal psychological treatment through talking to her, her volunteers and other survivors;
- reuniting women with their husbands and/or families; and
- a communal farm.

IV: *What she does*

- *Finding survivors who need help:* through her network of volunteers, Masika either goes to villages which have been attacked, or her volunteers bring her people. This includes men, as well as women and children.
- *On arrival:* they are debriefed by Masika. She takes a personal history but also uses this time to tell them that they are not alone, and about what happened to her. This has proved to be hugely effective in helping the victim start to try and accept what has happened to them. There are only six trained psychologists in the whole of DRC, despite no formal training she is providing much needed counseling.
- *Medical care:* Masika takes them to hospital if they need medical care. She will pay for the care herself (the victim will probably have no funds and no one to pay for any treatment they may need). Some arrive virtually naked, with few if any possessions having fled an attack on their village, or because they have been thrown out of their house after the rape. She will continue to help with their medical care as long as she can provide the funds.
- *Accommodation:* Initially the person will stay with her, where she feels better able to help them with their immediate psychological needs. In the past she has also funded new houses which she has arranged to be built for survivors. To date she has built over 50 houses for people who have passed through her centre.
- *Food and support/ the communal farm:* When she has funds, Masika rents a field where the survivors come to work. Here they prepare the ground, plant seeds to grow crops together. This will not only generate food but also produce which they can sell. The income generated means they can buy more seeds and plant more crops. In addition this is a time and place where they all come together. As they work, they talk; giving each other vital support that otherwise would mean total isolation for each person. Most of these people have been rejected by their spouse and/or their family. They will have been thrown out of their community without anything, no means of support, often without their children. Not only have they survived very severe physical and psychological trauma from the rape but also the rejection of everything they have ever known. This community support and bonding is vital for them.
- *Reunions:* Masika works with local chiefs to reunite people with their families. This involves often lengthy negotiations. Husbands usually don't want to take their wives back especially if they have a baby. Often she will have to get a medical certificate to prove the woman is not infected with HIV or any other STD. She has been successful in getting a number of men to take back their wives. Without these reunions women will have a very difficult and insecure future.

- *Education:* Masika pays for the school fees, so the children under 18 who are living with her, can go to school. For the boys who are products of rape this is particularly vital. Without a father they will not inherit any land and have no social standing or income. If they are educated she believes that at least they have a chance to get a job, which may enable them to buy their own land, and with it some kind of place in society. Without this kind of support and understanding, these children could well go and join a militia, only to repeat the pattern of violence their fathers have started.

V: *The need*

Such is the danger for women, and increasingly men, that rape continues whether there is fighting or not. In times of peace when there is little or no fighting, Maskia receives on average four or five new cases a month. When there is fighting she expects this number—four or five—per week, if not more.

RECOMMENDATIONS

I: *General*

Having worked in a number of different areas in North and South Kivu (as well as Ituri) for ten years, I have found that effective grass roots organizations, run by civilians for civilians outside of the main towns, are rarely, if ever, being supported by any kind of funding. Despite this, Congolese communities have found a way to run extremely efficient, low cost organizations that provide essential services and are helping to rebuild the country. They need small amounts of support, which will transform their ability to help many more thousands of people in rural, hard to reach areas, that otherwise are left neglected.

II: *The Masika Model*

Rebecca Masika has created a holistic model that provides all aspects of care—from identification of victims, to immediate needs through to aftercare. She does this at very little cost, with rarely any kind of salary for her or her volunteers. At present she is funding this centre through ad hoc donations, and income generated from selling various produce she or the collective have grown.

This model could be:

- (a) funded to enable Masika to continue with it (she is psychologically exhausted by the constant struggle of keeping this enterprise going);
- (b) funded to record Masika's own model that has proved so successful; or
- (c) copied and formalized so that centers like hers could be started in other areas. With a concrete model, training and empowering other survivors like Masika, could be defined and then replicated across Eastern Congo.

II: *Costs*

- The costs are low, for example \$250 pays for the rental of a large field for 12 months and for a large quantity of seeds. The produce will generate more than this, enabling the collective to pay off the rental, rent the field again with more land, and buy more seeds.
- Using her model of networks of volunteers (or paying small amounts of money) a vast network could be built up at low cost and become self perpetuating.

III: *Benefits*

- Providing holistic care to a section of society who are in desperate need at a minimal cost.
- Rebuilding women's (and men's) lives which in turn will rebuild Congolese society in a peaceful way.
- Providing psychological care as well as physical care. Masika's model of counseling could be used to create desperately needed psychological, grass roots treatment.
- Stopping the cycle of violence.

Written evidence from Tearfund

1. Tearfund welcomes the opportunity to contribute evidence to this Select Committee Inquiry into DFID's work in fragile and conflict-affected states. This evidence is based on our experience in supporting partners in all three countries and delivering programmes directly in DRC. We hope that it will be useful to the Select Committee and may also inform their forthcoming visit to the region.

2. Tearfund has cautiously welcomed the Bilateral Aid Review and the decision of DFID to continue working in a broad portfolio of countries. We support the decision to spend 30% of ODA on fragile and conflict-affected states by 2014 as it is right that DFID does not just withdraw from difficult contexts and give up on some of the most vulnerable people as a result. Correspondingly, we have also supported the decision to continue investing in some of the poorest communities in India. We believe that UK aid should be spent where the need is greatest and most of DFID's recent decisions appear to be in line with this principle. We do, however, have concerns about the withdrawal from Burundi which we will outline in this submission.

3. Our evidence will look at each country in turn as each has a very particular context. Having said that, there are a number of cross-cutting themes that should be prioritised by DFID across the region, including tackling violence against women. Our recent report *Silent No More*,⁶⁰ which explored the theme of sexual violence with case-studies from DRC, Burundi and Liberia, highlights the extent to which sexual violence is endemic. Recent reports have estimated a much higher incidence of rape than previously thought—a study in the American Journal of Public Health found that 400,000 females were raped in a 12 month period between 2006 and 2007. In Liberia, our research found that sexual violence was mainly committed against girls under 17 years old and of course it can often also occur within marriage.

4. The report also highlights that faith communities can have a critical role in tackling gender-based violence. Victims often have confidence in their faith leaders, and may seek help and psychosocial support from them. Most faiths will consider sexual violence un-acceptable and therefore have the mandate to fight it. Having said that, it is also true that some faith communities and faith organisations will condone one form or the other of sexual violence and may have inadvertently encouraged the perpetuation of sexual violence against women. These communities must not be ignored but should be proactively engaged in any strategy aimed at tackling violence against women. DFID has identified violence against women as a priority theme within its business plan and we would ask that DFID consider working with faith groups in the development of some of their pilot projects (see examples below) as, if included in the right way, they could play a significant role in tackling stigma and breaking the silence around this taboo subject.

5. Across all three countries, Tearfund would like to highlight the central role that faith communities are playing in the transformation of communities and this is often the case in fragile and conflict-affected countries where the state is weak. About 80% of primary education is provided by faith-based organisations in DRC, and whilst we would argue that the state must eventually secure basic services for all, the role of the church and other civil society organisations should be acknowledged and appropriately supported. Until the state is able to guarantee basic security and develop a robust tax base, civil society organisations (and faith-based organisations in particular) will continue to lead on the provision of basic services and will in some areas, be the sole employer or agency delivering social welfare.

DRC

6. Tearfund is working through partners in DRC (such as ECC and HEAL Africa) and directly supporting the reintegration process by working with host communities and returnees and helping them to re-establish their lives and their communities. Our Disaster Management Team is working in the east of the country; in North and South Kivu and Maniema Provinces. Current projects are based in Uvira and Baraka districts in South Kivu, Kailo and Pangi territories in Maniema, and Rutshuru Territory in North Kivu. The programme is currently assisting around 170,000 people, with an annual budget of £2.5 million, and currently employs around 150 national and 15 international staff. Tearfund's current projects include food security, agricultural extension work, schools reconstruction, water and sanitation provision to schools, health centres and communities and public health promotion. Given the high incidence of cholera in the region, Tearfund works alongside communities, building networks of community health-workers and with the local authorities in the formation of cholera response.

7. Tearfund welcomes the increase in funding to DRC through the Bilateral Aid Review (BAR) process and also the inclusion in DFID's priorities of:

- Helping ensure that everyone has the right to vote in democratic elections;
- Working to stop the illegal exploitation of minerals; and
- Protecting innocent civilians and reduce sexual violence by helping turn the police into an accountable, community-based service.

We also welcome the target to bring clean water to six million people by 2015.

⁶⁰ To download this report please visit www.wewillsspeakout.org

8. On the devastating subject of sexual violence, Tearfund is urging DFID to explore faith-based responses and would also encourage DFID to invest a portion of its funding to improve healthcare, and women's health in particular, in services provided to women recovering from the trauma of sexual violence. The following two examples demonstrate how the potential of churches and FBOs can be harnessed:

- (i) In Eastern DRC the Baptist Community in the Centre of Africa (CBCA) run over 400 schools and 100 training centres in North and South Kivu provinces. In this area of DRC, approximately 75% of schools are run by churches and the church has mobilised its members, teachers, pupils and parents to become key players in the fight against sexual violence.
- (ii) In Goma, Tearfund partner HEAL Africa has been working for many years, providing emotional, medical and practical assistance in collaboration with local churches. HEAL provide specialist medical care and are one of the only places in DRC where women can go to have the surgery that they need as result of brutal sexual violence.

9. Water and sanitation is a particular challenge in DRC and a recent UNEP report (Water Issues in the DRC: challenges and opportunities, 2011) has estimated that 74% of the population in DRC (approximately 54 million people) lack access to safe drinking water. The DRC will not meet the MDG water targets despite having over half of Africa's water reserves within its borders. In this context, we would have liked DFID to have been more ambitious in setting its BAR targets and hope that DFID's investment in water and sanitation will lead to them exceeding the target set of reaching 6m people by 2015. We would also urge DFID to champion the Sanitation and Water for All partnership at a global level, and to encourage more donor countries to sign up to this initiative.

10. More needs to be done on sanitation, the most off-track MDG target in sub-Saharan Africa. In Tearfund's 2007 study, carried out with ODI and our DRC partner PPSSP (Programme de Promotion des Soins de Sante Primaires en Zones de Sante Rurales), we found that there was a complete void in terms of policy and planning on sanitation and hygiene.⁶¹

11. Since September 2007, Tearfund has been delivering the DFID-funded (CHASE) WASH programme in seven fragile and conflict-affected states, one of which has been DRC. The others include Afghanistan, South Sudan, north Sudan, Liberia, Haiti and Myanmar. The project's focus is on increasing the capacity of local partners and local and national government departments to support improved access to clean water and sanitation and better hygiene behaviour. The project has a strong focus not only on practical methods for delivering access to WASH but also on capacity building, innovation and lesson learning. It is not a stand-alone operation but rather offers "value added" to broader programmes. We have welcomed the opportunity to partner with DFID on this programme and would urge them to continue investing in these kinds of community-based projects.

12. The exploitation of minerals, as noted by DFID, is also a considerable problem in DRC and addressing the mismanagement of natural resources is an area where we would like to see UK leadership. DFID has been working with the World Bank on the PROMINES project in DRC, offering technical assistance that will bring the DRC closer to compliance with the EITI (Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative). Whilst this work is welcome, Tearfund would urge DFID to go further and actively champion "*Publish What You Pay*" legislation in the UK and at a European level. This would require all UK and EU oil, gas and mining companies to disclose the payments that they make to foreign governments. We hope that this increased level of transparency, in line with Dodd-Frank legislation (section 1504) passed in the United States, will enable more resources to be made available for basic services like water, sanitation, health and education. In 2008, exports of oil, gas and minerals from Africa were worth roughly nine times the value of international aid to the continent. There is enormous potential for this sector to contribute revenue that could be used for meeting the MDGs and we would urge the UK Government to do all that it can to champion EU legislation that will shine a light on the resources that should be available for this purpose.

13. The elections later this year are of critical importance and we would urge DFID to do all it can to support the democratic process and ensure that the elections are fair and open, and take place in a context of peace and political stability.

RWANDA

14. DFID's strategy in Rwanda over the last few years has been to channel the majority of its bilateral aid through budget support and as a result civil society organisations have felt more distanced from DFID. Tearfund's local partners have reported that they have been unable to access DFID funding. This issue was highlighted in DFID's evaluation of its Rwanda programme (p.43, 2006), a report which recommended that country offices "*employ new aid instruments in a way that does provide spaces for civil society involvement*". Whilst Tearfund recognises the valuable role that budget support is playing in Rwanda, it is also important that DFID has a clear strategy for engaging with CSOs, particularly in holding the government to account.

⁶¹ *Sanitation and hygiene in developing countries: identifying and responding to barriers—a case-study from the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Tearfund/ODI/PPSSP, 2007).

15. DFID's decision in budget support countries to spend at least 5% of budget support on accountability strengthening measures⁶² should be helpful in this regard. Tearfund would urge the DFID country office to use this funding to support a diverse range of mechanisms and organisations and to avoid putting all of this funding into just one or two organisations or networks. It is not always clear how legitimate or representative and NGO platform is and in order to ensure genuine accountability, it is important to make funding decisions carefully and work through a range of channels.

16. In Rwanda, Tearfund has five partners with extensive reach across the country. Some of the partners projects in the north, eastern and western provinces have become models of community empowerment and poverty eradication. The delegation would be welcome to visit the Burambi Community project in northern Rwanda or the Nyamasheke community in western Rwanda to see how churches are contributing to community empowerment and transformation.

BURUNDI

17. In Burundi, Tearfund has five partners with extensive reach across the country, none of which have received DFID support. As with Rwanda, it has proven difficult for Tearfund partners, and other civil society organisations, to access funding.

18. Tearfund would like to echo comments recently made by the Anglican Archbishop of Burundi whilst launching the *Silent no More* report at Lambeth Palace, who called on DFID to rethink its decision to withdraw funding to the country when need is still enormous. The decision to close the DFID programme seems especially strange given that Burundi was listed in the top quartile of countries analysed for "need-effectiveness" (p 19, BAR Technical Report) and is still defined by the UN as a Least-Developed Country (LDC).

May 2011

Written evidence from both Twin and Fairtrade Foundations

BRIEF INTRODUCTION

1. Twin is a development charity specialising in developing smallholder agribusinesses and export supply chains into mainstream markets. Twin has been working in Eastern DRC for over three years and has helped set up a smallholder, Fairtrade certified, coffee export business in Kivu supplying Sainsbury's supermarket, supported by a DFID-funded Food Retail Industry Challenge Fund (FRICH) project that is managed by Sainsbury's. The Fairtrade Foundation is the UK member of Fairtrade International, the global standard setter and independent certification body for products carrying the FAIRTRADE Mark.

EVIDENCE

2. Twin, Sainsbury's, Finlay's and Comic Relief established a consortium in 2009 in order to rehabilitate smallholder speciality coffee production in Eastern DRC for export and distribution in the UK market. The project is funded by DFID under a FRICH project and will run until 2012, with £250k provided by DFID and the consortium match-funding DFID's grant.

3. In Eastern DRC, Arabica coffee is grown by tens of thousands of smallholders across the mountains from Butembo in the province of north Kivu to Fizi in South Kivu. The infrastructure and trade of this area has been in decline since independence, and was devastated in the conflicts following the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Formal coffee exports collapsed due to the conflict and insecurity, leading to more than half the crop being smuggled, and in many places farmers abandoned their land. Over the last three years, the security situation has stabilised, and work to re-establish civil society and to rebuild infrastructure has begun. Although the situation remains fragile, conditions now exist in which the Arabica coffee sector can be rebuilt.

4. In the DRC the FRICH project has focused on developing Sopacdi, an organisation of coffee farmers based on the North-West shore of Lake Kivu, into a democratically controlled and professionally-run export agribusiness. The aim of the project is to add value to the coffee through improved processing, direct export ex-Goma, organic and Fairtrade certification and marketing the coffees in the speciality sector. The Fairtrade certification guarantees the producers a minimum price, stability and pre-financing, as well as a "social premium", approximately 10% of the minimum price, which the cooperative can invest in its business or community. Since the project started in 2009, Sopacdi's membership has increased from 284 to 3,200 producers, of which over 600 are women. The organisation has been legally registered as a cooperative and the first democratic elections of leaders were successfully conducted in August 2010. Building on this project, Twin is now working with two further coffee cooperatives in South Kivu, which could extend benefits to a further 6,000 farmers and their families.

5. Over the first two years of the projects, Sopacdi increased its volume of production from 15 tonnes to 76.8 tonnes, with an estimated 153 tonnes in 2011. Sopacdi's turnover in 2011 is estimated to rise just above \$1 million. The average farm gate price received by Sopacdi members increased from \$0.80 per Kg in 2009

⁶² <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/DFID-business-plan.pdf>

to \$2 per Kg in 2011 and the members will receive an estimated Fairtrade Premium of \$65,000 in 2011, which will be used to strengthen the business and invest in social projects. A limited edition DRC and Malawi coffee blend, including Sopacdi's coffee, was launched by Sainsbury's in the UK for Red Nose Day and Fairtrade Fortnight, to date selling over 19,000 packs with a retail sales value of £30,000.

6. A lack of productive occupation, especially among younger people, provides fertile conditions for those seeking to foment and fund violence. Conversely, Sopacdi are specifically motivated by the desire to bring communities of the different ethnicities who have previously been in conflict together with a common economic interest and purpose. This is being worked out in practice by the inclusion of three tribal groupings within the cooperative.

7. With the support of this project, Sopacdi has demonstrated the capacity to produce and export a product of the highest international standard. The coffee holds its own in the market purely on the basis of quality. Fairtrade and organic certification then assure it's environmental and development credentials. The market demand and growth potential was reaffirmed when Twin and the president of Sopacdi met buyers at the Specialty Coffee association of America's annual trade show in April 2011. Demand for Sopacdi's high value coffee already exceeds supply by a wide margin, with interest for thousands of tonnes per annum over the longer term.

8. Although difficult to measure, the marketing of products from fragile or conflicted affected states does much to challenge and change perceptions, particularly in import markets where buyers' and consumers' opinions are affected by years of negative news stories. In this context, Fairtrade can act as a catalyst to influence industry, consumers and policy makers and open up new business opportunities and promote investment. Nasser Abufarha, the founder of Canaan Fair Trade and the Palestinian Fair Trade Association, talking about their experience of exporting from a conflict zone, says, "We didn't choose this conflict. It was imposed on us. It's regrettable that the majority of countries only see Palestine and Palestinians in the context of conflict. We are working to change that image by presenting our farmers and artisans and the high-quality products that they create".

9. While it is difficult to draw general conclusions from one project in the DRC, we believe our experience suggests there are further opportunities for DFID to promote broad-based economic development and to help rebuild local markets and exports even in fragile and conflict-affected areas. We note the following potentially significant implications from our experience to date:

- (a) That despite continued insecurity and the lack of rule of law there are significant opportunities to strengthen rural livelihoods, and kick-start broad-based economic growth through targeted business development programmes, involving social-private partnerships between the private sector, NGOs and local institutions. However, without DfID/donor aid as a catalyst, it is unlikely such partnerships would be formed given the significant risks and logistical barriers to working in fragile states.
- (b) There is the potential to spread the benefit of these economic opportunities widely through inclusive business models in the agricultural sector that benefit marginalised households, in particular women, help rebuild civic institutions, and involve significant growth linkages in the rural economy. Export agriculture, particularly focused on traditional cash crops, represent an important opportunity and stepping stone for broad-based economic rehabilitation in DRC and Burundi.
- (c) Fairtrade can play an important role in facilitating market access for smallholder businesses, by leveraging private sector investment, consumer markets and linkages to service providers. By providing a floor price, access to finance and an additional price premium, Fairtrade helps address some of the specific challenges producers face in fragile and conflict affected areas.
- (d) Existing business investment and market development opportunities are not exploited due to real and/or perceived transaction risks; there is a need for new public funding and risk sharing mechanisms tailored to fragile and conflict-affected areas.
- (e) Engagement in social-private partnerships helps to raise awareness at supplier and retailer level of the issues faced by small-scale producers, as well as raising the profile of their products and encouraging improved coordination along the supply chain.
- (f) As well as donor aid, success in this area depends on specialist expertise and skills, so donors needs to consider how they ensure that agencies with such skills are able to prosper in a competitive environment.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION

Given that DfID is one of the few departments whose funding has been ring fenced, we would recommend the following:

10. Establish a specific challenge fund for social-private partnerships (drawing on the FRICH model) aimed specifically at promoting inclusive business models and market development in fragile and conflict-affected areas. The levels of investment, in both infrastructure and business development, need to be at a scale commensurate with both the needs to develop the supply chain and the demonstrated level and value of demand.

11. In addition to the challenge fund, DFID should consider offering guarantees, indemnities, insurance and other financial instruments for commercial/NGO actors that overcome the significant risk barriers they face when investment in fragile and conflict-affected areas.

12. Provide support services to help social-private partnerships manage personal and organisational security more effectively and efficiently.

May 2011

Written evidence from Union for Democracy and Social Progress

BACKGROUND

The Great Lakes region has, in the past 10 years, or so, drawn the interest of the United Kingdom authorities, and to present they are on the phase of exploring a region that had long been the exclusive zone of France and Belgium international foreign policies.

Nonetheless, the United Kingdom has become the most powerful and influential international actor in the region, which deserves it credit for making a remarkable presence in its quest to contribute to the lasting peace and stability process in one of the volatile and unpredictable parts of the world.

From the massacre of Leopold II in Congo, the Rwandan genocide through to the recent regional war in Congo, there are trends of failure in the options adopted by all the stakeholders to address the ongoing crisis in a region with excessive opportunities for the countries involved and for the world at large.

Naturally when faced with such challenges, the common answer has always been to mobilize aid for development even though the definition of its destination has always been decided largely from the view points of the donors. Is this to conclude that donors' reading of the region situation is biased or subjective?

After years of foreign aid to the region, different views stem out in assessing its impact on the region. Broadly speaking, there is an overwhelming argument in favour of the progress made in Rwanda in the aftermath of genocide (http://eeas.europa.eu/rwanda/index_en.htm).

On the contrary, there is also an overwhelming consensus that in the Democratic Republic of Congo and in Burundi, the pace of change has been insignificant, and the call for a different approach is resoundingly pressing.

1. The key development priorities for dfid and other government departments

Throughout this paper, the focus will be on the Democratic Republic of Congo, but basic parallelism will be drawn with other countries involved. One may argue that a comprehensive approach should be taken to address the crisis in the region, our organisation takes the view there are fundamental differences of the crisis in each country though the lack of democratic institutions is likely to feature as the intersection overall.

In Rwanda, for instance, 19 years after the genocide and after two rounds of elections, the emerging crisis is emanating from the dissidents to the current administration although it is also true that Hutu militia continues to pose a considerable security risk to the country.

Comparing the development aid granted to the region, there are serious disparities, which makes it flawed to undertake a comparative study on the yields expected from each aid receiving country. The available data from the European Union indicate that from 2008 to 2013, Rwanda aid package is estimated to 290 million Euros against 584 million Euros for the Congo, a country eighty times the size of Rwanda. The DFID estimated that Rwanda was granted £52.8 million against £109.1 million for the Congo for 2009 to 2010 financial year.

Based on the above-quoted figures, the granting of aid is, in itself, disproportionately undermines the challenges that Congo face in what all analysts agree to be a post conflict country after years of dictatorship and civil war. Nonetheless, our organisation is of the view that these financial packages could have contributed to the country recovery if they were invested in the following sectors:

- 1. Political stability:* Having failed to deliver on the devolution of power to provinces and local institutions, the current administration has, yet again, become a risk factor for lasting peace, political stability, and thus to political stability upon which is based the chances of recovery and growth of the Congo. The current administration not only worked against the letter and the spirit of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue Comprehensive agreement signed in 2002 in South Africa, but ruined the prospect of creating a business climate for national and foreign investments. The hastily change in the country constitution tailored to benefit the incumbent President has further undermined our people confidence as well as that of foreign investors. In the aftermath of the elections of 2006, the current

administration in the Congo became embroiled in the controversy of Chinese agreement, which led to the traditional partners that financially supported the elections to overlook the institutions' building capacity.

2. *Knowledge sector*: The education sector is fundamental in the process of creating a skilful work force capable of meeting the foreign investors' needs. Wherever there have been social tensions either in North Africa or in Middle East, people frustration is predominantly built upon the lack of jobs to meet living costs, and the Congo is no exception to these trends.

3. *Energy and Technology sector*: To optimize the prospect of attracting foreign investments, it is prerequisite that the Congo invests in energy and technology. Whether it is in private or government management, the energy and technology are two vital engines to drive the efficiency.

4. *Security sector*: While some analysts have been advocating for economic growth when the recovery plan has not been fully reviewed for risk assessment, this organisation has great reservations as to the advances made in the security portfolio of Congo where the East-Northern regions are still experiencing extreme lack law and order and the attacks from Lord Resistance Army as well as from government and militia forces, it is not a conducive environment for businesses by the government, its people and the foreign investors. Therefore, an investment in the security sector is key successful factor for the recovery and growth.

2. *The most effective mechanisms for delivering aid*

The view adopted by our organisation is that the development aid originates from the donors who should have a voice on how this is managed. Notwithstanding the issue of sovereignty of the State, mechanisms for delivering aid should constitute part of the aid package, and this organisation recommends that monthly political meetings to be held between the DFID, its partners and the Congolese government in the efforts to assess and review the progress made in each sector funded.

Currently most of the projects funded through development aid are managed by the DFID, a cautionary measure to avoid fund being diverted for purposes other than those intended for. This attitude of the DFID and most of its partners not only help the Congolese government to escape from the accountability, but also distorts the democratic process in the end.

Ultimately, the development aid, from this organisation stand point, should be viewed as the enabler or coaching toolkits to boost the Congolese economic, political and social independence.

May 2011

Written evidence from WaterAid

WaterAid is an international NGO working in Rwanda but not in DRC or Burundi. This response draws on WaterAid's experience of working in Rwanda as well as other fragile and post-conflict states such as Liberia and Sierra Leone.

WaterAid believes that ensuring the provision of basic services—health, education, water and sanitation—is self-evidently a public good but also underpins the legitimacy and stability of nation states.

We have focussed on our response on the first two broad questions of the enquiry rather than the last few questions on our assessment of DFID's current programmes in fragile states.

The key development priorities DFID and other Government Departments should be addressing in fragile and conflict-affected states

People in conflict affected countries are twice as likely to be undernourished or without safe access to water than those in stable countries.⁶³ Diarrhoea is now the biggest killer of children in sub-Saharan Africa. Improvements in water, sanitation and hygiene form an essential first step in human development and overcoming poverty. Access to sanitation and water cannot be separated from progress on other economic and human development issues. Without access to sanitation and water, poor health and frequent illness lead to lower productivity and lower income; sanitation and water are drivers of development as well as outcomes of it. It is women and girls that bear the greatest burden of water and sanitation poverty either through heightened vulnerability to water and sanitation-related diseases or through water fetching labour that typically can take up two hours per day.

In order to deliver results in fragile states it is crucial that the most neglected and off-track areas of development are acted upon; including sanitation, which is now the most off-track MDG in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is therefore essential that DFID focuses its investment in fragile states within the water and sanitation sector.

⁶³ World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme, report from workshop on delivering water supply and sanitation in fragile states, Nairobi, Kenya, 3–5 May 2011. And the Water and Sanitation Programmes *Country Status Overviews 2011*.

The most effective mechanisms for delivering aid, and the role of DFID's focus on results in fragile and conflict affected states

The available evidence⁶⁴ has shown that the greatest progress in improving water and sanitation access has been achieved by countries where:

- (a) the water sector has carried out sector reforms and capacity building within its sector institutions; and
- (b) aid modalities have supported the development of country-led programs in which a reformed sector has been embedded in core country systems.

For fragile and post conflict states the challenge to achieving these two steps lies in breaking a vicious circle, where government institutions are too weak to deliver leaving donors to channel funding via NGOs and humanitarian agencies, or through propped up units within ministries. Whilst these strategies help in delivering the immediate objectives these practices risk becoming entrenched continuing well into the post-reconstruction and rehabilitation period and weakening the development of country-led systems.

Four strategies have been identified⁶⁵ that are consistent with building longer term sector performance in fragile states and post-conflict:

- (a) build on the strengths of fragile states—fragile states are not necessarily fragile in all areas and that there may be significant areas of strength to build on;
- (b) provide sector leadership with examples of the transition to development—from the various trajectories through which previously fragile states have strengthened their sectors' performance;
- (c) initiate an early dialogue between the line ministries responsible for Water and Sanitation Services and those ministries managing core country systems (finance, planning and local government); and
- (d) develop and use the aid modalities that promote the linkages between the Water and Sanitation Services sector and country systems and economy-wide capacity.

The UK Government is a leading partner in the Sanitation and Water for All (SWA) initiative, that is a global partnership between developing countries, donors, multi-lateral agencies, civil society and other development partners working together to achieve universal and sustainable access to sanitation and drinking water. The initiative has an immediate focus on achieving the Millennium Development Goals in the most off-track countries, which are in many cases fragile states. In these cases the SWA will strengthen national sanitation and drinking water planning, investments and accountability frameworks, that improve targeting and the impact of resources to the sector. At a global level SWA supports effective decision making and strengthened country led systems by championing the principles of mutual accountability of governments and donors. An early SWA pilot in Liberia has embedded a Country Compact that sets out the domestic and international activities, roles and responsibilities for strengthening the sector and its "service delivery pathways". Rwanda is one of the partner countries in the SWA.

With the UK Government's commitment to Sanitation and Water for All and to increase the UK Government's ambition on sanitation and water, these sectors should be high on DFID's priorities when it comes to working in fragile states.

June 2011

Written evidence from Womankind

1. ABOUT WOMANKIND WORLDWIDE

WOMANKIND Worldwide is the UK's leading international women's human rights and international development organisation working with 38 women's organisations across 15 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. We work with women's organisations to; eliminate violence against women; increase women's civil and political participation; and to mobilise political will and resources for women's rights and development.

We pride ourselves on our strong relationships with partners who provide essential services—from safe houses to legal aid—and are strong advocates for women's rights in their own countries and internationally. WOMANKIND support and build on the learning and experiences of our partners around the world and utilise this expertise to ensure that women's rights are at the heart of UK and international policy and programming. In the UK we are a leading voice on women's rights; we co-chair the Gender and Development (GAD) network working group on violence against women and we host Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS)—an expert network focusing on women, peace and security issues.

2. ABOUT THIS SUBMISSION

This submission will address the questions outlined by the IDC but will draw on our experience from the countries we work in. Womankind Worldwide does not currently work in DRC, Rwanda and Burundi but we do have experience of working in fragile and conflict-affected states including Afghanistan, Nepal, Zimbabwe,

⁶⁴ *Country Status Overviews*.

⁶⁵ WSP Fragile States seminar—Nairobi, May 2011.

Peru and Sierra Leone. We are currently expanding out work into Liberia, Kenya and Uganda—all countries which are conflict-affected.

Below we outline our key recommendations for working effectively in FCAS. Whilst we have separated key issues for , it is important to note that these issues are interrelated.

3. KEY DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES IN FCAS

3.1 *Gender equality and women's rights are central to working in FCAS—as recognised by UNSCR 1325*

We welcome the commitment to focus on fragile and conflict-affected countries and to increase the UK's support to conflict prevention. However, Womankind know from our work across a number of contexts, including Afghanistan, Zimbabwe, Peru and Nepal, that to be effective the UK strategy must recognise the central role that women play in building sustainable peace.

Empirical evidence already exists which demonstrates a clear link between gender equality and lower levels of involvement in violent conflict—for example, research carried out by RAND in 2008 has found that gender parity plays a critical role in state stability, and that decisions and compromises that are bad for women are “bad for human security, bad for development, and detrimental to a genuine peace”.⁶⁶ Furthermore, bureaucracies and governments that exclude women show higher levels of corruption,⁶⁷ thus undermining vital state-society relations.

This has been recognised by the United Nations by the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. This groundbreaking resolution addresses the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women, recognises the under-valued and under-utilised contributions women make to conflict preventions, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and peace building and stresses the importance of women's equal and full participation as active agents in building peace and security.

The importance of addressing gender equality is also recognised in the DFID briefing paper *Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations: promoting non-discrimination*,⁶⁸ which outlines that “donors have a responsibility to address discrimination within their support to peace-building and state-building” and “gender inequality should be an early, high priority.”

The UK has a strong record on women, peace and security and was instrumental in the passage of women, peace and security resolutions including UNSCR 1325. A revised UK National Action Plan was published in November 2010 but despite these commitments, there is still much progress to be made. Despite the UK's commitment to UNSCR1325, in reality, gender equality and women's empowerment continues to be seen as secondary to stability and building peace, and something that can be addressed further down the line.

Womankind strongly argues that investment in gender equality and women's rights can play a vital role in preventing conflict and is essential to working effectively in FCAS. Indeed, gender equality and women's rights are central to stability and building a sustainable peace.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Women, peace and security should be a standing item in the agenda of the UK National Security Council.
- The UK should meet the UN target of a minimum of 15% of post-conflict spending on women's recovery needs and empowerment.
- All training of police and security forces conducted by the UK should ensure women's involvement and should focus on the importance of UNSCR1325 and subsequent resolutions.
- The UK should develop a roster of experienced women practitioners to serve as intermediaries, mentors and provide training and support.
- A member of the National Security Council should have explicit responsibility for women, peace and security to ensure gender perspectives are taken into account in all discussions.
- Clarify lines of responsibility within government departments including the appointment of senior staff to champion women's rights in each of the international departments (following the DFID model of gender champions).
- Increase the amount of staff time dedicated to the implementation of the 1325 NAP.

⁶⁶ Bernard, C (Winter, 2008) Caution Nation-Builders: Gender assumptions ahead, RAND Monograph Vol 32:1, p 27. See also Caprioli, Mary (2003) Gender Equality and Civil Wars, CPR Working Paper No. 8, World Bank: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-1111996036679/20482367/WP8trxtsep3.pdf>; See also Caprioli, M “Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal Conflict”. *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (2), p.161–178.

⁶⁷ Dollar, D and Fismond, R (1999) “Are women really the fairer Sex? Corruption and Women in Government” World Bank, Policy Research Report on Gender and Development, working Paper Series No 4.

⁶⁸ DFID practice paper (March 2005) *Working Effectively in Conflict-affected and Fragile Situations. Briefing Paper D: Promoting non-discrimination*.

- Clearly stipulate how the Cross Whitehall group coordinating the Government’s activity and progress against the NAP on 1325 could feed into the development of BSOS and be used as a mechanism to inform and monitor the integration of a gender perspective into defence, diplomatic and development activity.
- A gendered understanding of conflict which recognises the different impact of conflict on women and men should be integrated into all UK analysis of conflict-affected and potential conflict areas and the planning of interventions in conflict and fragile states.

3.2 Women’s participation

The participation of women in all decision-making and peace processes is key to building stability overseas. Yet over the past 25 years, only one in 40 peace agreement signatories have been women. If post-conflict interventions are to be successful they must be long term and inclusive of the needs, skills and experiences of the whole of society.⁶⁹

As research by the International Crisis Group in Sudan, Congo and Uganda suggests, peace-building works better when women are involved, in part because women often take a more inclusive approach to security and address important social and economic issues that otherwise might be forgotten.⁷⁰ Furthermore, research by RAND shows that early emphasis on women’s inclusion is central to building a stable state.⁷¹ This is corroborated by Womankind’s work in areas such as Afghanistan where the lack of women’s involvement has been a barrier to sustainable peace and stabilisation. As women are so frequently excluded from post-conflict peace and governance processes their experiences during conflict and their needs as survivors of violence, are not even part of the discussion—thus undermining a sustainable and inclusive path forward. A UNIFEM study recently found that between 1990 and 2010 only 12 out of 585 peace accords referred to women’s needs in rehabilitation or reconstruction.⁷²

The UK government should ensure that women’s experiences and voices are taken into account in their planning and decision-making. DFID’s current gender vision does not include a specific pillar on women’s participation. Whilst it is referenced as a key part of the “enabling environment”, we have concerns that because it is not highlighted as a key pillar it will not be seen as a priority at headquarter or country office level. Indeed, an initial look at DFID country operational plans shows few results which specifically focus on increasing women’s participation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The UK government should demand the meaningful participation of women at all levels of discussion on conflict including post-conflict planning processes. They should proactively insist on women’s involvement in donor conferences including direct consultation, participation and involvement of civil society and women’s groups.
- DFID should clearly state how they will support women’s meaningful participation in local, provincial and national politics and peace processes, and how they will work with the FCO and MOD to champion and invest in women’s leadership.
- DFID and FCO should look at how election support programming can provide governments with technical support in applying gender quotas and ensuring the safety of female candidates and voters.
- Representatives from the UK government visiting conflict affected countries should meet with women’s organisations and women’s rights activists
- UK country offices, including DFID country offices, should provide an annual day on which women can visit the UK country offices (similar to the Global Open Days held by the UN) to enable women to put forward their viewpoints and recommendations.
- DFID should build women’s capacities by providing training that is specific to women’s participation in peace and security issues such as conflict and gender analysis, scenario assessment, conflict resolution, and mediation and negotiating skills.
- The UK government should measure progress on women’s participation by using indicators including the number of women taking part in peacetalks, the gender content of peace agreements and the extent to which post-conflict reparations, economic recovery programmes and DDR processes benefit women.

⁶⁹ See for example *SCR 1325 and Women’s Participation: Operational Guidelines for Conflict Resolution and Peace Processes*, Initiative on Quiet Diplomacy, 2010; *What the Women Say: Participation and UNSCR 1325: A Case Study Assessment by the International Civil Society Action Network and the MIT Center for International Studies*, 2010.

⁷⁰ International Crisis Group, (2006) “*Beyond Victimhood: Women’s peacebuilding in Sudan, Congo and Uganda*” Africa Report No 112–128.

⁷¹ Bernard, C (Winter, 2008) *Caution Nation-Builders: Gender assumptions ahead*, RAND Monograph Vol 32:1.

⁷² UNIFEM, *Women’s participation in Peace Negotiations*, August 2010.

3.3 Violence against women as a cause and consequence of conflict

The UN has made clear links to how poverty, conflict and the absence of human rights reinforce each other⁷³ and one of the most widespread abuses of human rights is the level of violence against women—particularly in times of conflict. Whilst violence against women and girls (VAWG), particularly in conflict, has been recognised by several UN Security Council resolutions (most notably UNSCR 1325 and 1820) and is acknowledged as both a war crime and a crime against humanity, violence against women remains widespread during and after conflict.

Today, violence against women is increasingly recognised as a defining characteristic of modern warfare⁷⁴ and women are targeted as a way for male combatants to humiliate attack and undermine enemy male combatants. Women are used during conflicts to deliver messages to enemies—they are raped and deliberately impregnated or infected with HIV to destabilise and hurt communities⁷⁵. In this way, violence against women can continue and exacerbate conflict. Moreover, violence against women has explicitly been used to justify violent conflict—for example, Mullah Omah cited the lack of security for citizens—and particularly the rape, torture, and murder of women and children—as one of the main reasons the Taliban emerged in the mid 1990s.⁷⁶

The UK government is increasingly committed to addressing VAWG; it is one of DFID's four pillars in the gender vision and there is now commitment to addressing international VAWG in the government's cross-government strategy and action plan on ending VAWG. In DFID's bilateral aid review, there is increasing focus on programming to address VAWG, particularly by strengthening justice systems and other channels where women can seek redress. However, the initial headline results in the DFID country operational plans focus more on provision of basic services and less on harder to measure but vitally important interventions on VAWG such as prevention work.

Furthermore, as eliminating VAWG has not been a priority for DFID before, there is less experience and evidence of successful programming work. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some DFID country offices are choosing not to prioritise VAWG because they have concerns about likelihood of success and how to measure interventions. With the focus on impact and value for money, country offices may be discouraged from planning interventions that focus on VAWG.

Where there is great need, including in FCAS where conflict greatly exacerbates existing power inequalities and violence, DFID country offices should be supported to deliver essential VAWG programming—including header to measure indicators that are needed to address VAWG. Whilst impact and value for money are extremely important, DFID should look at how it articulates impact and value for money in relation to VAWG—for example, an economic assessment of value for money may prioritise delivery of services as opposed to longer term behaviour change.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The UK government should build on the international momentum behind UN Security Council Resolutions (ie UNSCR 1325, UNSCR 1820) by highlighting that violence against women is a security issue in its own right. This requires cross-government buy-in and action.
- DFID should engage with civil society experts in the UK and in country to develop their work on VAWG.

3.4 Security and access to justice

As DFID outlines in *Building Peaceful States and Societies: A DFID Practice Paper*,⁷⁷ strong state-society relations underpin effective states and durable, positive peace and these strong state-society relations are fostered by the development of core state function such as security, law and justice, and financial and macroeconomic management.⁷⁸

With women often constituting at least 50% of the population, it is vital that state functions such as security and justice systems take into account the specific challenges that women and girls face in terms of their security and ability to access justice in times of conflict and post-conflict. Peace-building must include tackling impunity for perpetrators of violence against women, including those who commit violence against Women Human Rights Defenders.

⁷³ UN. *In larger freedoms: towards development, security and human rights for all*. Report of the Secretary-General, UN, (21 March 2005).

⁷⁴ UN. *Women, peace and security*. Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1325 (2000).

⁷⁵ Rehn, E and Sirleaf E J (2002) *Women, war and peace: the independent experts' assessment on the impact of armed conflict on women and women's role in peace-building* Progress of the World's Women 2002, UNIFEM.

⁷⁶ USAID (2007) *Women and conflict: an introductory guide for programming* p 12.

⁷⁷ DFID (2010) *Building peaceful states and societies: A DFID practice paper* p 15.

⁷⁸ DFID (2010) *Building peaceful states and societies: A DFID practice paper* p 27.

Violence against women at all levels—within the home, the community and at more high profile levels such as at national level—destabilises communities and is a direct barrier to peace because it impedes women’s participation in the economy, education, politics and public life. Indeed, an evaluation of DFID’s development assistance to conflict and post-conflict reconstruction found that conflict resolution would be greatly improved if critical linkages were made between the macro “hard” security processes such as Security Sector Reform and the local level work of women’s peace-building networks in disarmament and community peace-building.⁷⁹

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The UK government should explicitly address the fact that women have specific needs and challenges when outlining approaches to developing core state functions such as security and access to justice.
- The UK Government’s approach to supporting security and access to justice overseas should prioritise human security for women in relation to their access to formal, participatory and representative judicial mechanisms.
- DFID should ensure that security and justice programming specifically includes long-term support for women survivors of violence and the organisations that support them, with an emphasis on access to justice.

3.5 *Effective mechanisms for delivering aid: the importance of supporting women’s organisations and UN Women*

Womankind has been partnering with women’s rights organisations for over 20 years to deliver sustainable change. We believe that women’s organisations have skills and knowledge which allow them to develop a range of practical solutions around local conditions. In order to effectively involve women in state-building processes including security, justice and economic empowerment programmes, DFID should provide long term support for women’s organisations—not only as service providers but also as organisations that are building and supporting women’s leadership at all levels. Furthermore women’s organisations can play a vital role in national governance and accountability. A number of examples exist which highlight how important women’s organisations are in FCAS—in Liberia, the Women’s mass Action for Peace Network succeeded in bringing thousands of Liberian women onto the streets of Monrovia and later Accra where peace talks were taking place. Negotiations were largely focused on the demands of warring parties whilst violence continued on the streets. A mass sit-in organised by the women which barricaded delegates in meeting rooms led to international mediators securing agreements and setting deadlines.

Despite the successes women’s organisations working in FCAS around the world have had, local women’s organisations are often fighting for financial survival, and a lack of long term and sustainable funding makes it difficult for them to strategically plan. DFID country operational plans focus more on governments and multilaterals as key partners for delivering results. Womankind believe that civil society and specifically women’s organisations should be considered key partners and that resources should be allocated to them accordingly.

Another key partner missing from DFID country operational plans is UN Women. UN Women has prioritised women, peace and security in their strategic plan and we believe that with ambitious financial support and cooperation, UN Women will be a vital partner for delivering results in FCAS.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- DFID and FCO should provide long term and sustainable funding for women’s organisations in recognition of the vital role they play in delivering results for women in FCAS. The UK government should also provide support to women’s organisations to get their voices heard with key-decision makers nationally and internationally.
- DFID country offices should ensure engagement with women’s organisations by recognising them as key partners.
- The UK Government should support UN Women by providing at least £21million in core funding, which equates to the amount previously allocated to UNICEF, an agency with ambition and a delivery model akin to UN Women.⁸⁰

3.6 *Cross-government working*

The UK National Action Plan for the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (1325 NAP) provides a framework to ensure 1325 is incorporated into the Government’s work on conflict in defence, diplomatic and development activity.

⁷⁹ Johnston, N (March 2005) *Evaluation of DFID development assistance: gender equality and women’s empowerment. Phase II thematic evaluation—conflict and post conflict reconstruction*, Working Paper 12.

⁸⁰ Gender and Development Network (2010) *UN Women: A New Opportunity to Deliver for Women*: <http://www.gadnetwork.org.uk/un-women-a-new-opportunity-to/>

The FCO, MOD and DFID have all made commitments to further the implementation of SCR 1325 in conflict policy through training, programmes and operations commitments. Country plans have also been developed initially in Afghanistan, DRC and Nepal as well as a commitment to provide political support to strengthen implementation of 1325 by multilateral and regional organisations such as the UN, EU and NATO.

There will be an internal review of the 1325 NAP in August 2011 resulting in a report to Parliament in October 2011. 1325 NAP cannot succeed if it is not integrated into core security, defence, development and foreign policy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- BSOS should explicitly acknowledge the UK's National Action Plan on Security Council Resolution 1325 and the commitments within the 1325 NAP.

4.2 *Champion on International Violence against Women*

The recently appointed Champion for International Violence against Women and Girls provides a mechanism for coordination across government on women, peace and security. However, to be effective the post must be appropriately resourced and given the authority to ensure coherence across the international departments. Given the Champion does not sit on the National Security Council, BSOS should also consider the mechanism by which discussions of the Council will be informed by women, peace and security issues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The BSOS should explicitly reference the role of the Champion for International Violence against Women and the role of this post in coordinating action across Government with appropriate resources and authority.

4.3 *Cross-Government Coordination*

The BSOS should ensure an integrated approach across FCO, DFID and MOD to strengthen the ability of the UK to reduce the impact of conflict on women and promote their inclusion in conflict resolution.

The Government has recently developed or is currently consulting on a number of strategies which should inform and be integrated with BSOS. These include: (a) The Cross-Government Violence against Women and Girls Strategy which includes an international aspect—led by the Home Office (b) The DFID Gender Strategy (c) the implementation of the 1325 NAP—led by FCO. Staff working on the development of these strategies should be sharing knowledge, best practice and considering joint mechanisms for implementation and monitoring. Policy coherence is essential in order for the BSOS to be effective.

The 1325 NAP also requires a Cross Whitehall group (comprised of FCO, DFID, MOD and Stabilisation Unit) to meet quarterly to coordinate the Government's activity and progress against the NAP. This group should be made up of senior staff, at Director level, and BSOS should consider how this group can: a) feed into the development of BSOS and b) be used as a mechanism to inform and monitor the development of the Government's work on conflict and fragile states in defence, diplomatic and development activity.

4.4 *Building an Evidence-Base*

Within the NAP on SCR 1325, the UK Government has committed to commission research on gender and conflict. Research gaps identified in the NAP include SSR, security and justice, stabilisation, impact of conflict and effective female participation in peace-building.

The findings of this research will be crucial to inform the future development of the UK's foreign, defence and development policy. A commitment to increase the UK's support to conflict prevention and poverty reduction should also include the allocation of resources to develop an evidence base, and to ensure policy is informed by lessons learnt and best practice.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- BSOS should acknowledge the commitment to further research on women and conflict made in the NAP 1325 and state that foreign, defence and development policy must continue to be informed by evidence-based research and lessons learnt on women, peace and security.
- This commitment to further research must be supported through resources and funding.

Written evidence from World Vision

World Vision is a child focused Christian relief, development and advocacy organisation dedicated to working with children, their families and communities to overcome poverty and injustice. We are the world's biggest local charity, working in 100 countries and to improve the lives of 100 million people worldwide. We have three million supporters and employ 40,000 locally based staff, 97% of whom are nationals of the country in which they work.

World Vision believes the best way to change the life of a child is to change the world in which they live. We see children and their communities as active participants in shaping a better future, empowering them to find sustainable solutions to poverty.

World Vision welcomes this opportunity to provide written evidence to the Select Committee inquiry into working effectively in fragile and conflict-affected states. World Vision works in many of the world's most difficult environments and with communities worst affected by fragility and conflict.

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Working in fragile and conflict-affected states is vital to ensuring the security and saving the lives of highly vulnerable populations. It is estimated that for every £1 spent on conflict prevention £2,000 is spent on military intervention.⁸¹ However, this financial cost does not take into account the human cost of war both directly and indirectly; the deaths due to conflict devastate both families and communities. The indirect costs of conflict are felt most acutely by children due to an increase in diseases, lack of availability to health services, disruption in schooling and increase in vulnerability to abuse and exploitation. World Vision is pleased that DFID is continuing to focus on fragile states as these states are home to some of the world's most vulnerable and poor people. We very much support the decision in the Bilateral Aid Review (BAR) to increase the proportional of UK Aid that is given to fragile states.

2. SECURITISATION, POLICY COHERENCE AND THE STRATEGIC DEFENCE AND SECURITY REVIEW

2.1 In DFID country plans, poverty reduction must remain the main goal of UK aid in fragile states. UK security and foreign policy must not deter from this and DFID should provide clarification on some of the language in the BAR. Increasing aid to Somalia which would "reduce the threat it represents to the UK" (BAR Country Summaries, p 10) and "improve[ing] investment opportunities" (p 3) in DRC are welcome by-products of development aid but should never be the driver. Aid with an agenda other than poverty reduction will fuel suspicion and result in development and humanitarian workers being targeted. Therefore, World Vision is concerned that presenting aid as beneficial to Britain's national security or as a political incentive to Governments could undermine the ability of aid agencies to operate impartially and safely, as well as harming the efficacy of UK assistance. World Vision recommends that policy coherence in conflict prevention should prioritise empowering democratic institutions, civil society and development with no other purpose than poverty reduction.

2.2 It is also important that Country Plans include the most difficult to reach communities within fragile contexts. 40% of aid for Somalia will be spent in Somaliland, and yet this is not the area of Somalia that is most in need. It is not only the most poor and vulnerable countries that DFID should work in, but also those communities most in need within these countries. These areas are often more expensive to work in which is why we welcome DFID's adoption of an appropriately flexible value for money approach. In fragile and conflict-affected states results may be less tangible and more difficult to achieve, especially in the short term. DFID needs to consciously make sustained investment into the most vulnerable and hardest to reach communities in fragile states.

2.3 The Strategic Defence and Security Review reflects the trend of most Western governments to merge their development, democratic, and diplomatic objectives under a broader national security objective. It is crucial, however, that a distinction is made for humanitarian activities, especially in fragile states, such as DRC. Whilst coordination is welcome, aid should be given on the basis of need alone and in accordance with the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles.

2.3.1 Humanitarian intervention and activities must be driven by the humanitarian imperative, and be delivered in accordance with the humanitarian principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality. Merging diverse interests into one national security objective may challenge this independence and result in humanitarian agencies having a limited impact in reducing extreme poverty which would undermine the Government's commitment to poverty reduction. In a world where very few NGOs are perceived to be neutral by the beneficiary population, the need for good policy thinking cannot be overstated. The UK Government's policy in relation to national security should support coherence for international development across Whitehall, whilst ensuring that poverty reduction continues to be the sole reference point for determining where the UK's Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) budget is spent.

⁸¹ *The EastWest Institute*, <http://www.parliamentariansforconflictprevention.net/system/files/u9/FactsandFiguresA40909FINAL.pdf>

3. UNDERSTANDING CONTEXTS

3.1 Despite commitments to long term predictable aid, donors have continued to have an ad hoc approach to aid to fragile states, often due to political or governance concerns.⁸² Therefore, development policy should mitigate against political uncertainty in fragile states, by utilising a mixture of context appropriate aid instruments and by depoliticising aid. World Vision underscores the need for context specific engagement, as stated in the OECD “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations”.⁸³ Preventative action goes beyond institutions and military security. Conflict prevention is best realised through an understanding of people’s rights. ODA should focus on securing the conditions where civil, political, social, cultural and economic rights can be protected and fulfilled for all citizens, especially children.

3.1.1 Aid must be directed appropriately, as inequitable distribution can exacerbate or create instability within a conflict setting. The causes of instability are different in each context, meaning that the response should be too. Context analysis and context-specific responses are essential to ensuring that aid does not contribute to conflict or increase marginalisation of the most vulnerable people. It must respond to individual contexts rather than a one-size fits all approach, and crucially governance needs to be focused on people and communities not just institutions. DFID should partner with humanitarian agencies and other Civil Society Organisations, that work with communities, to landscape the changing humanitarian environment and DFID’s preparedness. DFID should also develop full context analyses to enable appropriate response, and to limit the risk of intervention worsening the situation.

3.1.2 As DFID seeks budgetary savings, they must not lose the ability to analyse and respond to the context, and must ensure that this analysis is resourced appropriately. DFID should ensure that context analysis is properly supported with both staff and financial resource.

4. FUNDING AND THE TRANSITION FOR HUMANITARIAN TO RECOVERY

4.1 The importance of flexible funding that addresses both the immediate humanitarian need and recovery is essential in fragile states. DFID seems to view pooled funding mechanisms as the way to deliver both humanitarian and recovery funding. These mechanisms were intended to provide flexible, coordinated and predictable funding for humanitarian and early recovery contexts and to harmonise donor funding for humanitarian and recovery programming. However, in reality these mechanisms have been slow to distribute funding and have at times become victim of competing demands at the administrative level. A 2008 National Audit Office Report highlights many of DFID’s failures in fragile states to the administrative agents used, including UNDP and the World Bank.⁸⁴ Accountability by the donor to the administrative body is essential to the success of these pooled funding mechanisms as well as robust monitoring and evaluation methods. We welcome the analysis of the Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) that these agencies need to perform better in emergencies, and DFID can play an important role in reforming these mechanisms to meet the needs of vulnerable and poor communities in a timely manner.

4.1.1 Pooled funding mechanisms should be designed not only in line with host government priorities but also in conjunction with civil society groups. Funding mechanisms should adopt at minimum a “do no harm” approach but where appropriate a conflict sensitive approach.

4.1.2 Multi Donor Trust Funds are intended to provide collaborative multi donor aid to governments to boost capacity and tackle weak governance often in a post conflict and recovery setting. The funds are politically and financially supported by a number of donor countries and have been set up in a number of countries including DRC. This mechanism has been designed to address key recommendations for funding in fragile states including by encouraging national ownership, alignment with national priorities, harmonisation and coordination by donors, providing for effective and inclusive partnerships and achieving development results and accounting for them. However, funding is often slow to be released and DFID needs to work closely with other donor governments to remove the blockages in MDTFs, in order to ensure that these funds are transparent and represent value for money.

4.1.3 DFID has channelled a significant proportion of funding through Humanitarian Coordinators in fragile states such as DRC. It is important that responsible donors continue to fund through this system, in order to ensure coordinated activity. However, DFID should similarly continue to seek reform in the UN coordination system to ensure it is more able to respond in a timely, effective and transparent manner.

4.2 Predictable and long term funding enables NGOs to respond more effectively. DFID should do better to ensure that funding for unpredictable contexts are predictable. Currently fragile contexts are often subject to relatively short term grants limiting the efficiency and effectiveness of longer term impact as NGOs stop and start work while looking for funding.

⁸² (For example, despite long term commitments, political concerns in Pakistan have led to an increased aid fluctuation in the education sector. For more information see, *The Final Countdown*, p.20, http://www.worldvision.org.uk/upload/pdf/The_Final_Countdown_GCE_Report_FINAL.pdf).

⁸³ <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/61/45/38368714.pdf>

⁸⁴ National Audit Office, “Department for International Development: Operating in insecure environments”, http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0708/operating_in_insecure_environment.aspx 2008

5. VALUE FOR MONEY AND RESILIENCE

5.1 Achieving value for money is important and we welcome this as a DFID's priority. Fragile states are complex environments and correspondingly needs a complex and flexible understanding of value for money. Internationally agreed standards for accountability and transparency should be adhered to in all humanitarian assistance in fragile states. As they develop their value for money frameworks, DFID should adopt a robust, but flexible approach in fragile states. This should ensure that all implementers of DFID humanitarian aid comply with international humanitarian accountability standards that promote accountability to beneficiaries, in order to reduce corruption and ensure effective humanitarian response. In accordance with IATI, DFID should ensure principles of transparency which are paramount to preventing waste and corruption. Better accountability ensures more effective aid and empowers citizens to hold service deliverers to account.

5.2 Pre-disaster investment is also essential to increase the resilience of the people who are affected by large and small scale emergencies. This ensures longer lasting impact and better use of resource in the longer term. In order to assist this, DFID can ensure that a percentage of emergency funding is ring-fenced for mitigation activities and preparedness planning by individual organisations and available for high risk countries, such as DRC, prior to emergencies occurring.

5.2.1 World Vision commends the emphasis in the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR) on the need for resilience to become core to the work of DFID, and believes that this has repercussions on the conclusions of the Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Review. Greater impact for those affected by humanitarian disasters, and therefore greater value for money in DFID's response can be achieved if disaster risk reduction becomes central to all of DFID's programmatic work. We recommend that the resilience agenda is widened from disaster preparedness to include the reduction of risks and vulnerabilities in communities, in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action. As a result, the HERR has important implications on the conclusions of the BAR and the MAR. We recommend that bilateral programmes include resilience much more explicitly and that DFID revisit the analysis that saw the resilience multilateral, UNISDR, scoring lowest in terms of fit with UK development policy. We believe that the important conclusions drawn by the HERR cannot be limited to humanitarian responses, but, in line with the review's recommendations, resilience will be a cross-cutting priority for DFID's bilateral and multilateral development programmes in the future.

5.2.2 As fragility and risk-prone contexts increase around the world, greater focus is needed on increasing individual and community resilience to risk. More innovative programming to enable this must continue to be supported by DFID—cash/voucher transfers, mobile tracking services (ie protection mapping), information services designed to speed people's recovery from disasters rather than being a means-to-an-end—and DFID should remain open and flexible to exploring new challenges and opportunities. However, these should be explored between emergencies, rather than at the start of a new response.

6. PROTECTION AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY

6.1 The role of military operations alongside humanitarian organisations has given rise to the concern by NGOs that military actors are increasingly encroaching on this terrain. World Vision has researched this and the findings are published in our report, "Principled Pragmatism", which tracks the interaction in the field between World Vision staff and military actors deployed in the region.⁸⁵ The report uses evidence from over 60 interviews held in different countries with an assortment of agencies. In addition to these interviews a tool was developed and piloted through a three month period to assess the levels of engagement between NGOs and military actors in areas of operation. The UK Government should also develop robust civilian military engagement guidelines for all UK Government actors to adhere to, which should be based on humanitarian principles.

6.2 The United Nations Security Council Resolutions, providing the backbone for peacekeeping mandates, have protection of civilians and humanitarian workers as a requisite activity. However peacekeeping missions have rarely been able to protect those in conflict contexts, the United Nations Organisation Missions in Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) currently have the strongest protection mandate of any UN peacekeeping mission. This mandate however has not guaranteed the protection of the population in DRC, in fact in a survey conducted by World Vision it was found that MONUC troops were not only not protecting civilians but were themselves intimidating women in the camps they were mandated to protect.⁸⁶

6.2.1 Peacekeeping missions rarely have the resources or ability to provide protection despite the mandates given. A common perception by local populations towards peacekeeping missions is that they are more interested in protecting themselves than the populations at risk. These perceptions are not helped by the limited relationships built up the troops and locals, in discussions with NATO forces local inclusion is often desired but found to be hard to manage in line with security requirements. The United Nations Mission in Sudan as well as the United Nations African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) faced criticism by communities for not leaving the compounds due to their

⁸⁵ Dr Edwina Thompson, *Principled Pragmatism: NGO engagement with armed actors*, (World Vision International, 2008), http://www.worldvision.org.uk/upload/pdf/Principled_pragmatism.pdf

⁸⁶ Speaking the unspeakable truth, report from Anna Ridout and Carrie Vandewindt DRC 2009.

own security needs. This inability or unwillingness to engage with the local context causes distrust between troops and populations as well as disappointment towards troops who are not fulfilling their mission. The UK Government, particularly the FCO, should press for UN peace keeping mandates in fragile states to emphasise civilian protection and ensure that peacekeeping troops have sufficient training so that they are able to fulfil this mandate.

6.3 Within a conflict context the access for humanitarian operations is paramount to the delivery of basic services. This humanitarian access has guaranteed not only access to vulnerable populations but by extension provided protection from harm. Under the banner of humanitarian access safety of humanitarian workers is assumed to be guaranteed due to the general understanding of all parties for the need for safe delivery of humanitarian aid to the population. Although NGOs have not historically delivered protection activities within conflict settings their presence has been seen by the local population to provide a degree of protection to the population at risk. This protection by presence has been compromised as attacks on NGOs inside conflict contexts have increased. The increasing risk to NGOs within these contexts has required a change in security regulations and restricts ability to access freely vulnerable populations.

6.3.1 Conflicts targeting civilian populations with increased fighting being conducted in civilian areas has meant that protection has become an activity NGOs have increasingly provided. Minimum response has been to “witness” the atrocities committed and speak out about the situation on the ground however, this role undertaken within humanitarian responses extends the role of NGOs outside just the delivery of services. This response has put those NGOs at risk both from attacks and retribution by governments through expulsion.⁸⁷ DFID needs to work closely with UN and NGOs to ensure that this risk is minimised. It is important that DFID works to ensure that humanitarian workers are not endangered by implementing DFID funding.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Policy coherence in conflict prevention should prioritise empowering democratic institutions, civil society and development with no other agenda than poverty reduction.
2. DFID needs to consciously make sustained investment into the most vulnerable and hardest to reach communities in fragile states.
3. Aid should be given on the basis of need alone and in accordance with the Good Humanitarian Donorship principles.
4. DFID should partner with humanitarian agencies and other Civil Society Organisations, who work with communities, to landscape the changing humanitarian environment and DFID’s preparedness. DFID should also develop full context analyses to enable appropriate response, and to limit the risk of intervention worsening the situation.
5. DFID should ensure that context analysis is properly supported with both staff and financial resource.
6. DFID should ensure that pooled funds are in line with host government priorities but also in conjunction with civil society groups.
7. DFID needs to work closely with other donor governments to remove the blockages in MDTFs, in order to ensure that these funds are transparent and represent value for money.
8. DFID should similarly continue to seek reform in the UN coordination system to ensure it is more able to respond in a timely, effective and transparent manner.
9. DFID should adopt a robust, but flexible approach to value for money in fragile states. This should ensure that all implementers of DFID humanitarian aid comply with international humanitarian accountability standards that promote accountability to beneficiaries, in order to reduce corruption and ensure effective humanitarian response.
10. We recommend that the resilience agenda is widened from disaster preparedness to include the reduction of risks and vulnerabilities in communities, in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action.
11. We recommend that bilateral programmes include resilience much more explicitly and that DFID revisit the analysis that saw the resilience multilateral, UNISDR, scoring lowest in terms of fit with UK development policy. We believe that the important conclusions drawn by the HERR cannot be limited to humanitarian responses, but, in line with the review’s recommendations, resilience will be a cross-cutting priority for DFID’s bilateral and multilateral development programmes in the future.
12. The UK Government should develop robust civilian military engagement guidelines for all UK Government actors to adhere to, which should be based on humanitarian principles.

⁸⁷ Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, NGOs and practical protection in humanitarian crises by Susan F Martin and Elizabeth Moller. November 2002.

13. The UK Government, particularly the FCO, should press for UN peace keeping mandates in fragile states to emphasise civilian protection and ensure that peacekeeping troops have sufficient training so that they are able to fulfil this mandate.

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